Selective Integration during Sequential Sampling in Posterior Neural Signals

Secondary motor integration as a final arbiter in sensorimotor decision-making

Sensorimotor decision-making is believed to involve a process of accumulating sensory evidence over time. While current theories posit a single accumulation process prior to planning an overt motor response, here, we propose an active role of motor processes in decision formation via a secondary leaky motor accumulation stage. The motor leak adapts the "memory" with which this secondary accumulator reintegrates the primary accumulated sensory evidence, thus adjusting the temporal smoothing in the motor evidence and, correspondingly, the lag between the primary and motor accumulators. We compare this framework against different single accumulator variants using formal model comparison, fitting choice, and response times in a task where human observers made categorical decisions about a noisy sequence of images, under different speed-accuracy trade-off instructions. We show that, rather than boundary adjustments (controlling the amount of evidence accumulated for decision commitment), adjustment of the leak in the secondary motor accumulator provides the better description of behavior across conditions. Importantly, we derive neural correlates of these 2 integration processes from electroencephalography data recorded during the same task and show that these neural correlates adhere to the neural response profiles predicted by the model. This framework thus provides a neurobiologically plausible description of sensorimotor decision-making that captures emerging evidence of the active role of motor processes in choice behavior.

Toward an Atlas of Canonical Cognitive Mechanisms

A central goal in Cognitive Science is understanding the mechanisms that underlie cognition. Here, we contend that Cognitive Science, despite intense multidisciplinary efforts, has furnished surprisingly few mechanistic insights. We attribute this slow mechanistic progress to the fact that cognitive scientists insist on performing underdetermined exercises, deriving overparametrized mechanistic theories of complex behaviors and seeking validation of these theories to the elusive notions of optimality and biological plausibility. We propose that mechanistic progress in Cognitive Science will accelerate once cognitive scientists start focusing on simpler explananda that will enable them to chart an atlas of elementary cognitive operations. Looking forward, the next challenge for Cognitive Science will be to understand how these elementary cognitive processes are pieced together to explain complex behavior.

Evidence integration and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency

Evidence integration is a normative algorithm for choosing between alternatives with noisy evidence, which has been successful in accounting for vast amounts of behavioural and neural data. However, this mechanism has been challenged by non-integration heuristics, and tracking decision boundaries has proven elusive. Here we first show that the decision boundaries can be extracted using a model-free behavioural method termed decision classification boundary, which optimizes choice classification based on the accumulated evidence. Using this method, we provide direct support for evidence integration over non-integration heuristics, show that the decision boundaries collapse across time and identify an integration bias whereby incoming evidence is modulated based on its consistency with preceding information. This consistency bias, which is a form of pre-decision confirmation bias, was supported in four cross-domain experiments, showing that choice accuracy and decision confidence are modulated by stimulus consistency. Strikingly, despite its seeming sub-optimality, the consistency bias fosters performance by enhancing robustness to integration noise.

Asymmetric reinforcement learning facilitates human inference of transitive relations

Humans and other animals are capable of inferring never-experienced relations (for example, A > C) from other relational observations (for example, A > B and B > C). The processes behind such transitive inference are subject to intense research. Here we demonstrate a new aspect of relational learning, building on previous evidence that transitive inference can be accomplished through simple reinforcement learning mechanisms. We show in simulations that inference of novel relations benefits from an asymmetric learning policy, where observers update only their belief about the winner (or loser) in a pair. Across four experiments (n = 145), we find substantial empirical support for such asymmetries in inferential learning. The learning policy favoured by our simulations and experiments gives rise to a compression of values that is routinely observed in psychophysics and behavioural economics. In other words, a seemingly biased learning strategy that yields well-known cognitive distortions can be beneficial for transitive inferential judgements.

Ciranka, Linde-Domingo et al. show that inference of transitive orderings from pairwise relations benefits from a seemingly biased learning strategy, where observers update their belief about one of the pair members but not the other.