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Park HJ, Kim BJ, Jeong HC. Role of generosity and forgiveness: Return to a cooperative society. Phys Rev E 2017; 95:042314. [PMID: 28505764 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.95.042314] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2016] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
One's reputation in human society depends on what and how one did in the past. If the reputation of a counterpart is too bad, we often avoid interacting with the individual. We introduce a selective cooperator called the goodie, who participates in the prisoner's dilemma game dependent on the opponent's reputation, and study its role in forming a cooperative society. We observe enhanced cooperation when goodies have a small but nonzero probability of playing the game with an individual who defected in previous rounds. Our finding implies that even this small generosity of goodies can provide defectors chances of encountering the better world of cooperation, encouraging them to escape from their isolated world of selfishness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hye Jin Park
- Department of Physics, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon 16419, Korea.,Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Beom Jun Kim
- Department of Physics, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon 16419, Korea
| | - Hyeong-Chai Jeong
- Department of Physics and Astronomy, Sejong University, Seoul 05006, Korea
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Antonioni A, Sánchez A, Tomassini M. Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation. Sci Rep 2016; 6:27160. [PMID: 27251114 PMCID: PMC4890023 DOI: 10.1038/srep27160] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/04/2016] [Accepted: 05/13/2016] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction. Cheaters end up being better off than honest individuals, who not only keep their true reputation but are also more cooperative. In practice, this results in honest subjects paying the costs of fraud as cheaters earn the same as in a truthful environment. These findings point to the importance of ensuring the truthfulness of reputation for a more equitable and fair society.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alberto Antonioni
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.,Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain.,Instituto de Biocomputación y F sica de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
| | - Angel Sánchez
- Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain.,Instituto de Biocomputación y F sica de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI), Universidad de Zaragoza, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain.,Institute UC3M-BS for Financial Big Data, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
| | - Marco Tomassini
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.,Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
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Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M. Multiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness. Proc Biol Sci 2008; 275:2529-36. [PMID: 18664435 PMCID: PMC2603203 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2008.0762] [Citation(s) in RCA: 95] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Empirical and theoretical evidence from various disciplines indicates that reputation, reputation building and trust are important for human cooperation, social behaviour and economic progress. Recently, it has been shown that reputation gained in games of indirect reciprocity can be transmitted by gossip. But it has also been shown that gossiping has a strong manipulative potential. We propose that this manipulative potential is alleviated by the abundance of gossip. Multiple gossip statements give a better picture of the actual behaviour of a person, and thus inaccurate or fake gossip has little power as long as it is in the minority. In addition, we investigate the supposedly strong connection between reciprocity, reputation and trust. The results of this experimental study (with 11 groups of 12 students each) document that gossip quantity helps to direct cooperation towards cooperators. Moreover, reciprocity, trust and reputations transferred via gossip are positively correlated. This interrelation might have helped to reach the high levels of cooperation that can be observed in humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ralf D Sommerfeld
- Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Postfach 165, 24306 Plön, Germany.
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