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Evers K, Farisco M, Pennartz CMA. Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses. Conscious Cogn 2024; 119:103668. [PMID: 38417198 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/24/2023] [Revised: 02/07/2024] [Accepted: 02/12/2024] [Indexed: 03/01/2024]
Abstract
How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.
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Affiliation(s)
- K Evers
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
| | - M Farisco
- Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; Bioethics Unit, Biogem, Molecular Biology and Molecular Genetics Research Institute, Ariano Irpino (AV), Italy
| | - C M A Pennartz
- Department of Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience, Swammerdam Institute for Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherland; Research Priority Area, Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
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2
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Bi Z, Li H, Tian L. Top-down generation of low-resolution representations improves visual perception and imagination. Neural Netw 2024; 171:440-456. [PMID: 38150870 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2023.12.030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/25/2023] [Revised: 11/30/2023] [Accepted: 12/18/2023] [Indexed: 12/29/2023]
Abstract
Perception or imagination requires top-down signals from high-level cortex to primary visual cortex (V1) to reconstruct or simulate the representations bottom-up stimulated by the seen images. Interestingly, top-down signals in V1 have lower spatial resolution than bottom-up representations. It is unclear why the brain uses low-resolution signals to reconstruct or simulate high-resolution representations. By modeling the top-down pathway of the visual system using the decoder of a variational auto-encoder (VAE), we reveal that low-resolution top-down signals can better reconstruct or simulate the information contained in the sparse activities of V1 simple cells, which facilitates perception and imagination. This advantage of low-resolution generation is related to facilitating high-level cortex to form geometry-respecting representations observed in experiments. Furthermore, we present two findings regarding this phenomenon in the context of AI-generated sketches, a style of drawings made of lines. First, we found that the quality of the generated sketches critically depends on the thickness of the lines in the sketches: thin-line sketches are harder to generate than thick-line sketches. Second, we propose a technique to generate high-quality thin-line sketches: instead of directly using original thin-line sketches, we use blurred sketches to train VAE or GAN (generative adversarial network), and then infer the thin-line sketches from the VAE- or GAN-generated blurred sketches. Collectively, our work suggests that low-resolution top-down generation is a strategy the brain uses to improve visual perception and imagination, which inspires new sketch-generation AI techniques.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zedong Bi
- Lingang Laboratory, Shanghai 200031, China.
| | - Haoran Li
- Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China
| | - Liang Tian
- Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China; Institute of Computational and Theoretical Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China; Institute of Systems Medicine and Health Sciences, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China; State Key Laboratory of Environmental and Biological Analysis, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China.
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3
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Onoda K, Akama H. Complex of global functional network as the core of consciousness. Neurosci Res 2023; 190:67-77. [PMID: 36535365 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2022.12.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/09/2022] [Revised: 11/20/2022] [Accepted: 12/13/2022] [Indexed: 12/23/2022]
Abstract
Finding the neural basis of consciousness is challenging, and the distribution location of the core of consciousness remains inconclusive. Integrated information theory (IIT) argues that the posterior part of the brain is the hot zone of consciousness, especially phenological consciousness. The IIT has proposed a "main complex", a set of elements determined such that the information loss in a hierarchical partition approach is the largest among those of any other supersets and subsets, as the core of consciousness in a dynamic system. This approach may be applicable not only to phenomenal but also to access-consciousness. This study estimated the main complex of brain dynamics using functional magnetic resonance imaging in Human Connectome Project (HCP) and sleep datasets. The complex analyses revealed the common networks across various tasks and rest-state in HCP, composed of executive control, salience, and dorsal/ventral attention networks. The set of networks of the main complex was maintained during sleep. However, compared with the wakefulness stage, the amount of information of these networks and the default mode network, was reduced for the hypnagogic stage. The global interconnected structure composed of major functional networks can comprise the core of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Keiichi Onoda
- Department of Psychology, Otemon Gakuin University, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-8502, Japan.
| | - Hiroyuki Akama
- Department of Life Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
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4
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Fedotov SA, Baidyuk EV. Communication as the Origin of Consciousness. Integr Psychol Behav Sci 2023; 57:20-42. [PMID: 35364805 DOI: 10.1007/s12124-022-09686-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/23/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023]
Abstract
Since the middle of the 20th century, more and more data have appeared on the limited role of consciousness in determining human behavior. In this opinion paper, we hypothesize that the basis of consciousness is precisely the communicative function, and discuss relations of consciousness to other cognitive processes such sensory detection, decision-making and emotions. Within the framework of the hypothesis, consciousness is considered as a highly specialized function of the brain, which ensures encoding of personal information as communication messages. On a subjective level, mental representation just means the state of information to be shared in a human group. Accordingly, consciousness affects only those components of human behavior that are associated with the transmission of messages. Sensory detection, decision-making, emotions and other processes are only projected into consciousness during the encoding of information of them. The communication hypothesis assumes that consciousness is an adaptation that increases the efficiency of a collective way of life, and the emergence of consciousness is inextricably linked with the development of language in human culture. In the future, our view of consciousness provides an opportunity for an objective analysis of subjective phenomena by means of a directed study of the formation of messages both at the level of brain processes and at the level of interactions between individuals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sergei A Fedotov
- Laboratory of Comparative Behavior, Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 199034, St. Petersburg, Russia.
- Laboratory of Amyloid Biology, St. Petersburg State University, 199034, St. Petersburg, Russia.
| | - Ekaterina V Baidyuk
- Laboratory of Molecular Medicine, Institute of Cytology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 194064, St. Petersburg, Russia
- Laboratory of Comparative Biochemistry of Enzymes, Sechenov Institute of Evolutionary Physiology and Biochemistry, Russian Academy of Sciences, 194223, St. Petersburg, Russia
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5
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Digital computing through randomness and order in neural networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2022; 119:e2115335119. [PMID: 35947616 PMCID: PMC9388095 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2115335119] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
We propose that coding and decoding in the brain are achieved through digital computation using three principles: relative ordinal coding of inputs, random connections between neurons, and belief voting. Due to randomization and despite the coarseness of the relative codes, we show that these principles are sufficient for coding and decoding sequences with error-free reconstruction. In particular, the number of neurons needed grows linearly with the size of the input repertoire growing exponentially. We illustrate our model by reconstructing sequences with repertoires on the order of a billion items. From this, we derive the Shannon equations for the capacity limit to learn and transfer information in the neural population, which is then generalized to any type of neural network. Following the maximum entropy principle of efficient coding, we show that random connections serve to decorrelate redundant information in incoming signals, creating more compact codes for neurons and therefore, conveying a larger amount of information. Henceforth, despite the unreliability of the relative codes, few neurons become necessary to discriminate the original signal without error. Finally, we discuss the significance of this digital computation model regarding neurobiological findings in the brain and more generally with artificial intelligence algorithms, with a view toward a neural information theory and the design of digital neural networks.
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6
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Marchetti G. The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it. Front Psychol 2022; 13:913309. [PMID: 35967722 PMCID: PMC9368316 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.913309] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/05/2022] [Accepted: 07/01/2022] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.
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Lahav N, Neemeh ZA. A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness. Front Psychol 2022; 12:704270. [PMID: 35801192 PMCID: PMC9255957 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.704270] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2021] [Accepted: 12/01/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon. Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect. There is an “explanatory gap” between our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects, referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation. Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness. Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties. We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer. We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer. Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic. In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective). These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct, just as in the case of an observer that claims to be at rest while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity. Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged, as they both describe the same underlying reality. Based on relativistic phenomena in physics we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem. Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness, we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nir Lahav
- Department of Physics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
- *Correspondence: Nir Lahav,
| | - Zachariah A. Neemeh
- Department of Philosophy, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United States
- Institute for Intelligent Systems, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, United States
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Niikawa T, Miyahara K, Hamada HT, Nishida S. Functions of consciousness: conceptual clarification. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac006. [PMID: 35356269 PMCID: PMC8963277 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2021] [Revised: 02/07/2022] [Accepted: 02/25/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
There are many theories of the functions of consciousness. How these theories relate to each other, how we should assess them, and whether any integration of them is possible are all issues that remain unclear. To contribute to a solution, this paper offers a conceptual framework to clarify the theories of the functions of consciousness. This framework consists of three dimensions: (i) target, (ii) explanatory order, and (iii) necessity/sufficiency. The first dimension, target, clarifies each theory in terms of the kind of consciousness it targets. The second dimension, explanatory order, clarifies each theory in terms of how it conceives of the explanatory relation between consciousness and function. The third dimension, necessity/sufficiency, clarifies each theory in terms of the necessity/sufficiency relation posited between consciousness and function. We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some existing scientific and philosophical theories of the functions of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Katsunori Miyahara
- Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience (CHAIN), Hokkaido University, Kita 12 Nishi 7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido, 060-0812, Japan
| | - Hiro Taiyo Hamada
- Neurotechnology R&D Unit, Araya Inc., 1-12-32 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-6024, Japan
| | - Satoshi Nishida
- Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet), Advanced ICT Research Institute, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), 1-4 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka 565-0871, Japan
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9
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Frigato G. The Neural Correlates of Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness Seem to Coincide and Would Correspond to a Memory Center, an Activation Center and Eight Parallel Convergence Centers. Front Psychol 2021; 12:749610. [PMID: 34659068 PMCID: PMC8511498 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.749610] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/29/2021] [Accepted: 09/01/2021] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
An increasing number of authors suggest that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have no selective, executive, or metacognitive function. It is believed that attention unconsciously selects the contents that will become conscious. Consciousness would have only the fundamental function of transforming the selected contents into a format easily used by high-level processors, such as working memory, language, or autobiographical memory. According to Dehaene, the neural correlates (NC) of access consciousness (AC; cognitive consciousness) constitute a widespread network in the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. While Tononi localized the correlates of phenomenal consciousness (PC; subjective consciousness) to a posterior “hot zone” in the temporo-parietal cortex. A careful examination of the works of these two groups leads to the conclusion that the correlates of access and PC coincide. The two consciousnesses are therefore two faces of the same single consciousness with both its cognitive and subjective contents. A review of the literature of the pathology called “neglect” confirms that the common correlates include 10: a memory center, an activation center, and eight parallel centers. From study of the “imagery” it can be deduced that these eight parallel centers would operate as points of convergence in the third person linking the respective eight sensory-motor-emotional areas activated by external perceptions and the corresponding memories of these perceptions deposited in the memory center. The first four centers of convergence appear in the most evolved fish and gradually reach eight in humans.
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10
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Langdon A, Botvinick M, Nakahara H, Tanaka K, Matsumoto M, Kanai R. Meta-learning, social cognition and consciousness in brains and machines. Neural Netw 2021; 145:80-89. [PMID: 34735893 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.10.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2021] [Revised: 09/20/2021] [Accepted: 10/01/2021] [Indexed: 12/11/2022]
Abstract
The intersection between neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) research has created synergistic effects in both fields. While neuroscientific discoveries have inspired the development of AI architectures, new ideas and algorithms from AI research have produced new ways to study brain mechanisms. A well-known example is the case of reinforcement learning (RL), which has stimulated neuroscience research on how animals learn to adjust their behavior to maximize reward. In this review article, we cover recent collaborative work between the two fields in the context of meta-learning and its extension to social cognition and consciousness. Meta-learning refers to the ability to learn how to learn, such as learning to adjust hyperparameters of existing learning algorithms and how to use existing models and knowledge to efficiently solve new tasks. This meta-learning capability is important for making existing AI systems more adaptive and flexible to efficiently solve new tasks. Since this is one of the areas where there is a gap between human performance and current AI systems, successful collaboration should produce new ideas and progress. Starting from the role of RL algorithms in driving neuroscience, we discuss recent developments in deep RL applied to modeling prefrontal cortex functions. Even from a broader perspective, we discuss the similarities and differences between social cognition and meta-learning, and finally conclude with speculations on the potential links between intelligence as endowed by model-based RL and consciousness. For future work we highlight data efficiency, autonomy and intrinsic motivation as key research areas for advancing both fields.
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Affiliation(s)
- Angela Langdon
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, USA
| | - Matthew Botvinick
- DeepMind, London, UK; Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London, UK
| | | | - Keiji Tanaka
- RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Wako, Saitama, Japan
| | - Masayuki Matsumoto
- Division of Biomedical Science, Faculty of Medicine, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan; Graduate School of Comprehensive Human Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan; Transborder Medical Research Center, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan
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11
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Rorot W. Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab038. [PMID: 34650816 PMCID: PMC8512254 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/08/2021] [Revised: 09/10/2021] [Accepted: 09/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to review existing work on consciousness within the frameworks of Predictive Processing, Active Inference, and Free Energy Principle. The emphasis is put on the role played by the precision and complexity of the internal generative model. In the light of those proposals, these two properties appear to be the minimal necessary components for the emergence of conscious experience-a Minimal Unifying Model of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wiktor Rorot
- Faculty of Philosophy and Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927, Stawki 5/7, Warsaw 00-183, Poland
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12
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Tivadar RI, Knight RT, Tzovara A. Automatic Sensory Predictions: A Review of Predictive Mechanisms in the Brain and Their Link to Conscious Processing. Front Hum Neurosci 2021; 15:702520. [PMID: 34489663 PMCID: PMC8416526 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2021.702520] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2021] [Accepted: 07/12/2021] [Indexed: 01/22/2023] Open
Abstract
The human brain has the astonishing capacity of integrating streams of sensory information from the environment and forming predictions about future events in an automatic way. Despite being initially developed for visual processing, the bulk of predictive coding research has subsequently focused on auditory processing, with the famous mismatch negativity signal as possibly the most studied signature of a surprise or prediction error (PE) signal. Auditory PEs are present during various consciousness states. Intriguingly, their presence and characteristics have been linked with residual levels of consciousness and return of awareness. In this review we first give an overview of the neural substrates of predictive processes in the auditory modality and their relation to consciousness. Then, we focus on different states of consciousness - wakefulness, sleep, anesthesia, coma, meditation, and hypnosis - and on what mysteries predictive processing has been able to disclose about brain functioning in such states. We review studies investigating how the neural signatures of auditory predictions are modulated by states of reduced or lacking consciousness. As a future outlook, we propose the combination of electrophysiological and computational techniques that will allow investigation of which facets of sensory predictive processes are maintained when consciousness fades away.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Robert T. Knight
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
| | - Athina Tzovara
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
- Sleep-Wake Epilepsy Center | NeuroTec, Department of Neurology, Inselspital, Bern University Hospital, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
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13
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VanRullen R, Kanai R. Deep learning and the Global Workspace Theory. Trends Neurosci 2021; 44:692-704. [PMID: 34001376 DOI: 10.1016/j.tins.2021.04.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2020] [Revised: 02/19/2021] [Accepted: 04/14/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Recent advances in deep learning have allowed artificial intelligence (AI) to reach near human-level performance in many sensory, perceptual, linguistic, and cognitive tasks. There is a growing need, however, for novel, brain-inspired cognitive architectures. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) refers to a large-scale system integrating and distributing information among networks of specialized modules to create higher-level forms of cognition and awareness. We argue that the time is ripe to consider explicit implementations of this theory using deep-learning techniques. We propose a roadmap based on unsupervised neural translation between multiple latent spaces (neural networks trained for distinct tasks, on distinct sensory inputs and/or modalities) to create a unique, amodal Global Latent Workspace (GLW). Potential functional advantages of GLW are reviewed, along with neuroscientific implications.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rufin VanRullen
- The Brain and Cognition Research Center (CerCo), CNRS UMR5549, Toulouse, France; Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute (ANITI), Université de Toulouse, France.
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14
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Stein T, Peelen MV. Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects. Nat Hum Behav 2021; 5:612-624. [PMID: 33398144 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-01004-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2020] [Accepted: 10/21/2020] [Indexed: 01/28/2023]
Abstract
The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
| | - Marius V Peelen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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15
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Isham EA. Temporal experience modifies future thoughts: Manipulation of Libet's W influences difficulty assessment during a decision-making task. PLoS One 2020; 15:e0237680. [PMID: 33232317 PMCID: PMC7685477 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0237680] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/27/2020] [Accepted: 11/10/2020] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Past studies have employed the subjective experience of decision time (Libet’s W) as an index of consciousness, marking the moment at which the agent first becomes aware of a decision. In the current study, we examined whether the temporal experience of W affects subsequent experience related to the action. Specifically, we tested whether W influenced the perception of difficulty in a decision-making task, hypothesizing that temporal awareness of W might influence the sense of difficulty. Consistent with our predictions, when W was perceived as early or late, participants subsequently rated the decision difficulty to be easy or difficult, respectively (Exp.1). Further investigation showed that perceived difficulty, however, did not influence W (Exp.2). Together, our findings suggest a unidirectional relationship such that W plays a role in the metacognition of difficulty evaluation. The results imply that subjective temporal experience of decision time modifies the consequential sense of difficulty.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eve A. Isham
- Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States of America
- Center for Mind and Brain, University of California, Davis, CA, United States of America
- * E-mail:
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16
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Niikawa T. A Map of Consciousness Studies: Questions and Approaches. Front Psychol 2020; 11:530152. [PMID: 33132949 PMCID: PMC7578362 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.530152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/28/2020] [Accepted: 09/02/2020] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
This article aims to present a map of consciousness studies, which consists of a list of fundamental questions about consciousness and existing approaches to them. The question list includes five fundamental categories: Definitional, Phenomenological, Epistemological, Ontological, and Axiological. Each fundamental category is divided into more determinate questions. Existing approaches to each question are also classified into a few groups, presenting principal researchers who take each kind of approach. In the final section, I demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed map of consciousness studies by applying it to examine the integrated information theory and the global workspace theory of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Takuya Niikawa
- Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, Paris, France.,Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
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Chang AYC, Biehl M, Yu Y, Kanai R. Information Closure Theory of Consciousness. Front Psychol 2020; 11:1504. [PMID: 32760320 PMCID: PMC7374725 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01504] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/15/2019] [Accepted: 06/05/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Information processing in neural systems can be described and analyzed at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Generally, information at lower levels is more fine-grained but can be coarse-grained at higher levels. However, only information processed at specific scales of coarse-graining appears to be available for conscious awareness. We do not have direct experience of information available at the scale of individual neurons, which is noisy and highly stochastic. Neither do we have experience of more macro-scale interactions, such as interpersonal communications. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that conscious experiences co-vary with information encoded in coarse-grained neural states such as the firing pattern of a population of neurons. In this article, we introduce a new informational theory of consciousness: Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT). We hypothesize that conscious processes are processes which form non-trivial informational closure (NTIC) with respect to the environment at certain coarse-grained scales. This hypothesis implies that conscious experience is confined due to informational closure from conscious processing to other coarse-grained scales. Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT) proposes new quantitative definitions of both conscious content and conscious level. With the parsimonious definitions and a hypothesize, ICT provides explanations and predictions of various phenomena associated with consciousness. The implications of ICT naturally reconcile issues in many existing theories of consciousness and provides explanations for many of our intuitions about consciousness. Most importantly, ICT demonstrates that information can be the common language between consciousness and physical reality.
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Wiese W. The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model. Neurosci Conscious 2020; 2020:niaa013. [PMID: 32676200 PMCID: PMC7352491 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaa013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/10/2020] [Revised: 04/24/2020] [Accepted: 04/29/2020] [Indexed: 12/15/2022] Open
Abstract
This article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wanja Wiese
- Department of Philosophy, Johannes Gutenberg University, Jakob-Welder-Weg 18, 55128 Mainz, Germany
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Safron A. An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Neuronal Workspace Theories With the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; Toward Solving the Hard Problem and Characterizing Agentic Causation. Front Artif Intell 2020; 3:30. [PMID: 33733149 PMCID: PMC7861340 DOI: 10.3389/frai.2020.00030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2019] [Accepted: 04/03/2020] [Indexed: 01/01/2023] Open
Abstract
The Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework (FEP-AI) begins with the understanding that persisting systems must regulate environmental exchanges and prevent entropic accumulation. In FEP-AI, minds and brains are predictive controllers for autonomous systems, where action-driven perception is realized as probabilistic inference. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) begins with considering the preconditions for a system to intrinsically exist, as well as axioms regarding the nature of consciousness. IIT has produced controversy because of its surprising entailments: quasi-panpsychism; subjectivity without referents or dynamics; and the possibility of fully-intelligent-yet-unconscious brain simulations. Here, I describe how these controversies might be resolved by integrating IIT with FEP-AI, where integrated information only entails consciousness for systems with perspectival reference frames capable of generating models with spatial, temporal, and causal coherence for self and world. Without that connection with external reality, systems could have arbitrarily high amounts of integrated information, but nonetheless would not entail subjective experience. I further describe how an integration of these frameworks may contribute to their evolution as unified systems theories and models of emergent causation. Then, inspired by both Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) and the Harmonic Brain Modes framework, I describe how streams of consciousness may emerge as an evolving generation of sensorimotor predictions, with the precise composition of experiences depending on the integration abilities of synchronous complexes as self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs). These integrating dynamics may be particularly likely to occur via richly connected subnetworks affording body-centric sources of phenomenal binding and executive control. Along these connectivity backbones, SOHMs are proposed to implement turbo coding via loopy message-passing over predictive (autoencoding) networks, thus generating maximum a posteriori estimates as coherent vectors governing neural evolution, with alpha frequencies generating basic awareness, and cross-frequency phase-coupling within theta frequencies for access consciousness and volitional control. These dynamic cores of integrated information also function as global workspaces, centered on posterior cortices, but capable of being entrained with frontal cortices and interoceptive hierarchies, thus affording agentic causation. Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) represents a synthetic approach to understanding minds that reveals compatibility between leading theories of consciousness, thus enabling inferential synergy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Safron
- Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, United States
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