The Altruism Requirement as Moral Fiction

It is widely agreed that living kidney donation is permitted but living kidney sales are not. Call this the Received View. One way to support the Received View is to appeal to a particular understanding of the conditions under which living kidney transplantation is permissible. It is often claimed that donors must act altruistically, without the expectation of payment and for the sake of another. Call this the Altruism Requirement. On the conventional interpretation, the Altruism Requirement is a moral fact. It states a legitimate constraint on permissible transplantation and is accepted on the basis of cogent argument. The present paper offers an alternative interpretation. I suggest the Altruism Requirement is a moral fiction-a kind of motivated falsehood. It is false that transplantation requires altruism. But the Requirement serves a purpose. Accepting it allows kidney donation but not kidney sale. It, in short, rationalizes the Received View.

The general public's attitude towards accepting payment for kidney donation

Introduction

Kidney transplantation has become the most cost-effective treatment for patients with end-stage kidney disease (ESKD) and offers them the highest quality of life. Yet, kidney donation is often inaccessible due to cultural and traditional beliefs about organ donation. The goal of our study is to assess the value of kidney donation using the Willingness to Accept (WTA) technique. We also aim to understand the factors influencing an individual's willingness to donate an organ.

Methods

A self-administered survey was completed by 985 participants from the general public. The quantitative method and survey design that were chosen used descriptive, correlational, nonparametric, and multivariate statistical tests.

Results

Most of the respondents, 895 (90.9%) are not willing to donate a kidney while alive. Four hundred and five (41.1%) of the respondents are not willing to donate a kidney after their death, while the rest are willing to donate their kidney after their death without financial compensation. The same attitude applies to the donation of a kidney from their relatives. Significant predictors from the results of the logistic regression model in predicting the lowest (minimal) amount that will encourage donation of one kidney after death were: Marital status; Nationality; Adi card holder; Knowing people who need a kidney donation; confidence in the medical staff; and consideration of the family's opinions regarding organ donation.

Discussion

Using cost benefit analysis (CBA), with the aim of evaluating the willingness of individuals to accept payment for innovative medical procedures, such as kidney donation, allows an assessment of the perceived value of the medical procedure and enables policymakers to decide whether to allocate funds or offer subsidies for kidney donation, given the limited healthcare resources available. During our research, we found that most participants did not support the commercialization of organs. Our recommendation for policymakers and health professionals is to continue providing adequate funding for kidney donations and to implement educational programs aimed at improving attitudes towards organ donation.

A fair exchange: why living kidney donors in England should be financially compensated

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one 'buyer'-in this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the 'crowding out' of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England.

The Morality of Kidney Sales: When Caring for the Seller's Dignity Has Moral Costs

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller's dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller's dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney.

If the Price is Right: The Ethics and Efficiency of Market Solutions to the Organ Shortage

Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and a market-based procurement system introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment-for-consent futures market, and the family-reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, that consent to sell organs is invalid, that sellers will be harmed, and that commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family-reward futures market fares best in this comparison but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models and the increase in available organs they can be expected to provide.

Organ Vouchers and Barter Markets: Saving Lives, Reducing Suffering, and Trading in Human Organs

The essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy explore an innovative voucher program for encouraging kidney donation. Discussions cluster around a number of central moral and political/theoretical themes: (1) What are the direct and indirect health care costs and benefits of such a voucher system in human organs? (2) Do vouchers lead to more effective and efficient organ procurement and allocation or contribute to greater inequalities and inefficiencies in the transplantation system? (3) Do vouchers contribute to the inappropriate commodification of human body parts? (4) Is there a significant moral difference between such a voucher system and a market in human organs for transplantation? This paper argues that while kidney vouchers constitute a step in the right direction, fuller utilization of market-based incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges (e.g., organ exchanges, organ chains, and organ vouchers), would save more lives and further reduce human suffering.

'Because you can't live on love': living kidney donors' perspectives on compensation and payment for organ donation

CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE

Living kidney donation accounts for approximately half of all kidney transplantation in many countries and is central to health policy focused on increasing organ supply. However, little examination of the economic consequences of living kidney donation has been undertaken from the perspective of donors themselves. This article documents living kidney donors' views regarding recompense and payment for organ donation, based on their experience.

PARTICIPANTS

Twenty-five living kidney donors from New Zealand participated in this study.

METHODS

This qualitative study, based on thematic analysis, uses semi-structured in-depth interviews to examine the experiences of living kidney donors. Themes were organized around altruism and the 'gift', perceptions of shared corporeality and identity, and donor support.

RESULTS

Most participants agreed the donation process was costly in terms of time and money. Many incurred personal costs, and some experienced financial hardship. All the participants viewed financial hardship as a barrier to organ donation and favoured recompense for direct and indirect costs. Most did not support payment for organs, and none supported commercialization.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings show that framing organ donation as a 'gift' can stymie discussion about reciprocity, remuneration and exchange, making talk about financial recompense difficult. Financial well-being, nonetheless, has implications for the ability to care for self and others post-operatively. We conclude that the economic consequences for living kidney donors in jurisdictions where recompense for direct and indirect costs is insufficient are unfair. Review of financial assistance for live organ donors is therefore recommended.

From blood donation to kidney sales: the gift relationship and transplant commercialism

In The Gift Relationship, Richard Titmuss argued that the practice of altruistic blood donation fosters social solidarity while markets in blood erode it. This paper considers the implications of this line of argument for the organ market debate. I defend Titmuss' arguments against a number of criticisms and respond to claims that Titmuss' work is not relevant to the context of live donor organ transplantation. I conclude that Titmuss' arguments are more resilient than many advocates of organ markets suggest, and more relevant to the debate than is commonly appreciated.

Bioethics of organ transplantation

As the ability to transplant organs and tissues has grown, the demand for these procedures has increased as well--to the point at which it far exceeds the available supply creating the core ethical challenge for transplantation--rationing. The gap between supply and demand, although large, is worse than it appears to be. There are two key steps to gaining access to a transplant. First, one must gain access to a transplant center. Then, those waiting need to be selected for a transplant. Many potential recipients do not get admitted to a program. They are deemed too old, not of the right nationality, not appropriate for transplant as a result of severe mental impairment, criminal history, drug abuse, or simply because they do not have access to a competent primary care physician who can refer them to a transplant program. There are also financial obstacles to access to transplant waiting lists in the United States and other nations. In many poor nations, those needing transplants simply die because there is no capacity or a very limited capacity to perform transplants. Although the demand for organs now exceeds the supply, resulting in rationing, the size of waiting lists would quickly expand were there to suddenly be an equally large expansion in the number of organs available for transplantation. Still, even with the reality of unavoidable rationing, saving more lives by increasing organ supply is a moral good. Current public policies for obtaining organs from cadavers are not adequate in that they do not produce the number of organs that public polls of persons in the United States indicate people are willing to donate.

The Iranian model of living renal transplantation

Organ shortage for transplantation remains a worldwide serious problem for kidney patients with end-stage renal failure, and several countries have tried different models to address this issue. Iran has 20 years of experience with one such model that involves the active role of the government and charity foundations. Patients with a desperate demand for a kidney have given rise to a black market of brokers and other forms of organ commercialism only accessible to those with sufficient financial resources. The current Iranian model has enabled most of the Iranian kidney transplant candidates, irrespective of socioeconomic class, to have access to kidney transplantation. The Iranian government has committed a large budget through funding hospital and staff at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education by supporting the brain death donation (BDD) program or redirecting part of the budget of living unrelated renal donation (LURD) to the BDD program. It has been shown that it did not prevent the development and progression of a BDD program. However, the LURD program is characterized by several controversial procedures (e.g., confrontation of donor and recipient at the end of the evaluation procedure along with some financial interactions) that should be ethically reviewed. Operational weaknesses such as the lack of a registration system and long-term follow-up of the donors are identified as the 'Achilles heel of the model'.

Addressing the shortage of kidneys for transplantation: purchase and allocation through chain auctions

Transplantation is generally the treatment of choice for those suffering from kidney failure. Not only does transplantation offer improved quality of life and increased longevity relative to dialysis, it also reduces end-stage renal disease program expenditures, providing savings to Medicare. Unfortunately, the waiting list for kidney transplants is long, growing, and unlikely to be substantially reduced by increases in the recovery of cadaveric kidneys. Another approach is to obtain more kidneys through payment to living "donors," or vendors. Such direct commodification, in which a price is placed on kidneys, has generally been opposed by medical ethicists. Much of the ethical debate, however, has been in terms of commodification through market exchange. Recognizing that there are different ethical concerns associated with the purchase of kidneys and their allocation, it is possible to design a variety of institutional arrangements for the commodification of kidneys that pose different sets of ethical concerns. We specify three such alternatives in detail sufficient to allow an assessment of their likely consequences and we compare these alternatives to current policy in terms of the desirable goals of promoting human dignity, equity, efficiency, and fiscal advantage. This policy analysis leads us to recommend that kidneys be purchased at administered prices by a nonprofit organization and allocated to the transplant centers that can organize the longest chains of transplants involving willing-but-incompatible donor-patient dyads.

Why should we compensate organ donors when we can continue to take organs for free? A response to some of my critics

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective-and morally justified-means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where "market-place morality" is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves.