Why we need ESS signalling theory

Influence of visual background on discrimination of signal-relevant colours in zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata)

Colour signals of many animals are surrounded by a high-contrast achromatic background, but little is known about the possible function of this arrangement. For both humans and non-human animals, the background colour surrounding a colour stimulus affects the perception of that stimulus, an effect that can influence detection and discrimination of colour signals. Specifically, high colour contrast between the background and two given colour stimuli makes discrimination more difficult. However, it remains unclear how achromatic background contrast affects signal discrimination in non-human animals. Here, we test whether achromatic contrast between signal-relevant colours and an achromatic background affects the ability of zebra finches to discriminate between those colours. Using an odd-one-out paradigm and generalized linear mixed models, we found that higher achromatic contrast with the background, whether positive or negative, decreases the ability of zebra finches to discriminate between target and non-target stimuli. This effect is particularly strong when colour distances are small (less than 4 ΔS) and Michelson achromatic contrast with the background is high (greater than 0.5). We suggest that researchers should consider focal colour patches and their backgrounds as collectively comprising a signal, rather than focusing on solely the focal colour patch itself.

The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle

The most widely cited explanation for the evolution of reliable signals is Zahavi's so-called Handicap Principle, which proposes that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. Here we provide a critical review of the Handicap Principle and its theoretical development. We explain why this idea is erroneous, and how it nevertheless became widely accepted as the leading explanation for honest signalling. In 1975, Zahavi proposed that elaborate secondary sexual characters impose 'handicaps' on male survival, not due to inadvertent signalling trade-offs, but as a mechanism that functions to demonstrate males' genetic quality to potential mates. His handicap hypothesis received many criticisms, and in response, Zahavi clarified his hypothesis and explained that it assumes that signals are wasteful as well as costly, and that they evolve because wastefulness enforces honesty. He proposed that signals evolve under 'signal selection', a non-Darwinian type of selection that favours waste rather than efficiency. He maintained that the handicap hypothesis provides a general principle to explain the evolution of all types of signalling systems, i.e. the Handicap Principle. In 1977, Zahavi proposed a second hypothesis for honest signalling, which received many different labels and interpretations, although it was assumed to be another example of handicap signalling. In 1990, Grafen published models that he claimed vindicated Zahavi's Handicap Principle. His conclusions were widely accepted and the Handicap Principle subsequently became the dominant paradigm for explaining the evolution of honest signalling in the biological and social sciences. Researchers have subsequently focused on testing predications of the Handicap Principle, such as measuring the absolute costs of honest signals (and using energetic and other proximate costs as proxies for fitness), but very few have attempted to test Grafen's models. We show that Grafen's models do not support the handicap hypothesis, although they do support Zahavi's second hypothesis, which proposes that males adjust their investment into the expression of their sexual signals according to their condition and ability to bear the costs (and risks to their survival). Rather than being wasteful over-investments, honest signals evolve in this scenario because selection favours efficient and optimal investment into signal expression and minimizes signalling costs. This idea is very different from the handicap hypothesis, but it has been widely misinterpreted and equated to the Handicap Principle. Theoretical studies have since shown that signalling costs paid at the equilibrium are neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain signal honesty, and that honesty can evolve through differential benefits, as well as differential costs. There have been increasing criticisms of the Handicap Principle, but they have focused on the limitations of Grafen's model and overlooked the fact that it is not a handicap model. This model is better understood within a Darwinian framework of adaptive signalling trade-offs, without the added burden and confusing logic of the Handicap Principle. There is no theoretical or empirical support for the Handicap Principle and the time is long overdue to usher this idea into an 'honorable retirement'.

Not what it looks like: mate-searching behaviour, mate preferences and clutch production in wandering and territory-holding female fiddler crabs

Risks inherent in mate-searching have led to the assumption that females moving sequentially through populations of courting males are sexually receptive, but this may not be true. We examined two types of fiddler crab females: wanderers moving through the population of courting males and residents that were occupying and defending their own territories. Sometimes residents leave territories to look for new burrows and we simulated this by displacing wanderers and residents and observing their behaviour while wandering. We predicted that the displaced wanderers would exhibit more mate-searching behaviours than resident females. However, wandering and resident females behaved nearly identically, displaying mate-searching behaviours and demonstrating matching mate preferences. Also, males behaved the same way towards both female types and similar proportions of wanderers and residents stayed in a male's burrow to mate. But more wanderers than residents produced egg clutches when choosing a burrow containing a male, suggesting females should be categorized as receptive and non-receptive. Visiting and rejecting several males is not the defining feature of female mate choice. Moving across the mudflat by approaching and leaving a succession of burrows (mostly occupied by males) is an adaptive anti-predator behaviour that is useful in the contexts of mate-searching and territory-searching.

Cry-wolf signals emerging from coevolutionary feedbacks in a tritrophic system

For a communication system to be stable, senders should convey honest information. Providing dishonest information, however, can be advantageous to senders, which imposes a constraint on the evolution of communication systems. Beyond single populations and bitrophic systems, one may ask whether stable communication systems can evolve in multitrophic systems. Consider cross-species signalling where herbivore-induced plant volatiles (HIPVs) attract predators to reduce the damage from arthropod herbivores. Such plant signals may be honest and help predators to identify profitable prey/plant types via HIPV composition and to assess prey density via the amount of HIPVs. There could be selection for dishonest signals that attract predators for protection from possible future herbivory. Recently, we described a case in which plants release a fixed, high amount of HIPVs independent of herbivore load, adopting what we labelled a 'cry-wolf' strategy. To understand when such signals evolve, we model coevolutionary interactions between plants, herbivores and predators, and show that both 'honest' and 'cry-wolf' types can emerge, depending on the assumed plant-herbivore encounter rates and herbivore population density. It is suggested that the 'cry-wolf' strategy may have evolved to reduce the risk of heavy damage in the future. Our model suggests that eco-evolutionary feedback loops involving a third species may have important consequences for the stability of this outcome.

On the evolutionary origins of differences in sexual preferences

A novel explanation of the evolutionary process leading to the appearance of differences in sexual preferences is proposed. The explanation is fully general: it is not specific to any particular type of sexual preferences, nor to any species or population. It shows how different sexual preferences can appear in any large group-living population in which sexual selection is sufficiently strong in each sex. The main idea is that the lack of interest toward a member of the opposite sex may be interpreted as a signal of popularity, and thus of reproductive success. It is then boosted by the Fisher runaway process far beyond the point where it becomes costly, resulting in a generalized trait-lack of interest toward the opposite sex. If the interest diverts toward other targets then different sexual preferences emerge. This hypothesis is placed into the context of other works on different sexual preferences in animals; supporting evidence from the literature is reviewed and additional research needed to confirm or refute the hypothesis in any given species is outlined.

Sex typicality and attractiveness in childhood and adulthood: assessing their relationships from videos

Prior research suggests that sex typicality (especially femininity of females, but also masculinity of males) relates to perceptions of attractiveness, for both heterosexual and homosexual individuals. Using videos from childhood and adulthood, we investigated how different components of sex typicality contributed to this effect, whether the sex of the evaluator or of the target moderated the effect, and how the relationship of attractiveness with sex typicality varied across the lifespan. In Study 1, videos of 45 female and 50 male heterosexual and homosexual adult targets (ages 18-30 years) were judged by 56 female and 65 male heterosexual and homosexual raters (ages 18-30 years). Results suggested that both heterosexual men and lesbians viewed more feminine women as more attractive. Femininity of appearance was a primary contributor to this relationship. Masculinity was not related to men's attractiveness. Study 2 used similar methodology (44 male and 46 female heterosexual and homosexual targets and 22 male and 20 female heterosexual raters). Study 2 replicated results of Study 1. In addition, Study 2 included ratings of childhood videos of targets (ages 0-15). Results suggested that childhood femininity related to attractiveness of both young girls and young boys and that the relationship became stronger for girls as they got older. The impact of femininity on attractiveness may, therefore, depend on both targets' sex and their maturity.

THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS

Everywhere the issue has been examined, people make discriminations about others’ physical attractiveness. Can human standards of physical attractiveness be understood through the lens of evolutionary biology? In the past decade, this question has guided much theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, we (a) outline the basic adaptationist approach that has guided the bulk of this work, (b) describe evolutionary models of signaling that have been applied to understand human physical attractiveness, and (c) discuss and evaluate specific lines of empirical research attempting to address the selective history of human standards of physical attractiveness. We also discuss ways evolutionary scientists have attempted to understand variability in standards of attractiveness across cultures as well as the ways current literature speaks to body modification in modern Western cultures. Though much work has been done, many fundamental questions remain unanswered.

Game-theoretical approaches to studying the evolution of biochemical systems

Evolutionary optimization has been successfully used to increase our understanding of key properties of biochemical systems. Traditional optimization is, however, often insufficient for gaining deeper insights into the evolution of such systems because usually there is a mutual relationship between the properties optimized by evolution and the properties of the environment. Thus, by evolving towards optimal properties, organisms change their environment, which in turn alters the optimum. Evolutionary game theory provides an appropriate framework for analyzing evolution in such 'dynamic fitness landscapes'. We therefore argue that it is a promising approach to studying the evolution of biochemical systems. Indeed, recent studies have applied evolutionary game theory to key issues in the evolution of energy metabolism.

Error-proneness as a handicap signal

This paper describes two discrete signalling models in which the error-proneness of signals can serve as a handicap signal. In the first model, the direct handicap of sending a high-quality signal is not large enough to assure that a low-quality signaller will not send it. However, if the receiver sometimes mistakes a high-quality signal for a low-quality one, then there is an indirect handicap to sending a high-quality signal. The total handicap of sending such a signal may then still be such that a low-quality signaller would not want to send it. In the second model, there is no direct handicap of sending signals, so that nothing would seem to stop a signaller from always sending a high-quality signal. However, the receiver sometimes fails to detect signals, and this causes an indirect handicap of sending a high-quality signal that still stops the low-quality signaller of sending such a signal. The conditions for honesty are that the probability of an error of detection is higher for a high-quality than for a low-quality signal, and that the signaller who does not detect a signal adopts a response that is bad to the signaller. In both our models, we thus obtain the result that signal accuracy should not lie above a certain level in order for honest signalling to be possible. Moreover, we show that the maximal accuracy that can be achieved is higher the lower the degree of conflict between signaller and receiver. As well, we show that it is the conditions for honest signalling that may be constraining signal accuracy, rather than the signaller trying to make honest signals as effective as possible given receiver psychology, or the signaller adapting the accuracy of honest signals depending on his interests.

Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their meanings

We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.

Bower decorations attract females but provoke other male spotted bowerbirds: bower owners resolve this trade-off

Elaborate secondary sexual traits offset the costs that they impose on their bearer by facilitating reproductive benefits, through increased success in intrasexual contests or increased attractiveness to choosy mates. Some traits enhance both strategies. Conversely, I show that spotted bowerbirds Chlamydera maculata may face a trade-off. The trait that best predicts their mating success, numbers of Solanum berries exhibited on a bower, also provokes increased intrasexual aggression in the form of bower destructions by neighbouring bower owners, which reduce the quality of the male's bower. At natural berry numbers, levels of mating success in the population are skewed, but levels of destruction do not vary with berry number. When berry numbers are artificially exaggerated, increased levels of destructions occur, but mating success does not increase. When offered excess berries, either to add to the bower or artificially placed on the bower, bower owners preferred to use numbers of berries related to the number that they displayed naturally. This decision is made without direct experience of the attendant changes in destruction or mating success. This indicates that bower owners may assess their own social standing in relation to their neighbours and modulate their display accordingly.

Human facial expressions as adaptations: Evolutionary questions in facial expression research

The importance of the face in social interaction and social intelligence is widely recognized in anthropology. Yet the adaptive functions of human facial expression remain largely unknown. An evolutionary model of human facial expression as behavioral adaptation can be constructed, given the current knowledge of the phenotypic variation, ecological contexts, and fitness consequences of facial behavior. Studies of facial expression are available, but results are not typically framed in an evolutionary perspective. This review identifies the relevant physical phenomena of facial expression and integrates the study of this behavior with the anthropological study of communication and sociality in general. Anthropological issues with relevance to the evolutionary study of facial expression include: facial expressions as coordinated, stereotyped behavioral phenotypes, the unique contexts and functions of different facial expressions, the relationship of facial expression to speech, the value of facial expressions as signals, and the relationship of facial expression to social intelligence in humans and in nonhuman primates. Human smiling is used as an example of adaptation, and testable hypotheses concerning the human smile, as well as other expressions, are proposed.

Signalling among relatives. II. Beyond the tower of Babel

Models of costly signalling are commonly employed in evolutionary biology in order to explain how honest communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be stable. These models have focused primarily on a single type of honest signalling equilibrium, the separating equilibrium in which any two different signallers send distinct signals, thereby providing signal receivers with complete information. In this paper, we demonstrate that in signalling among relatives (modelled using the Sir Philip Sidney game), there is not one but a large number of possible signalling equilibria, most of which are pooling equilibria in which different types of signallers may share a common signal. We prove that in a general Sir Philip Sidney game, any partition of signallers into equi-signalling classes can have a stable signalling equilibrium if and only if it is a contiguous partition, and provide examples of such partitions. A similar (but slightly stricter) condition is shown to hold when signals are transmitted through a medium with signalling error. These results suggest a solution to a problem faced by previous signalling theory models: when we consider the separating equilibrium, signal cost is independent of the frequency of individuals sending that signal and, consequently, even very rare signaller types can drastically affect signal cost. Here, we show that by allowing these rare signallers to pool with more common signallers, signal cost can be greatly reduced.

Multiple displays in animal communication: ‘backup signals’ and ‘multiple messages’

Why are animal displays so complex? In contexts ranging from courtship and mating to parent-offspring communication to predator deterrence, biological signals often involve a number of different visual, auditory and/or olfactory components. Previous models of communication have tended to ignore this complexity, assuming that only one kind of display is available. Here, a new game-theoretical model of signalling is described, in which signallers may use more than one display to advertise their qualities. Additional displays may serve to enhance the accuracy with which receivers assess a single quality (the ‘backup signal’ hypothesis), or to provide information about different qualities (the ‘multiple message’ hypothesis). Multiple signals are shown to be stable, even when multiple receiver preferences entail significant costs, provided that signalling costs are strongly accelerating. In such cases, signallers bias their investment towards more efficient forms of signal, but not to the exclusion of other display types. When costs are not strongly accelerating, by contrast, individual signallers employ only a single display at equilibrium. If different signals provide information about different qualities, however, then the equilibrium may feature alternative signalling strategies, with signallers who excel in one quality employing one kind of display, and those who excel in another quality employing another kind.

An evolutionary perspective on signaling in behavior and immunology

Signaling and communication are important at different levels of biological organization. Signals exchanged between cells of the immune system initiate and coordinate the immune response; signals exchanged between individuals often coordinate social behavior. Behavioral ecologists interested in the evolution and functional design of signals exchanged between individuals have produced a theory of signaling and communication that stresses the importance of cooperation and conflict; if a conflict of interest between signaler and receiver is great enough, signals evolve towards greater reliability. We suggest that the application of signaling system theory to signals exchanged between cells within an individual will allow for a better understanding of immunity and intra-individual communication in general, with potential for novel approaches to the treatment of disease.

The evolution of exploitation and honesty in animal communication: a model using artificial neural networks

Conflicts of interest arise between signaller and receiver in most kinds of biological communication. Some authors have argued that this conflict is likely to give rise to deceit and exploitation, as receivers lag behind in the coevolutionary 'arms race' with signallers. Others have argued that such manipulation is likely to be short-lived and that receivers can avoid being deceived by paying attention to signals that are costly and hence 'unfakeable.' These two views have been hard to reconcile. Here, we present results from simulations of signal evolution using artificial neural networks, which demonstrate that honesty can coexist with a degree of exploitation. Signal cost ensures that receivers are able to obtain some honest information, but is unable to prevent exploitative signalling strategies from gaining short-term benefits. Although any one receiver bias that is open to exploitation will subsist for only a short period of time once signallers begin to take advantage of it, new preferences of this kind are constantly regenerated through selection and random drift. Hidden preferences and sensory exploitation are thus likely to have an enduring influence on the evolution of honest, costly signals. At the same time, honesty and cost are prerequisites for the evolution of exploitation. When signalling is cost-free, selection cannot act to maintain honesty, and receivers rapidly evolve to ignore signals. This leads to a reduction in the extent of hidden preference, and a consequent loss of potential for exploitation.