Cross-Modality Evidence for Reduced Choice History Biases in Psychosis-Prone Individuals

Self-initiation enhances perceptual processing of auditory stimuli in an online study

Understanding how the brain incorporates sensory and motor information will enable better theory building on human perception and behavior. In this study, we aimed to estimate the influence of predictive mechanisms on the magnitude and variability of sensory attenuation in two online samples. After the presentation of a visual cue stimulus, participants (Experiment 1: N = 224, Experiment 2: N = 84) compared the loudness of two consecutive tones in a two-alternative forced-choice task. In Experiment 1, the first tone was either self-initiated or not; in Experiment 2, the second tone was either self-initiated or not (active and passive condition, respectively). We further manipulated identity prediction (i.e., the congruence of pre-learned cue-sound combinations; congruent vs. incongruent), and the duration of the onset delay (to account for effects of attentional differences between the passive and active condition, 50 ms vs. 0 ms). We critically discuss our results within the framework of both classical (i.e., motor-based forward models) and contemporary approaches (i.e., predictive processing framework). Contrary to our preregistered hypothesis, we observed enhanced perceptual processing, instead of attenuation, for self-initiated auditory sensory input. Further, our results reveal an effect of fixed sound delays on the processing of motor and non-motor-based predictive information, and may point to according shifts in attention, leading to a perceptual bias. These results might best be captured by a hybrid explanatory model, combining predictions based on self-initiated motor action with a global predictive mechanism.

Bayesian accounts of perceptual decisions in the nonclinical continuum of psychosis: Greater imprecision in both top-down and bottom-up processes

Neurocomputational accounts of psychosis propose mechanisms for how information is integrated into a predictive model of the world, in attempts to understand the occurrence of altered perceptual experiences. Conflicting Bayesian theories postulate aberrations in either top-down or bottom-up processing. The top-down theory predicts an overreliance on prior beliefs or expectations resulting in aberrant perceptual experiences, whereas the bottom-up theory predicts an overreliance on current sensory information, as aberrant salience is directed towards objectively uninformative stimuli. This study empirically adjudicates between these models. We use a perceptual decision-making task in a neurotypical population with varying degrees of psychotic-like experiences. Bayesian modelling was used to compute individuals' reliance on prior relative to sensory information. Across two datasets (discovery dataset n = 363; independent replication in validation dataset n = 782) we showed that psychotic-like experiences were associated with an overweighting of sensory information relative to prior expectations, which seem to be driven by decreased precision afforded to prior information. However, when prior information was more uncertain, participants with greater psychotic-like experiences encoded sensory information with greater noise. Greater psychotic-like experiences were associated with aberrant precision in the encoding both prior and likelihood information, which we suggest may be related to generally heightened perceptions of task instability. Our study lends empirical support to notions of both weaker bottom-up and weaker (rather than stronger) top-down perceptual processes, as well as aberrancies in belief updating that extend into the non-clinical continuum of psychosis.