Role of feedback and broadcasting in the naming game

Negative public opinion and minority-driven social change in hypergraphs

The phenomenon where a committed minority overturns established social norms, frequently witnessed in revolutions and elections, has drawn extensive attention as it powerfully showcases the profound influence of strong personal convictions. In order to unravel the underlying mechanisms of the crucial role of public opinion within the dynamic process where a committed minority can leverage negative public opinion to challenge the status and even overturn established norms when a critical threshold is reached, we investigated the effects of negative public opinion by integrating it into the well-established traditional naming game model. It was found that there exists an optimal range of negative public opinion influence, which facilitates the minority's ability to gain power and achieve social consensus. Notably, our results show that a smaller critical mass of committed individuals could trigger consensus behavior under this mechanism. The introduction of negative public influence into opinion propagation has yielded intriguing results, offering a new perspective on expanding consensus formation in opinion dynamics, particularly in diverse environments.

Collective effect of self-learning and social learning on language dynamics: a naming game approach in social networks

Linguistic rules form the cornerstone of human communication, enabling people to understand and interact with one another effectively. However, there are always irregular exceptions to regular rules, with one of the most notable being the past tense of verbs in English. In this work, a naming game approach is developed to investigate the collective effect of social behaviours on language dynamics, which encompasses social learning, self-learning with preference and forgetting due to memory constraints. Two features that pertain to individuals' influential ability and affinity are introduced to assess an individual's role of social influence and discount the information they communicate in the Bayesian inference-based social learning model. Our findings suggest that network heterogeneity and community structure significantly impact language dynamics, as evidenced in synthetic and real-world networks. Furthermore, self-learning significantly enhances the process of language regularization, while forgetting has a relatively minor impact. The results highlight the substantial influence of network structure and social behaviours on the transition of opinions, from consensus to polarization, demonstrating its importance in language dynamics. This work sheds new light on how individual learners adopt language rules through the lenses of complexity science and decision science, advancing our understanding of language dynamics.

Temporal network epistemology: On reaching consensus in a real-world setting

This work develops the concept of the temporal network epistemology model enabling the simulation of the learning process in dynamic networks. The results of the research, conducted on the temporal social network generated using the CogSNet model and on the static topologies as a reference, indicate a significant influence of the network temporal dynamics on the outcome and flow of the learning process. It has been shown that not only the dynamics of reaching consensus is different compared to baseline models but also that previously unobserved phenomena appear, such as uninformed agents or different consensus states for disconnected components. It has also been observed that sometimes only the change of the network structure can contribute to reaching consensus. The introduced approach and the experimental results can be used to better understand the way how human communities collectively solve both complex problems at the scientific level and to inquire into the correctness of less complex but common and equally important beliefs' spreading across entire societies.

Language Evolution in Swarm Robotics: A Perspective

While direct local communication is very important for the organization of robot swarms, so far it has mostly been used for relatively simple tasks such as signaling robots preferences or states. Inspired by the emergence of meaning found in natural languages, more complex communication skills could allow robot swarms to tackle novel situations in ways that may not be a priori obvious to the experimenter. This would pave the way for the design of robot swarms with higher autonomy and adaptivity. The state of the art regarding the emergence of communication for robot swarms has mostly focused on offline evolutionary approaches, which showed that signaling and communication can emerge spontaneously even when not explicitly promoted. However, these approaches do not lead to complex, language-like communication skills, and signals are tightly linked to environmental and/or sensory-motor states that are specific to the task for which communication was evolved. To move beyond current practice, we advocate an approach to emergent communication in robot swarms based on language games. Thanks to language games, previous studies showed that cultural self-organization—rather than biological evolution—can be responsible for the complexity and expressive power of language. We suggest that swarm robotics can be an ideal test-bed to advance research on the emergence of language-like communication. The latter can be key to provide robot swarms with additional skills to support self-organization and adaptivity, enabling the design of more complex collective behaviors.

A bird's-eye view of naming game dynamics: From trait competition to Bayesian inference

The present contribution reviews a set of different versions of the basic naming game model, differing in the underlying topology or in the mechanisms regulating the interactions between agents. We include also a Bayesian naming game model recently introduced, which merges the social dynamics of the basic naming game model with the Bayesian learning framework introduced by Tenenbaum and co-workers. The latter model goes beyond the fixed nature of names and concepts of standard semiotic dynamics models and the corresponding one-shot learning process by describing dynamically how agents can generalize a concept from a few examples, according to principles of Bayesian inference.

Analysis of the high-dimensional naming game with committed minorities

The naming game has become an archetype for linguistic evolution and mathematical social behavioral analysis. In the model presented here, there are N individuals and K words. Our contribution is developing a robust method that handles the case when K=O(N). The initial condition plays a crucial role in the ordering of the system. We find that the system with high Shannon entropy has a higher consensus time and a lower critical fraction of zealots compared to low-entropy states. We also show that the critical number of committed agents decreases with the number of opinions and grows with the community size for each word. These results complement earlier conclusions that diversity of opinion is essential for evolution; without it, the system stagnates in the status quo [S. A. Marvel et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 118702 (2012)PRLTAO0031-900710.1103/PhysRevLett.109.118702]. In contrast, our results suggest that committed minorities can more easily conquer highly diverse systems, showing them to be inherently unstable.

Minimal Requirements for the Emergence of Learned Signaling

The emergence of signaling systems has been observed in numerous experimental and real‐world contexts, but there is no consensus on which (if any) shared mechanisms underlie such phenomena. A number of explanatory mechanisms have been proposed within several disciplines, all of which have been instantiated as credible working models. However, they are usually framed as being mutually incompatible. Using an exemplar‐based framework, we replicate these models in a minimal configuration which allows us to directly compare them. This reveals that the development of optimal signaling is driven by similar mechanisms in each model, which leads us to propose three requirements for the emergence of conventional signaling. These are the creation and transmission of referential information, a systemic bias against ambiguity, and finally some form of information loss. Considering this, we then discuss some implications for theoretical and experimental approaches to the emergence of learned communication.

Committed activists and the reshaping of status-quo social consensus

The role of committed minorities in shaping public opinion has been recently addressed with the help of multiagent models. However, previous studies focused on homogeneous populations where zealots stand out only for their stubbornness. Here we consider the more general case in which individuals are characterized by different propensities to communicate. In particular, we correlate commitment with a higher tendency to push an opinion, acknowledging the fact that individuals with unwavering dedication to a cause are also more active in their attempts to promote their message. We show that these activists are not only more efficient in spreading their message but that their efforts require an order of magnitude fewer individuals than a randomly selected committed minority to bring the population over to a new consensus. Finally, we address the role of communities, showing that partisan divisions in the society can make it harder for committed individuals to flip the status-quo social consensus.

Analysis of the "naming game" with learning errors in communications

Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches consensus asymptotically. We study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, with error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed. Then, a strategy for agents to prevent learning errors is suggested. To that end, three typical topologies of communication networks, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed to investigate the effects of various learning errors. Simulation results on these models show that 1) learning errors slightly affect the convergence speed but distinctively increase the requirement for memory of each agent during lexicon propagation; 2) the maximum number of different words held by the population increases linearly as the error rate increases; 3) without applying any strategy to eliminate learning errors, there is a threshold of the learning errors which impairs the convergence. The new findings may help to better understand the role of learning errors in naming game as well as in human language development from a network science perspective.

Propensity and stickiness in the naming game: tipping fractions of minorities

Agent-based models of the binary naming game are generalized here to represent a family of models parameterized by the introduction of two continuous parameters. These parameters define varying listener-speaker interactions on the individual level with one parameter controlling the speaker and the other controlling the listener of each interaction. The major finding presented here is that the generalized naming game preserves the existence of critical thresholds for the size of committed minorities. Above such threshold, a committed minority causes a fast (in time logarithmic in size of the network) convergence to consensus, even when there are other parameters influencing the system. Below such threshold, reaching consensus requires time exponential in the size of the network. Moreover, the two introduced parameters cause bifurcations in the stabilities of the system's fixed points and may lead to changes in the system's consensus.

Evolution of communication protocols using an artificial regulatory network

I describe the Utrecht Machine (UM), a discrete artificial regulatory network designed for studying how evolution discovers biochemical computation mechanisms. The corresponding binary genome format is compatible with gene deletion, duplication, and recombination. In the simulation presented here, an agent consisting of two UMs, a sender and a receiver, must encode, transmit, and decode a binary word over time using the narrow communication channel between them. This communication problem has chicken-and-egg structure in that a sending mechanism is useless without a corresponding receiving mechanism. An in-depth case study reveals that a coincidence creates a minimal partial solution, from which a sequence of partial sending and receiving mechanisms evolve. Gene duplications contribute by enlarging the regulatory network. Analysis of 60,000 sample runs under a variety of parameter settings confirms that crossover accelerates evolution, that stronger selection tends to find clumsier solutions and finds them more slowly, and that there is implicit selection for robust mechanisms and genomes at the codon level. Typical solutions associate each input bit with an activation speed and combine them almost additively. The parents of breakthrough organisms sometimes have lower fitness scores than others in the population, indicating that populations can cross valleys in the fitness landscape via outlying members. The simulation exhibits back mutations and population-level memory effects not accounted for in traditional population genetics models. All together, these phenomena suggest that new evolutionary models are needed that incorporate regulatory network structure.

Naming game on networks: let everyone be both speaker and hearer

To investigate how consensus is reached on a large self-organized peer-to-peer network, we extended the naming game model commonly used in language and communication to Naming Game in Groups (NGG). Differing from other existing naming game models, in NGG everyone in the population (network) can be both speaker and hearer simultaneously, which resembles in a closer manner to real-life scenarios. Moreover, NGG allows the transmission (communication) of multiple words (opinions) for multiple intra-group consensuses. The communications among indirectly-connected nodes are also enabled in NGG. We simulated and analyzed the consensus process in some typical network topologies, including random-graph networks, small-world networks and scale-free networks, to better understand how global convergence (consensus) could be reached on one common word. The results are interpreted on group negotiation of a peer-to-peer network, which shows that global consensus in the population can be reached more rapidly when more opinions are permitted within each group or when the negotiating groups in the population are larger in size. The novel features and properties introduced by our model have demonstrated its applicability in better investigating general consensus problems on peer-to-peer networks.

Opinion dynamics and influencing on random geometric graphs

We investigate the two-word Naming Game on two-dimensional random geometric graphs. Studying this model advances our understanding of the spatial distribution and propagation of opinions in social dynamics. A main feature of this model is the spontaneous emergence of spatial structures called opinion domains which are geographic regions with clear boundaries within which all individuals share the same opinion. We provide the mean-field equation for the underlying dynamics and discuss several properties of the equation such as the stationary solutions and two-time-scale separation. For the evolution of the opinion domains we find that the opinion domain boundary propagates at a speed proportional to its curvature. Finally we investigate the impact of committed agents on opinion domains and find the scaling of consensus time.

Information sharing and sorting in a community

We present the results of a detailed numerical study of a model for the sharing and sorting of information in a community consisting of a large number of agents. The information gathering takes place in a sequence of mutual bipartite interactions where randomly selected pairs of agents communicate with each other to enhance their knowledge and sort out the common information. Although our model is less restricted compared to the well-established naming game, the numerical results strongly indicate that the whole set of exponents characterizing this model are different from those of the naming game and they assume nontrivial values. Finally, it appears that in analogy to the emergence of clusters in the phenomenon of percolation, one can define clusters of agents here having the same information. We have studied in detail the growth of the largest cluster in this article and performed its finite-size scaling analysis.

Analytic treatment of tipping points for social consensus in large random networks

We introduce a homogeneous pair approximation to the naming game (NG) model by deriving a six-dimensional Open Dynamics Engine (ODE) for the two-word naming game. Our ODE reveals the change in dynamical behavior of the naming game as a function of the average degree {k} of an uncorrelated network. This result is in good agreement with the numerical results. We also analyze the extended NG model that allows for presence of committed nodes and show that there is a shift of the tipping point for social consensus in sparse networks.

Opinion formation in time-varying social networks: The case of the naming game

We study the dynamics of the naming game as an opinion formation model on time-varying social networks. This agent-based model captures the essential features of the agreement dynamics by means of a memory-based negotiation process. Our study focuses on the impact of time-varying properties of the social network of the agents on the naming game dynamics. In particular, we perform a computational exploration of this model using simulations on top of real networks. We investigate the outcomes of the dynamics on two different types of time-varying data: (1) the networks vary on a day-to-day basis and (2) the networks vary within very short intervals of time (20 sec). In the first case, we find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the naming game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely leading to metastability. In the second case, we investigate the evolution of the naming game in perfect synchronization with the time evolution of the underlying social network shedding new light on the traditional emergent properties of the game that differ largely from what has been reported in the existing literature.

Consensus in networks of mobile communicating agents

Populations of mobile and communicating agents describe a vast array of technological and natural systems, ranging from sensor networks to animal groups. Here, we investigate how a group-level agreement may emerge in the continuously evolving network defined by the local interactions of the moving individuals. We adopt a general scheme of motion in two dimensions and we let the individuals interact through the minimal naming game, a prototypical scheme to investigate social consensus. We distinguish different regimes of convergence determined by the emission range of the agents and by their mobility, and we identify the corresponding scaling behaviors of the consensus time. In the same way, we rationalize also the behavior of the maximum memory used during the convergence process, which determines the minimum cognitive/storage capacity needed by the individuals. Overall, we believe that the simple and general model presented in this paper can represent a helpful reference for a better understanding of the behavior of populations of mobile agents.

Social consensus through the influence of committed minorities

We show how the prevailing majority opinion in a population can be rapidly reversed by a small fraction p of randomly distributed committed agents who consistently proselytize the opposing opinion and are immune to influence. Specifically, we show that when the committed fraction grows beyond a critical value p(c) ≈ 10%, there is a dramatic decrease in the time T(c) taken for the entire population to adopt the committed opinion. In particular, for complete graphs we show that when p < pc, T(c) ~ exp [α(p)N], whereas for p>p(c), T(c) ~ ln N. We conclude with simulation results for Erdős-Rényi random graphs and scale-free networks which show qualitatively similar behavior.

Social influencing and associated random walk models: Asymptotic consensus times on the complete graph

We investigate consensus formation and the asymptotic consensus times in stylized individual- or agent-based models, in which global agreement is achieved through pairwise negotiations with or without a bias. Considering a class of individual-based models on finite complete graphs, we introduce a coarse-graining approach (lumping microscopic variables into macrostates) to analyze the ordering dynamics in an associated random-walk framework. Within this framework, yielding a linear system, we derive general equations for the expected consensus time and the expected time spent in each macro-state. Further, we present the asymptotic solutions of the 2-word naming game and separately discuss its behavior under the influence of an external field and with the introduction of committed agents.