Individual differences affect honest signalling in a songbird

The role of social costs as a mechanism enforcing the honesty of ultraviolet-reflecting signals in a lizard

According to animal signalling theory, social costs incurred by aggressive conspecifics are one mechanism maintaining signal honesty. Although our understanding of signal evolution has much improved for pigment-based colours, the mechanisms maintaining the honesty of structural colour signals, such as ultraviolet (UV), remain elusive. Here, we used the common lizard (Zootoca vivipara) to test whether the honesty of UV-reflecting signals displayed on male throats is under social control. To do so, we staged agonistic interactions between non-manipulated focal males and opponents of either larger or smaller body size. We manipulated the UV component of the male throat colour patch to create small cheaters with UV-enhanced throats, large cheaters with UV-reduced throats, and their respective controls. In support of a conventional signal hypothesis, focal males were aggressive towards large cheaters and became submissive when these large cheaters retaliated, and were less submissive against small cheaters. However, that focal males were not more aggressive towards small cheaters contradicts our initial predictions. We confirm that male UV reflectance and bite force were good predictors of contest outcomes in control conditions. Overall, we provide partial evidence suggesting that social costs enforce UV signal honesty in common lizards.

Song overlapping, noise, and territorial aggression in great tits

Communication often happens in noisy environments where interference from the ambient noise and other signalers may reduce the effectiveness of signals which may lead to more conflict between interacting individuals. Signalers may also evolve behaviors to interfere with signals of opponents, for example, by temporally overlapping them with their own, such as the song overlapping behavior that is seen in some songbirds during aggressive interactions. Song overlapping has been proposed to be a signal of aggressive intent, but few studies directly examined the association between song overlapping and aggressive behaviors of the sender. In the present paper, we examined whether song overlapping and ambient noise are associated positively with aggressive behaviors. We carried out simulated territorial intrusions in a population of great tits (Parus major) living in an urban–rural gradient to assess signaling and aggressive behaviors. Song overlapping was associated negatively with aggressive behaviors males displayed against a simulated intruder. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that song overlapping is an aggressive signal in this species. Ambient noise levels were associated positively with aggressive behaviors but did not correlate with song rate, song duration, or song overlapping. Great tits in noisy urban habitats may display higher levels of aggressive behaviors due to either interference of noise in aggressive communication or another indirect effect of noise.

Are signals of aggressive intent less honest in urban habitats?

How anthropogenic change affects animal social behavior, including communication is an important question. Urban noise often drives shifts in acoustic properties of signals but the consequences of noise for the honesty of signals—that is, how well they predict signaler behavior—is unclear. Here we examine whether honesty of aggressive signaling is compromised in male urban song sparrows (Melospiza melodia). Song sparrows have two honest close-range signals: the low amplitude soft songs (an acoustic signal) and wing waves (a visual signal), but whether the honesty of these signals is affected by urbanization has not been examined. If soft songs are less effective in urban noise, we predict that they should predict attacks less reliably in urban habitats compared to rural habitats. We confirmed earlier findings that urban birds were more aggressive than rural birds and found that acoustic noise was higher in urban habitats. Urban birds still sang more soft songs than rural birds. High rates of soft songs and low rates of loud songs predicted attacks in both habitats. Thus, while urbanization has a significant effect on aggressive behaviors, it might have a limited effect on the overall honesty of aggressive signals in song sparrows. We also found evidence for a multimodal shift: urban birds tended to give proportionally more wing waves than soft songs than rural birds, although whether that shift is due to noise-dependent plasticity is unclear. These findings encourage further experimental study of the specific variables that are responsible for behavioral change due to urbanization.

Soft song, the low amplitude songs given in close range interactions, is an honest threat signal in urban song sparrows. Given its low amplitude, soft songs may be a less effective signal in noisy urban habitats. However, we found that soft song remained an honest signal predicting attack in urban habitats. We also found that birds may use more visual signals (rapid fluttering of wings) in urban habitats to avoid masking from acoustic noise.

When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game

Background

The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and thus signals can be deceitful. Aggressive communication appears to be a prime candidate for such deceitful communication, because bluffing has been described in several species. Bluffing in these situations are supposed to be maintained by frequency dependent selection where the fitness of a given type depends on the frequencies of the other types in the population. Previous efforts to model such a scenario through individual based simulations have yielded conflicting results. Studies have either found a rich set of polymorphic strategies including the traditional cheating scenario or found none. Thus, the modelling assumptions responsible for these diverging conclusions remain unclear.

Results

In this study, I investigate the effects of four modelling assumptions: the role of an extended strategy set, the initial population composition (seeding), the differences in pay-offs and finally different parameter spaces. I investigate the effects of these factors on the evolvability of both honest and mixed cheating strategies. I show that both honest and cheating equilibria readily evolve and that the investigated parameter range and the seeding of the starting populations have the greatest influence on the outcome.

Conclusions

Both honest signalling and polymorphic cheating equilibria are more likely to evolve from a narrow strategy set than from a random mixture of strategies. A large potential strategy set is not a setback for the evolution of communication -honest or cheating- as long as the initial population is seeded with only a few strategies. In addition, different sections of the parameter space show consistently different behaviour. Thus, frequency dependent selection has the potential to explain various empirical observations that show consistent differences in aggressive behaviour.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12862-017-1112-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Social costs enforce honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation

Understanding the processes that promote signal reliability may provide important insights into the evolution of diverse signalling strategies among species. The signals that animals use to communicate must comprise mechanisms that prohibit or punish dishonesty, and social costs of dishonesty have been demonstrated for several fixed morphological signals (e.g. colour badges of birds and wasps). The costs maintaining the honesty of dynamic signals, which are more flexible and potentially cheatable, are unknown. Using an experimental manipulation of the dynamic visual signals used by male veiled chameleons (Chamaeleo calyptratus) during aggressive interactions, we tested the idea that the honesty of rapid colour change signals is maintained by social costs. Our results reveal that social costs are an important mechanism maintaining the honesty of these dynamic colour signals-'dishonest' chameleons whose experimentally manipulated coloration was incongruent with their contest behaviour received more physical aggression than 'honest' individuals. This is the first demonstration, to the best our knowledge, that the honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation-physiological colour change-can be maintained by the social costliness of dishonesty. Behavioural responses of signal receivers, irrespective of any specific detection mechanisms, therefore prevent chameleon cheaters from prospering.

The fitness consequences of honesty: Under-signalers have a survival advantage in song sparrows

How honest or reliable signaling can evolve and be maintained has been a major question in evolutionary biology. The question is especially puzzling for a particular class of signals used in aggressive interactions: threat signals. Here, we report a study on song sparrows (Melospiza melodia) in which we assayed males with playbacks on their territories to quantify their aggressiveness (flights and close proximity) and aggressive signaling levels (rates of soft song, a close-range signal reliably predicting attack) and asked whether these traits affect individuals' survival on territory. We found that the effect of aggressive signaling via soft song interacted with aggressive behaviors such that there was a negative correlational selection: among males with low aggression, those males that signaled at higher levels (over-signalers) had higher survival whereas among males with high aggression those that signaled at low levels (under-signalers) survived longer. In other words, males that deviate from reliable signaling have a survival advantage. These results, along with previous research that suggested most of the deviation from reliable signaling in this system is in the form of under-signaling (high-aggression males signaling at low levels) pose a puzzle for future research on how this reliable signaling system is maintained.