Out of the blue: understanding abrupt and wayward transitions in thought using probability and predictive processing

Does familiarity-detection flip attention inward? The familiarity-flip-of-attention account of the primacy effect in memory for repetitions

In cognitive psychology, research on attention is shifting from focusing primarily on how people orient toward stimuli in the environment toward instead examining how people orient internally toward memory representations. With this new shift the question arises: What factors in the environment send attention inward? A recent proposal is that one factor is cue familiarity-detection (Cleary, Irving & Mills, Cognitive Science, 47, e13274, 2023). Within this theoretical framework, we reinterpret a decades-old empirical pattern-a primacy effect in memory for repetitions-in a novel way. The effect is the finding that altered repetitions of an image were remembered as re-occurrences of the first presentation despite having a changed left-right orientation; participants better retained the first orientation while incorrectly remembering changed instantiations as repetitions of the first orientation (DiGirolamo & Hintzman, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 121-124, 1997). We argue that this pattern, which has never been fully explained, is an existing empirical test of the newly proposed mechanism of cue familiarity-detection flipping attention inward toward memory. Specifically, an image's first appearance is novel so draws attention outward toward encoding the stimulus' attributes like orientation; subsequent mirror-reversed appearances are detected as familiar so flip attention inward toward memory search, which leads to 1) inattentional blindness for the changed orientation due to the familiarity-driven shift of attention inward and 2) memory retrieval of the first instance and its orientation, thereby enhancing memory for the first instance and its previously encoded attributes like orientation.

Dynamics of spontaneous thoughts: Exploration, attentional profile and the segmentation of the stream of thoughts

For a long time, clinical knowledge and first-person reports have pointed to individual differences in the dynamics of spontaneous thoughts, in particular in the extreme case of psychiatric conditions (e.g. racing thoughts in Attention Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder, ADHD; rumination in depression). We used a novel procedure to investigate this individual variability by combining verbal fluency tasks and introspective reports of thought content. Our goal was twofold. First, we tested the hypothesis that a greater segmentation of the stream of thoughts would be associated with trait inattention, in line with subjective reports of ADHD patients. Second, we tested whether the segmentation of the stream of thoughts increased with an increased tendency for exploratory behavior, following recent theoretical claims on the mechanisms underpinning the generation of spontaneous thoughts. Our results support both hypotheses, shedding light on the factors contributing to the individual variability in the dynamics of the stream of thought.

A dual process model of spontaneous conscious thought

In the present article, I review theory and evidence on the psychological mechanisms of mind wandering, paying special attention to its relation with executive control. I then suggest applying a dual-process framework (i.e., automatic vs. controlled processing) to mind wandering and goal-directed thought. I present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of the view that mind wandering is based on automatic processing, also considering its relation to the concept of working memory. After that, I outline three scenarios for an interplay between mind wandering and goal-directed thought during task performance (parallel automatic processing, off-task thought substituting on-task thought, and non-disruptive mind wandering during controlled processing) and address the ways in which the mind-wandering and focused-attention spells can terminate. Throughout the article, I formulate empirical predictions. In conclusion, I discuss how automatic and controlled processing may be balanced in human conscious cognition.

A possible shared underlying mechanism among involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu

We propose that IAM and déjà vu may not share a placement on the same gradient, per se, but the mechanism of cue familiarity detection, and a major differentiating factor between the two metacognitive experiences is whether the resulting inward directed search of memory yields retrieved content or not. Déjà vu may manifest when contentless familiarity detection is inexplicable by the experiencer.

Investigating the appraisal structure of spontaneous thoughts: evidence for differences among unexpected thought, involuntary autobiographical memories, and ruminative thought

Involuntary thinking occurs when mental states arise without intention. Such thoughts can take different forms, such as involuntary autobiographical memories (IAM), ruminative thoughts, and unexpected thoughts-all of which are popular areas of study, albeit in somewhat disparate literatures. Despite these mental states sharing a common thread of feeling involuntary in nature, it is nevertheless unclear what separates them phenomenologically. We conducted a set of exploratory and confirmatory experiments to elucidate the appraisal dimensions behind these forms of involuntary thought, with a particular interest in understanding the phenomenology behind unexpected thoughts that are predicted to violate expectations of both timing and content. Across two experiments, we found that unexpected thoughts had unique appraisal structures compared to the other two forms of involuntary thought: they were less identifiably cued, more surprising in content and timing, and offered new information (i.e., insight). We discuss how these distinctions support recent theories regarding the nature of unexpected thought and its relation to other forms of involuntary thinking, namely IAM and ruminative thought, which are the more commonly studied forms of involuntary thinking.

Emotion in the mind's eye: Imagination for adaptive cognition

In a complex world, we are constantly faced with environmental stimuli that shape our moment-to-moment experiences. But just as rich and complex as the external world is the internal milieu-our imagination. Imagination offers a powerful vehicle for playing out hypothetical experiences in the mind's eye. It allows us to mentally time travel to behold what the future might bring, including our greatest desires or fears. Indeed, imagined experiences tend to be emotion-laden. How and why are humans capable of this remarkable feat? Based on psychological findings, we highlight the importance of imagination for emotional aspects of cognition and behavior, namely in the generation and regulation of emotions. Based on recent cognitive neuroscience work, we identify putative neural networks that are most critical for emotional imagination, with a major focus on the default mode network. Finally, we briefly highlight the possible functional implications of individual differences in imagination. Overall, we hope to address why humans have the capacity to simulate hypothetical emotional experiences and how this ability can be harnessed in adaptive (and sometimes maladaptive) ways. We end by discussing open questions.

Are involuntary autobiographical memory and déjà vu natural products of memory retrieval?

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, we hypothesise that both can be described as "involuntary" or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum.

Constructive episodic simulation in dreams

Memories of the past help us adaptively respond to similar situations in the future. Originally described by Schacter & Addis in 2007, the "constructive episodic simulation" hypothesis proposes that waking thought combines fragments of various past episodes into imagined simulations of events that may occur in the future. This same framework may be useful for understanding the function of dreaming. N = 48 college students were asked to identify waking life sources for a total of N = 469 dreams. Participants frequently traced dreams to at least one past or future episodic source (53.5% and 25.7% of dreams, respectively). Individual dreams were very often traced to multiple waking sources (43.9% of all dreams with content), with fragments of past memory incorporated into scenarios that anticipated future events. Waking-life dream sources are described in terms of their phenomenology and distribution across time and sleep stage, providing new evidence that dreams not only reflect the past, but also utilize memory in simulating potential futures.

Prefrontal contributions to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience

The human prefrontal cortex is a structurally and functionally heterogenous brain region, including multiple subregions that have been linked to different large-scale brain networks. It contributes to a broad range of mental phenomena, from goal-directed thought and executive functions to mind-wandering and psychedelic experience. Here we review what is known about the functions of different prefrontal subregions and their affiliations with large-scale brain networks to examine how they may differentially contribute to the diversity of mental phenomena associated with prefrontal function. An important dimension that distinguishes across different kinds of conscious experience is the stability or variability of mental states across time. This dimension is a central feature of two recently introduced theoretical frameworks-the dynamic framework of thought (DFT) and the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) model-that treat neurocognitive dynamics as central to understanding and distinguishing between different mental phenomena. Here, we bring these two frameworks together to provide a synthesis of how prefrontal subregions may differentially contribute to the stability and variability of thought and conscious experience. We close by considering future directions for this work.

Offline perception: an introduction

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different disciplines and research directions involved and to explore the prospects of a unificatory account of offline perception in general. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.