A New Defense of Brain Death as the Death of the Human Organism

An Update on Brain Death/Death by Neurologic Criteria since the World Brain Death Project

The World Brain Death Project (WBDP) is a 2020 international consensus statement that provides historical background and recommendations on brain death/death by neurologic criteria (BD/DNC) determination. It addresses 13 topics including: (1) worldwide variance in BD/DNC, (2) the science of BD/DNC, (3) the concept of BD/DNC, (4) minimum clinical criteria for BD/DNC determination, (5) beyond minimum clinical BD/DNC determination, (6) pediatric and neonatal BD/DNC determination, (7) BD/DNC determination in patients on ECMO, (8) BD/DNC determination after treatment with targeted temperature management, (9) BD/DNC documentation, (10) qualification for and education on BD/DNC determination, (11) somatic support after BD/DNC for organ donation and other special circumstances, (12) religion and BD/DNC: managing requests to forego a BD/DNC evaluation or continue somatic support after BD/DNC, and (13) BD/DNC and the law. This review summarizes the WBDP content on each of these topics and highlights relevant work published from 2020 to 2023, including both the 192 citing publications and other publications on BD/DNC. Finally, it reviews questions for future research related to BD/DNC and emphasizes the need for national efforts to ensure the minimum standards for BD/DNC determination described in the WBDP are included in national BD/DNC guidelines and due consideration is given to the recommendations about social and legal aspects of BD/DNC determination.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.