On Knowing What One Knows

At-one-ment and twoness are not opposites

This paper explores how at-one-ment and twoness interact in the clinical setting. Namely, how the unconscious mode of knowing the other intuitively from the inside, by becoming at-one with them, interacts with the conscious-rational mode of knowing about the other from the outside; how experiencing the other's experience as one's own, rather than like one's own, informs (and is informed by) the common clinical stance of twoness, in which analyst and patient meet as separate persons. Through clinical illustrations, I argue that these are complementary (rather than contradictory) modes of knowing, communicating and being and that, paradoxically, twoness is essential for the emergence of at-one-ment, even though the latter is inadvertent.

Some Arguments About Free Association as a Technique

Freud, early in psychoanalytic history, modified hypnotic technique and recommended, in its stead, free association. This paper takes a close look at the theoretical foundations of that technique in light of theoretical developments over the past hundred plus years. It is argued that free association is similar to an asymptote, which is never quite reached. Moreover, it is argued that the direction to free associate is contraindicated in many, if not most, psychological disturbances. Guided association or avoidance of free association is sometimes required. For a limited group of patients, whose major ego functions (abstraction, integration, and reality testing), ego strengths (impulse control, affect tolerance, and containing primary process), object relations (capacities for empathy, trust, and closeness), and superego (shame/guilt) are intact, the direction to use the couch and attempt to free associate may still be quite useful. For most people who present for treatment, however, this approach is likely not beneficial. The complex arguments about the decision-making process regarding free association are discussed.

The problem of self-disclosure in psychoanalysis

The problem of self-disclosure is explored in relation to currently shifting paradigms of the nature of the analytic relation and analytic interaction. Relational and intersubjective perspectives emphasize the role of self-disclosure as not merely allowable, but as an essential facilitating aspect of the analytic dialogue, in keeping with the role of the analyst as a contributing partner in the process. At the opposite extreme, advocates of classical anonymity stress the importance of neutrality and abstinence. The paper seeks to chart a course between unconstrained self-disclosure and absolute anonymity, both of which foster misalliances. Self-disclosure is seen as at times contributory to the analytic process, and at times deleterious. The decision whether to self-disclose, what to disclose, and when and how, should be guided by the analyst's perspective on neutrality, conceived as a mental stance in which the analyst assesses and decides what, at any given point, seems to contribute to the analytic process and the patient's therapeutic benefit. The major risk in self-disclosure is the tendency to draw the analytic interaction into the real relation between analyst and patient, thus diminishing or distorting the therapeutic alliance, mitigating transference expression, and compromising therapeutic effectiveness.