Pay-for-performance reduces healthcare spending and improves quality of care: Analysis of target and non-target obstetrics and gynecology surgeries

Objective

In Korea, the Value Incentive Program (VIP) was first applied to selected clinical conditions in 2007 to evaluate the performance of medical institutes. We examined whether the condition-specific performance of the VIP resulted in measurable improvement in quality of care and in reduced medical costs.

Design

Population-based retrospective observational study.

Setting

We used two data set including the results of quality assessment and hospitalization data from National Health Claim data from 2011 to 2014.

Participants

Participants who were admitted to the hospital for obstetrics and gynecology were included. A total of 535 289 hospitalizations were included in our analysis.

Methods

We used a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model to identify associations between the quality assessment and length of stay (LOS). A GEE model based on a gamma distribution was used to evaluate medical cost. The Poisson regression analysis was used to evaluate readmission.

Main Outcome Measures

The outcome variables included LOS, medical costs and readmission within 30 days.

Results

Higher condition-specific performance by VIP participants was associated with shorter LOSs, decreases in medical cost, and lower within 30-day readmission rates for target and non-target surgeries. LOS and readmission within 30 days were different by change in quality assessment at each medical institute.

Conclusions

Our findings contribute to the body of evidence used by policy-makers for expansion and development of the VIP. The study revealed the positive effects of quality assessment on quality of care. To reduce the between-institute quality gap, alternative strategies are needed for medical institutes that had low performance.

Participating physician preferences regarding a pay-for-performance incentive design: a discrete choice experiment

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P (pay-for-performance) program design.

DESIGN

We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians.

PARTICIPANTS

All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼ 60%.

RESULTS

Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude.

CONCLUSIONS

Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement.