A comparison of delusions and overvalued ideas

Belief Inflexibility and Cognitive Biases in Anorexia Nervosa-The Role of the Bias against Disconfirmatory Evidence and Its Clinical and Neuropsychological Correlates

The aim of this study was to explore, in a sample of patients with a diagnosis of AN, the ability to question their first impression and, in particular, the willingness to integrate their prior ideas and thoughts with additional progressive incoming information. A total of 45 healthy women and 103 patients with a diagnosis of AN, consecutively admitted to the Eating Disorder Padova Hospital-University Unit, underwent a broad clinical and neuropsychological assessment. All participants were administered the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task, which specifically investigates belief integration cognitive bias. Acute AN patients showed a significantly greater bias toward disconfirming their previous judgment, in comparison to healthy women (BADE score, respectively, 2.5 ± 2.0 vs. 3.3 ± 1.6; Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.012). A binge-eating/purging subtype of AN individuals, compared to restrictive AN patients and controls, showed greater disconfirmatory bias and also a significant propensity to uncritically accept implausible interpretations (BADE score, respectively, 1.55 ± 1.6 and 2.70 ± 1.97 vs. 3.33 ± 1.63; Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.002 and liberal acceptance score, respectively, 1.32 ± 0.93 and 0.92 ± 1.21 vs. 0.98 ± 0.75; Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.03). Abstract thinking skills and cognitive flexibility, as well as high central coherence, are neuropsychological aspects positively correlated with cognitive bias, in both patients and controls. Research into belief integration bias in AN population could enable us to shed light on hidden dimensional aspects, facilitating a better understanding of the psychopathology of a disorder that is so complex and difficult to treat.

Acting on delusion and delusional inconsequentiality: A review

OBJECTIVES

Two of Europe's most influential psychopathologists at the start of the twentieth century (Eugen Bleuler and Karl Jaspers) pointed out the fact that patients rarely act according to their delusions. This study proposes an investigation of how this issue is addressed in psychopathological literature.

METHODS

This article offers a critical review of psychopathological literature which focuses on the influence of delusional ideation on behaviour.

RESULTS

Phenomenological psychiatry has relied on the paradox pointed out by Bleuler and Jaspers to emphasize disorders of self-experience in psychosis whereas analytical philosophy of delusion has focused on the psychological status of delusion, regarded as belief, certainty, or imagination. The empirical studies conducted during the past three decades - which were devoted to acting on delusion - focused on violent and safety-seeking behaviours. These studies have shown that these behavioural disorders are motivated by an emotional outburst (anger and/or fear) rather than by delusional content.

CONCLUSION

Delusional inconsequentiality can be clarified by conceptual research in phenomenological psychiatry and analytical philosophy, even though its role in the psychopathological processes has not yet been clearly identified or conceptualised. Empirical psychopathology on acting on delusion confirms the delusional inconsequentiality, but only implicitly, by highlighting the role of affectivity (rather than beliefs) in delusional actions. Given the major implications of better understanding this phenomenon, in terms of psychopathology and clinical practices, we suggest considering delusional inconsequentiality as a promising concept which could guide further research in contemporary psychopathology.

Comorbidity between obsessive-compulsive disorder and body dysmorphic disorder: prevalence, explanatory theories, and clinical characterization

BACKGROUND

With the advent of the fifth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) has been subsumed into the obsessive-compulsive disorders and related disorders (OCDRD) category.

OBJECTIVE

We aimed to determine the empirical evidence regarding the potential relationship between BDD and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) based on the prevalence data, etiopathogenic pathways, and clinical characterization of patients with both disorders.

METHOD

A comprehensive search of databases (PubMed and PsycINFO) was performed. Published manuscripts between 1985 and May 2015 were identified. Overall, 53 studies fulfilled inclusion criteria.

RESULTS

Lifetime comorbidity rates of BDD-OCD are almost three times higher in samples with a primary diagnosis of BDD than those with primary OCD (27.5% vs 10.4%). However, other mental disorders, such as social phobia or major mood depression, are more likely among both types of psychiatric samples. Empirical evidence regarding the etiopathogenic pathways for BDD-OCD comorbidity is still inconclusive, whether concerning common shared features or one disorder as a risk factor for the other. Specifically, current findings concerning third variables show more divergences than similarities when comparing both disorders. Preliminary data on the clinical characterization of the patients with BDD and OCD indicate that the deleterious clinical impact of BDD in OCD patients is greater than vice versa.

CONCLUSION

Despite the recent inclusion of BDD within the OCDRD, data from comparative studies between BDD and OCD need further evidence for supporting this nosological approach. To better define this issue, comparative studies between BDD, OCD, and social phobia should be carried out.

The characterization of beliefs in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Beliefs are associated with most obsessions and compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The characteristics of these beliefs can vary considerably, which has led to some of them being regarded as overvalued ideas or delusions and has contributed to confusion regarding the conceptualization and classification of OCD. This article proposes that beliefs arising in the context of OCD be assessed along the following, well-defined characteristics: conviction, fixity, fluctuation, resistance (to beliefs), insight pertaining to an awareness of the inaccuracy of one's belief, and insight referring to the ability to attribute the belief to an illness. This approach to the assessment of OCD-related beliefs may allow a clearer distinction between non-delusional beliefs, overvalued ideas, and delusions. Although the characteristics of non-delusional beliefs may vary, especially on the dimension of awareness of the inaccuracy of belief, these beliefs can generally be distinguished from overvalued ideas and delusions in terms of lower levels of conviction and fixity and greater fluctuation, resistance and ability to attribute the belief to OCD. The development of an assessment tool using these well-defined characteristics will test the proposed model, which may lead to a more objective evaluation of OCD-related beliefs. This is likely to have implications for diagnostic conceptualization and subtyping of OCD.