High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

The shorter a man is, the more he defends fairness: relative height disadvantage promoting third-party punishment-evidence from inter-brain synchronization

Third-party punishment occurs in interpersonal interactions to sustain social norms, and is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the interacting individuals. During social interactions, height is the striking physical appearance features first observed, height disadvantage may critically influence men's behavior and mental health. Herein, we explored the influence of height disadvantage on third-party punishment through time-frequency analysis and electroencephalography hyperscanning. Two participants were randomly designated as the recipient and third party after height comparison and instructed to complete third-party punishment task. Compared with when the third party's height is higher than the recipient's height, when the third party's height is lower, the punishment rate and transfer amount were significantly higher. Only for highly unfair offers, the theta power was significantly greater when the third party's height was lower. The inter-brain synchronization between the recipient and the third party was significantly stronger when the third party's height was lower. Compared with the fair and medium unfair offers, the inter-brain synchronization was strongest for highly unfair offers. Our findings indicate that the height disadvantage-induced anger and reputation concern promote third-party punishment and inter-brain synchronization. This study enriches research perspective and expands the application of the theory of Napoleon complex.

Norm Dynamics: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Social Norm Emergence, Persistence, and Change

Social norms are the glue that holds society together, yet our knowledge of them remains heavily intellectually siloed. This article provides an interdisciplinary review of the emerging field of norm dynamics by integrating research across the social sciences through a cultural-evolutionary lens. After reviewing key distinctions in theory and method, we discuss research on norm psychology-the neural and cognitive underpinnings of social norm learning and acquisition. We then overview how norms emerge and spread through intergenerational transmission, social networks, and group-level ecological and historical factors. Next, we discuss multilevel factors that lead norms to persist, change, or erode over time. We also consider cultural mismatches that can arise when a changing environment leads once-beneficial norms to become maladaptive. Finally, we discuss potential future research directions and the implications of norm dynamics for theory and policy.

Communicating emotions, but not expressing them privately, reduces moral punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game

The existence of moral punishment, that is, the fact that cooperative people sacrifice resources to punish defecting partners requires an explanation. Potential explanations are that people punish defecting partners to privately express or to communicate their negative emotions in response to the experienced unfairness. If so, then providing participants with alternative ways to privately express or to communicate their emotions should reduce moral punishment. In two experiments, participants interacted with cooperating and defecting partners in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. After each round, participants communicated their emotions to their partners (Experiments 1 and 2) or only expressed them privately (Experiment 2). Each trial concluded with a costly punishment option. Compared to a no-expression control group, moral punishment was reduced when emotions were communicated to the defecting partner but not when emotions were privately expressed. Moral punishment may thus serve to communicate emotions to defecting partners. However, moral punishment was only reduced but far from being eliminated, suggesting that the communication of emotions does not come close to replacing moral punishment. Furthermore, prompting participants to focus on their emotions had undesirable side-effects: Privately expressing emotions diminished cooperation, enhanced hypocritical punishment (i.e., punishment of defecting partners by defecting participants), and induced an unspecific bias to punish the partners irrespective of their actions.

Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences

Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences-including confrontation, gossip and ostracism-which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Anthropological Prosociality via Sub-Group Level Selection

A perennial challenge of evolutionary psychology is explaining prosocial traits such as a preference for fairness rather than inequality, compassion towards suffering, and an instinctive ability to coordinate within small teams. Considering recent fossil evidence and a novel logical test, we deem present explanations insufficiently explanatory of the divergence of hominins. In answering this question, we focus on the divergence of hominins from the last common ancestor (LCA) shared with Pan. We consider recent fossil discoveries that indicate the LCA was bipedal, which reduces the cogency of this explanation for hominin development. We also review evolutionary theory that claims to explain how hominins developed into modern humans, however it is found that no mechanism differentiates hominins from other primates. Either the mechanism was available to the last common ancestor (LCA) (with P. troglodytes as its proxy), or because early hominins had insufficient cognition to utilise the mechanism. A novel mechanism, sub-group level selection (sGLS) is hypothesised by triangulating two pieces of data rarely considered by evolutionary biologists. These are behavioural dimorphism of Pan (chimpanzees and bonobos) that remain identifiable in modern humans, and the social behaviour of primate troops in a savannah ecology. We then contend that sGLS supplied an exponential effect which was available to LCA who left the forest, but was not sufficiently available to any other primates. In conclusion, while only indirectly supported by various evidence, sGLS is found to be singularly and persuasively explanatory of human's unique evolutionary story.

How does the strength of ties influence relationship quality in Chinese megaprojects? The mediating role of contractual flexibility

Purpose

This study aims to explore the influence of the strength of ties (strong ties and weak ties) on contractual flexibility (term flexibility and process flexibility) and relationship quality among stakeholders in a megaproject network.

Design/methodology/approach

This study, via a questionnaire survey, collected 380 valid responses from megaproject professionals (including project managers, department managers and project engineers). The data were analyzed using least squares structural equation modeling.

Findings

The results show that both strong ties and weak ties have positive effects on relationship quality. The introduction of contractual flexibility can help improve relationship quality by combining the positive effects of the strength of ties. Interestingly, the indirect influence of strong ties on relationship quality is mainly due to term flexibility. However, the influence of process flexibility is not significant, while weak ties have an indirect influence through term flexibility and process flexibility.

Research limitations/implications

This study, while helpful to megaproject management both in theory and practice, is nevertheless subject to several limitations. First, this study only considers the impact of the strength of ties on contractual flexibility and relationship quality; other factors, such as environmental uncertainty, are not explored. Second, the sample data are limited to just a few regions of China. Future research should cover other influencing factors, in order to make the model more substantial; data should also be collected from different cultural and industrial sources, thereby extending and further verifying the results.

Originality/value

This study makes three contributions to extant megaproject literature. First, this study provides a deep and nuanced understanding of the strength of ties. With the distinction between strong ties and weak ties clearly explained, this research furnishes a subtler understanding of relationship governance than has previously been achieved. Second, by precisely identifying the mechanism of how contract flexibility improves contract control and coordination functions, this research offers a complementary view of how contractual flexibility positively contributes to cooperation and relationship quality. Third, this study identifies which dimension of the strength of ties is more influential. This brings a new explanation for the previous controversy and offers some insight into the determinants of how to improve relationship quality in Chinese megaprojects.

Punishment: one tool, many uses

Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment - paying a cost to harm others - is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.

How do socio-ecological factors shape culture? Understanding the process of micro-macro interactions

Socio-ecological environments produce certain psychological functions. that are adaptive for survival in each environment. Past evidence suggests that interdependence-related psychological features are prevalent in East Asian cultures partly due to the history of 'rice-crop farming' (versus herding) in those areas. However, it is unclear how and why certain functional behaviors required by the socio-ecological environment are sublimated to become cultural values, which are then transmitted and shared among people. In this paper, we conceptually review the works examining various macro sharing processes for cultural values, and focus on the use of multilevel analysis in elucidating the effect of both macro and individual level factors. Uchida et al.'s study (2019) suggests that collective activities at the macro level (community-level), which is required by a certain socio-ecological environment, promote interdependence not only among farmers but also non-farmers. The multilevel processes of how psychological characteristics are construed by macro factors will be discussed.

Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

Violators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.

Societal threat as a moderator of cultural group selection

As scholars have rushed to either prove or refute cultural group selection (CGS), the debate lacks sufficient consideration of CGS's potential moderators. We argue that pressures for CGS are particularly strong when groups face ecological and human-made threat. Field, experimental, computational, and genetic evidence are presented to substantiate this claim.

Evolutionary routes to stable ownership

Ownership can evolve in potentially any species. Drawing on insights from across disciplines, we distinguish between possession and ownership and present species-neutral criteria for ownership, defined as respect for possession. We use a variant of the tug-of-war evolutionary game to demonstrate how ownership can evolve in the form of a new, biologically realistic strategy, Restraint With Retaliation (RWR). In our game, resource holding potential (RHP) is assumed to be equal between interactants, and resource holding asymmetry determines whether ownership is adaptive. RWR will be evolutionarily stable when the ratio of resource holdings between interactants is relatively low, but not when this ratio is sufficiently high. We offer RWR as one evolutionary route to ownership among many, and discuss how ownership unites previously described behavioural phenomena across taxa. We propose that some but not all mechanisms of territory formation and maintenance can be considered ownership, and show that territories are not the only resources that can be owned. We argue that ownership can be a powerful cooperative solution to tragedies of the commons and problems of collective action throughout the biological world. We advance recent scholarship that has begun to investigate the biological importance of ownership, and we call for a comprehensive account of its evolutionary logic and taxonomic distribution. We propose that ownership should be considered a fundamental, unifying biological phenomenon.

Looking Under the Hood of Third-Party Punishment Reveals Design for Personal Benefit

Third-party intervention, such as when a crowd stops a mugger, is common. Yet it seems irrational because it has real costs but may provide no personal benefits. In a laboratory analogue, the third-party-punishment game, third parties (“punishers”) will often spend real money to anonymously punish bad behavior directed at other people. A common explanation is that third-party punishment exists to maintain a cooperative society. We tested a different explanation: Third-party punishment results from a deterrence psychology for defending personal interests. Because humans evolved in small-scale, face-to-face social worlds, the mind infers that mistreatment of a third party predicts later mistreatment of oneself. We showed that when punishers do not have information about how they personally will be treated, they infer that mistreatment of other people predicts mistreatment of themselves, and these inferences predict punishment. But when information about personal mistreatment is available, it drives punishment. This suggests that humans’ punitive psychology evolved to defend personal interests.

Dopamine-System Genes and Cultural Acquisition: The Norm Sensitivity Hypothesis

Previous research in cultural psychology shows that cultures vary in the social orientation of independence and interdependence. To date, however, little is known about how people may acquire such global patterns of cultural behavior or cultural norms. Nor is it clear what genetic mechanisms may underlie the acquisition of cultural norms. Here, we draw on recent evidence for certain genetic variability in the susceptibility to environmental influences and propose a norm sensitivity hypothesis, which holds that people acquire culture, and rules of cultural behaviors, through reinforcement-mediated social learning processes. One corollary of the hypothesis is that the degree of cultural acquisition should be influenced by polymorphic variants of genes involved in dopaminergic neural pathways, which have been widely implicated in reinforcement learning. We reviewed initial evidence for this prediction and discussed challenges and directions for future research.

Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so

Punishers can benefit from a tough reputation, where future partners cooperate because they fear repercussions. Alternatively, punishers might receive help from bystanders if their act is perceived as just and other-regarding. Third-party punishment of selfish individuals arguably fits these conditions, but it is not known whether third-party punishers are rewarded for their investments. Here, we show that third-party punishers are indeed rewarded by uninvolved bystanders. Third parties were presented with the outcome of a dictator game in which the dictator was either selfish or fair and were allocated to one of three treatments in which they could choose to do nothing or (1) punish the dictator, (2) help the receiver, or (3) choose between punishment and helping, respectively. A fourth player (bystander) then sees the third-party's decision and could choose to reward the third party or not. Third parties that punished selfish dictators were more likely to be rewarded by bystanders than third parties that took no action in response to a selfish dictator. However, helpful third parties were rewarded even more than third-party punishers. These results suggest that punishment could in principle evolve via indirect reciprocity, but also provide insights into why individuals typically prefer to invest in positive actions.

Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions

In many species, mutual cooperation is stabilized by forms of policing and peer punishment: if cheaters are punished, there is a strong selective pressure to cooperate. Most human societies have complemented, and sometimes even replaced, such peer punishment mechanisms with pool punishment, where punishment is outsourced to central institutions such as the police. Even before free-riding occurs, such institutions require investments, which could serve as costly signals. Here, we show with a game theoretical model that this signaling effect in turn can be crucial for the evolution of punishment institutions: In the absence of such signals, pool punishment is only stable with second-order punishment and can only evolve when individuals have the freedom not to take part in any interaction. With such signals, individuals can opportunistically adjust their behavior, which promotes the evolution of stable pool punishment even in situations where no one can stand aside. Thus, the human propensity to react opportunistically to credible punishment threats is often sufficient to establish stable punishment institutions and to maintain high levels of cooperation.