1
|
Kleiner J. Towards a structural turn in consciousness science. Conscious Cogn 2024; 119:103653. [PMID: 38422757 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103653] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2023] [Revised: 01/22/2024] [Accepted: 01/30/2024] [Indexed: 03/02/2024]
Abstract
Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structural approaches, the viability of structure-preserving mappings, and the question of what a structure of conscious experience is in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Johannes Kleiner
- Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 München, Germany; Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Großhaderner Str. 2, 82152 Planegg-Martinsried, Germany; Institute for Psychology, University of Bamberg, Markusplatz 3, 96047 Bamberg, Germany; Association for Mathematical Consciousness Science, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 München, Germany.
| |
Collapse
|
2
|
Huang Z. Temporospatial Nestedness in Consciousness: An Updated Perspective on the Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness. ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2023; 25:1074. [PMID: 37510023 PMCID: PMC10378228 DOI: 10.3390/e25071074] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2023] [Revised: 06/20/2023] [Accepted: 06/27/2023] [Indexed: 07/30/2023]
Abstract
Time and space are fundamental elements that permeate the fabric of nature, and their significance in relation to neural activity and consciousness remains a compelling yet unexplored area of research. The Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) provides a framework that links time, space, neural activity, and consciousness, shedding light on the intricate relationships among these dimensions. In this review, I revisit the fundamental concepts and mechanisms proposed by the TTC, with a particular focus on the central concept of temporospatial nestedness. I propose an extension of temporospatial nestedness by incorporating the nested relationship between the temporal circuit and functional geometry of the brain. To further unravel the complexities of temporospatial nestedness, future research directions should emphasize the characterization of functional geometry and the temporal circuit across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Investigating the links between these scales will yield a more comprehensive understanding of how spatial organization and temporal dynamics contribute to conscious states. This integrative approach holds the potential to uncover novel insights into the neural basis of consciousness and reshape our understanding of the world-brain dynamic.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Zirui Huang
- Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA;
- Center for Consciousness Science, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Mediano PAM, Rosas FE, Bor D, Seth AK, Barrett AB. The strength of weak integrated information theory. Trends Cogn Sci 2022; 26:646-655. [PMID: 35659757 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.04.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/22/2021] [Revised: 04/21/2022] [Accepted: 04/21/2022] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Pedro A M Mediano
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK; Department of Psychology, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK.
| | - Fernando E Rosas
- Centre for Psychedelic Research, Imperial College London, London, UK; Data Science Institute, Imperial College London, London, UK; Centre for Complexity Science, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Daniel Bor
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK; Department of Psychology, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
| | - Anil K Seth
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; CIFAR Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, Toronto, Canada
| | - Adam B Barrett
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; The Data Intensive Science Centre, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
4
|
Tagliazucchi E. Language as a Window Into the Altered State of Consciousness Elicited by Psychedelic Drugs. Front Pharmacol 2022; 13:812227. [PMID: 35392561 PMCID: PMC8980225 DOI: 10.3389/fphar.2022.812227] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/09/2021] [Accepted: 03/01/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Psychedelics are drugs capable of eliciting profound alterations in the subjective experience of the users, sometimes with long-lasting consequences. Because of this, psychedelic research tends to focus on human subjects, given their capacity to construct detailed narratives about the contents of their consciousness experiences. In spite of its relevance, the interaction between serotonergic psychedelics and language production is comparatively understudied in the recent literature. This review is focused on two aspects of this interaction: how the acute effects of psychedelic drugs impact on speech organization regardless of its semantic content, and how to characterize the subjective effects of psychedelic drugs by analyzing the semantic content of written retrospective reports. We show that the computational characterization of language production is capable of partially predicting the therapeutic outcome of individual experiences, relate the effects elicited by psychedelics with those associated with other altered states of consciousness, draw comparisons between the psychedelic state and the symptomatology of certain psychiatric disorders, and investigate the neurochemical profile and mechanism of action of different psychedelic drugs. We conclude that researchers studying psychedelics can considerably expand the range of their potential scientific conclusions by analyzing brief interviews obtained before, during and after the acute effects. Finally, we list a series of questions and open problems that should be addressed to further consolidate this approach.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Enzo Tagliazucchi
- Latin American Brain Health Institute (BrainLat), Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, Santiago, Chile.,Departamento de Física, Universidad de Buenos Aires and Instituto de Física de Buenos Aires (IFIBA, CONICET), Pabellón I, Ciudad Universitaria (1428), Buenos Aires, Argentina
| |
Collapse
|
5
|
Letheby C, Mattu J. Philosophy and classic psychedelics: A review of some emerging themes. JOURNAL OF PSYCHEDELIC STUDIES 2022. [DOI: 10.1556/2054.2021.00191] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Serotonergic (or “classic”) psychedelics have struck many researchers as raising significant philosophical questions that, until recently, were largely unexplored by academic philosophers. This paper provides an overview of four emerging lines of research at the intersection of academic philosophy and psychedelic science that have gained considerable traction in the last decade: selfless consciousness, psychedelic epistemology, psychedelic ethics, and spiritual/religious naturalism. In this paper, we highlight philosophical questions concerning (i) psychedelics, self-consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness, (ii) the epistemic profile of the psychedelic experience; (iii) ethical concerns about the appropriate use of psychedelics; and (iv) whether spiritual or religious dimensions of psychedelic use are compatible with a naturalistic worldview.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Chris Letheby
- Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Hwy, Crawley WA 6009, Australia
- Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, North Terrace, Adelaide SA 5005, Australia
| | - Jaipreet Mattu
- Department of Philosophy, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, 7170 Western Interdisciplinary Research Building, 1151 Richmond St., London, Ontario, N6A 5B8, Canada
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Walter J. Consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon: implications for the assessment of disorders of consciousness. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab047. [PMID: 34992792 PMCID: PMC8716840 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab047] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/27/2021] [Revised: 10/19/2021] [Accepted: 12/10/2021] [Indexed: 01/10/2023] Open
Abstract
Disorders of consciousness (DoCs) pose a significant clinical and ethical challenge because they allow for complex forms of conscious experience in patients where intentional behaviour and communication are highly limited or non-existent. There is a pressing need for brain-based assessments that can precisely and accurately characterize the conscious state of individual DoC patients. There has been an ongoing research effort to develop neural measures of consciousness. However, these measures are challenging to validate not only due to our lack of ground truth about consciousness in many DoC patients but also because there is an open ontological question about consciousness. There is a growing, well-supported view that consciousness is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be fully described in terms of the theoretical construct of hierarchical, easily ordered conscious levels. The multidimensional view of consciousness challenges the utility of levels-based neural measures in the context of DoC assessment. To examine how these measures may map onto consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon, this article will investigate a range of studies where they have been applied in states other than DoC and where more is known about conscious experience. This comparative evidence suggests that measures of conscious level are more sensitive to some dimensions of consciousness than others and cannot be assumed to provide a straightforward hierarchical characterization of conscious states. Elevated levels of brain complexity, for example, are associated with conscious states characterized by a high degree of sensory richness and minimal attentional constraints, but are suboptimal for goal-directed behaviour and external responsiveness. Overall, this comparative analysis indicates that there are currently limitations to the use of these measures as tools to evaluate consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon and that the relationship between these neural signatures and phenomenology requires closer scrutiny.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Jasmine Walter
- Cognition and Philosophy Lab, 21 Chancellor’s Walk, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia
| |
Collapse
|