Pay-for-performance reduces healthcare spending and improves quality of care: Analysis of target and non-target obstetrics and gynecology surgeries

Effects of the 2018 Japan Floods on long-term care insurance costs in Japan: retrospective cohort study

BACKGROUND

Climate change has increased the frequency and severity of torrential rains and floods around the world. Estimating the costs of these disasters is one of the five global research priorities identified by WHO. The 2018 Japan Floods hit western Japan causing extensive destruction and many deaths, especially among vulnerable elderly. Such affected elderly would need long-term care due to the various health problems caused by the disaster. A Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) system provides care services in Japan. The aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of the 2018 Japan Floods on LTCI costs and service utilization.

METHODS

The participants of this retrospective cohort study were all verified persons utilizing LTCI services in Hiroshima, Okayama and Ehime prefectures. The observation period was from 2 months before to 6 months after the disaster. We used Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs) to examine the association between disaster status (victims or non-victims) and the monthly total costs of LTCI service (with gamma-distribution/log-link) by residential environment (home or facility). Among home residents, we also examined each service utilization (home-based service, short-stay service and facility service), using the GEEs. After the GEEs, we estimated Average Marginal Effects (AME) over all observation periods by months as the attributable disaster effect.

RESULTS

The total number of participants was 279,578. There were 3024 flood victims. The disaster was associated with significantly higher total costs. The AME for home residents at 2 months after was $214 (Standard Error (SE): 12, p < 0.001), which was the highest through the observation period. Among facility residents, the AME immediately after the disaster increased by up to $850 (SE: 29, p < 0.001). The service utilization among home residents showed a different trend for each service. The AME of home-based services decreased by up to - 15.2% (SE:1.3, p < 0.001). The AME for short-stay service increased by up to 8.2% (SE: 0.9, p < 0.001) and the AME for facility service increased by up to 7.4% (SE: 0.7, p < 0.001), respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

The 2018 Japan Floods caused an increase in LTCI costs and the utilization of short-stay and facility services, and a decrease in utilization of home-based services.

Performance Pay in Hospitals: An Experiment on Bonus-Malus Incentives

Recent policy reforms in Germany require the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives in the inpatient care sector. We conduct a controlled online experiment with real hospital physicians from public hospitals and medical students in Germany, in which we investigate the effects of introducing a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to a simplified version of the German Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) system using a sequential design with stylized routine cases. In both parts, participants choose between the patient optimal and profit maximizing treatment option for the same eight stylized routine cases. We find that the introduction of bonus–malus incentives only statistically significantly increases hospital physicians’ proportion of patient optimal choices for cases with high monetary baseline DRG incentives to choose the profit maximizing option. Medical students behave qualitatively similar. However, they are statistically significantly less patient oriented than real hospital physicians, and statistically significantly increase their patient optimal decisions with the introduction of bonus–malus incentives in all stylized routine cases. Overall, our results indicate that whether the introduction of a performance pay component with bonus–malus incentives to the (German) DRG system has a positive effect on the quality of care or not particularly depends on the monetary incentives implemented in the DRG system as well as the type of participants and their initial level of patient orientation.

Do Financial Incentives Change Length-of-stay Performance in Emergency Departments? A Retrospective Study of the Pay-for-performance Program in Metro Vancouver

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been implemented in various forms to reduce emergency department (ED) patient length of stay (LOS). This retrospective study investigated to what extent the timing of patient disposition in Metro Vancouver EDs was influenced by a LOS-based P4P program.

METHODS

We analyzed ED visit records of four major hospitals in Metro Vancouver, Canada. For each ED, we individually tested whether LOS was distributed discontinuously at the LOS target before and after the P4P program was terminated. For the P4P effective period, we examined whether patients discharged just prior to the LOS target had a higher 7-day return-and-admission (RA) rate-the probability that a patient, after being discharged home, returned to any ED within 7 days and was admitted to an inpatient unit-than patients discharged just after the target.

RESULTS

Prior to the termination of the P4P program, in all four EDs, the LOS density of admitted patients was discontinuous and had a significant drop at the P4P 10-hours admission LOS target; a similar phenomenon was observed among discharged patients at the 4-hours discharge LOS target, but only in the two lower-volume EDs. Furthermore, in a lower-volume ED, patients who were discharged right before the 4-hours P4P LOS target had a higher 7-day RA rate than patients discharged right after the LOS target. After the termination of the discharge incentive, the discontinuity at the discharge LOS target became less evident, but patients were still more frequently admitted just before 10 hours in three of the four EDs as the local health authority continued to support the admission incentive scheme after the government terminated the P4P program.

CONCLUSIONS

The LOS-based financial incentive scheme appears to have influenced the timing of ED patient dispositions. The results suggest mixed consequences of the P4P program-it can reduce access block for admitted patients but may also lead to discharges associated with return visits and admissions.