The computational stance in biology

Consciousness and its hard problems: separating the ontological from the evolutionary

Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness "machine" is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.

Protein Is an Intelligent Micelle

Interpreting biological phenomena at the molecular and cellular levels reveals the ways in which information that is specific to living organisms is processed: from the genetic record contained in a strand of DNA, to the translation process, and then to the construction of proteins that carry the flow and processing of information as well as reveal evolutionary mechanisms. The processing of a surprisingly small amount of information, i.e., in the range of 1 GB, contains the record of human DNA that is used in the construction of the highly complex system that is the human body. This shows that what is important is not the quantity of information but rather its skillful use-in other words, this facilitates proper processing. This paper describes the quantitative relations that characterize information during the successive steps of the "biological dogma", illustrating a transition from the recording of information in a DNA strand to the production of proteins exhibiting a defined specificity. It is this that is encoded in the form of information and that determines the unique activity, i.e., the measure of a protein's "intelligence". In a situation of information deficit at the transformation stage of a primary protein structure to a tertiary or quaternary structure, a particular role is served by the environment as a supplier of complementary information, thus leading to the achievement of a structure that guarantees the fulfillment of a specified function. Its quantitative evaluation is possible via using a "fuzzy oil drop" (FOD), particularly with respect to its modified version. This can be achieved when taking into account the participation of an environment other than water in the construction of a specific 3D structure (FOD-M). The next step of information processing on the higher organizational level is the construction of the proteome, where the interrelationship between different functional tasks and organism requirements can be generally characterized by homeostasis. An open system that maintains the stability of all components can be achieved exclusively in a condition of automatic control that is realized by negative feedback loops. This suggests a hypothesis of proteome construction that is based on the system of negative feedback loops. The purpose of this paper is the analysis of information flow in organisms with a particular emphasis on the role of proteins in this process. This paper also presents a model introducing the component of changed conditions and its influence on the protein folding process-since the specificity of proteins is coded in their structure.

There’s Plenty of Room Right Here: Biological Systems as Evolved, Overloaded, Multi-Scale Machines

The applicability of computational models to the biological world is an active topic of debate. We argue that a useful path forward results from abandoning hard boundaries between categories and adopting an observer-dependent, pragmatic view. Such a view dissolves the contingent dichotomies driven by human cognitive biases (e.g., a tendency to oversimplify) and prior technological limitations in favor of a more continuous view, necessitated by the study of evolution, developmental biology, and intelligent machines. Form and function are tightly entwined in nature, and in some cases, in robotics as well. Thus, efforts to re-shape living systems for biomedical or bioengineering purposes require prediction and control of their function at multiple scales. This is challenging for many reasons, one of which is that living systems perform multiple functions in the same place at the same time. We refer to this as “polycomputing”—the ability of the same substrate to simultaneously compute different things, and make those computational results available to different observers. This ability is an important way in which living things are a kind of computer, but not the familiar, linear, deterministic kind; rather, living things are computers in the broad sense of their computational materials, as reported in the rapidly growing physical computing literature. We argue that an observer-centered framework for the computations performed by evolved and designed systems will improve the understanding of mesoscale events, as it has already done at quantum and relativistic scales. To develop our understanding of how life performs polycomputing, and how it can be convinced to alter one or more of those functions, we can first create technologies that polycompute and learn how to alter their functions. Here, we review examples of biological and technological polycomputing, and develop the idea that the overloading of different functions on the same hardware is an important design principle that helps to understand and build both evolved and designed systems. Learning to hack existing polycomputing substrates, as well as to evolve and design new ones, will have massive impacts on regenerative medicine, robotics, and computer engineering.

Turing's cascade instability supports the coordination of the mind, brain, and behavior

Turing inspired a computer metaphor of the mind and brain that has been handy and has spawned decades of empirical investigation, but he did much more and offered behavioral and cognitive sciences another metaphor-that of the cascade. The time has come to confront Turing's cascading instability, which suggests a geometrical framework driven by power laws and can be studied using multifractal formalism and multiscale probability density function analysis. Here, we review a rapidly growing body of scientific investigations revealing signatures of cascade instability and their consequences for a perceiving, acting, and thinking organism. We review work related to executive functioning (planning to act), postural control (bodily poise for turning plans into action), and effortful perception (action to gather information in a single modality and action to blend multimodal information). We also review findings on neuronal avalanches in the brain, specifically about neural participation in body-wide cascades. Turing's cascade instability blends the mind, brain, and behavior across space and time scales and provides an alternative to the dominant computer metaphor.

Consciousness as a Product of Evolution: Contents, Selector Circuits, and Trajectories in Experience Space

Conscious experience can be treated as a complex unified whole, but to do so is problematic from an evolutionary perspective if, like other products of evolution, consciousness had simple beginnings, and achieved complexity only secondarily over an extended period of time as new categories of subjective experience were added and refined. The premise here is twofold, first that these simple beginnings can be investigated regardless of whether the ultimate source of subjective experience is known or understood, and second, that of the contents known to us, the most accessible for investigation will be those that are, or appear, most fundamental, in the sense that they resist further deconstruction or analysis. This would include qualia as they are usually defined, but excludes more complex experiences (here, formats) that are structured, or depend on algorithmic processes and/or memory. Vision and language for example, would by this definition be formats. More formally, qualia, but not formats, can be represented as points, lines, or curves on a topological experience space, and as domains in a configuration space representing a subset of neural correlates of consciousness, the selector circuits (SCs), responsible for ensuring that a particular experience is evoked rather than some other. It is a matter of conjecture how points in SC-space map to experience space, but both will exhibit divergence, insuring that a minimal distance separates points in experience space representing different qualia and the SCs that evoke them. An analysis of how SCs evolve over time is used to highlight the importance of understanding patterns of descent among putative qualia, i.e., their homology across species, and whether this implies descent from an ancestral experience, or ur-quale, that combines modes of experience that later came to be experienced separately. The analysis also provides insight into the function of consciousness as viewed from an evolutionary perspective, defined here in terms of the access it allows to regions of SC-space that would otherwise be unavailable to real brains, to produce consciously controlled behaviors that could otherwise not occur.

Evolving Consciousness: Insights From Turing, and the Shaping of Experience

A number of conceptual difficulties arise when considering the evolutionary origin of consciousness from the pre-conscious condition. There are parallels here with biological pattern formation, where, according to Alan Turing’s original formulation of the problem, the statistical properties of molecular-level processes serve as a source of incipient pattern. By analogy, the evolution of consciousness can be thought of as depending in part on a competition between alternative variants in the microstructure of synaptic networks and/or the activity patterns they generate, some of which then serve as neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Assuming that NCCs perform this function only if reliably ordered in a particular and precise way, Turing’s formulation provides a useful conceptual framework for thinking about how this is achieved developmentally, and how changes in neural structure might correlate with change at the level of conscious experience. The analysis is largely silent concerning the nature and ultimate source of conscious experience, but shows that achieving sentience is sufficient to begin the process by which evolution elaborates and shapes that first experience. By implication, much of what evolved consciousness achieves in adaptive terms can in principle be investigated irrespective of whether or not the ultimate source of real-time experience is known or understood. This includes the important issue of how precisely NCCs must be structured to ensure that each evokes a particular experience as opposed to any other. Some terminological issues are clarified, including that of “noise,” which here refers to the statistical variations in neural structure that arise during development, not to sensory noise as experienced in real time.

Liquid brains, solid brains

Cognitive networks have evolved a broad range of solutions to the problem of gathering, storing and responding to information. Some of these networks are describable as static sets of neurons linked in an adaptive web of connections. These are 'solid' networks, with a well-defined and physically persistent architecture. Other systems are formed by sets of agents that exchange, store and process information but without persistent connections or move relative to each other in physical space. We refer to these networks that lack stable connections and static elements as 'liquid' brains, a category that includes ant and termite colonies, immune systems and some microbiomes and slime moulds. What are the key differences between solid and liquid brains, particularly in their cognitive potential, ability to solve particular problems and environments, and information-processing strategies? To answer this question requires a new, integrative framework. This article is part of the theme issue 'Liquid brains, solid brains: How distributed cognitive architectures process information'.

Neural coding: The bureaucratic model of the brain

The neural coding metaphor is so ubiquitous that we tend to forget its metaphorical nature. What do we mean when we assert that neurons encode and decode? What kind of causal and representational model of the brain does the metaphor entail? What lies beneath the neural coding metaphor, I argue, is a bureaucratic model of the brain.