Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment

Towards preferential selection in the prisoner's dilemma game

In previous works, the choice of learning neighbor for an individual has generally obeyed pure random selection or preferential selection rules. In this paper, we introduce a tunable parameter ε to characterize the strength of preferential selection and focus on the transition towards preferential selection in the spatial evolutionary game by controlling ε to guide the system from pure random selection to preferential selection. Our simulation results reveal that the introduction of preferential selection can hugely alleviate social dilemmas and enhance network reciprocity. A larger ε leads to a higher critical threshold of the temptation b for the extinction of cooperators. Moreover, we provide some intuitive explanations for the above results from the perspective of strategy transition and cooperative clusters. Finally, we examine the robustness of the results for noise K and different topologies, find that qualitative features of the results are unchanged.

Moderating Role of Peer Pressure and Positive Learning Environment Between Career Calling and Academic Procrastination in Chinese Medical Students During Controlled COVID-19 Pandemic: A Cross-Sectional Study

Purpose

The COVID-19 pandemic sets specific circumstances that may accelerate academic procrastination behavior of medical students. Career calling is a protective factor that fights against academic procrastination and may further improve medical students' mental health and academic achievement. This study aims to determine the status of Chinese medical students' academic procrastination during controlled COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the study investigates the relationships and mechanisms among career calling, peer pressure, a positive learning environment, and academic procrastination.

Patients and Methods

Data were collected from several Chinese medical universities through an anonymous cross-sectional survey of 3614 respondents (effective response rate = 60.0%). Using online questionnaires to collect the data and IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0 for statistical analysis.

Results

The average score of academic procrastination of Chinese medical students was 2.62±0.86. This study proved the usage of peer pressure and positive learning environment as moderating roles of relationship between career calling and academic procrastination. Career calling was negatively correlated with academic procrastination (r = -0.232, p < 0.01), while it was positively correlated with peer pressure (r = 0.390, p < 0.01) and a positive learning environment (r = 0.339, p < 0.01). Moreover, academic procrastination was negatively correlated with peer pressure (r = -0.279, p < 0.01) and a positive learning environment (r = -0.242, p < 0.01). Peer pressure was positively correlated with a positive learning environment (r = 0.637, p < 0.01).

Conclusion

The findings emphasize the importance of constructive peer pressure and a positive learning environment that discourages academic procrastination. Educators should highlight medical career calling education by offering related courses to fight against academic procrastination.

Two-layer network model of public goods games with intervention and corruption

Public goods games are widely used to model social dilemmas involving multiple agents. Though defection is the only rational choice for an individual in a public goods game, cooperative behavior is observed in a variety of social dilemmas, which is the subject of our research. Punishing defectors has been shown to be an effective mechanism for promoting cooperation, but it relies on the third-party umpire being fair. In this article, an umpire intervention model with corruption is proposed to explore the impact of corruption on punishment mechanisms. In our model, players and umpires operate in a multilayer network. The players play public goods games, which are overseen by umpires. Fair umpires punish defectors, whereas corrupt umpires take bribes from defectors rather than meting out a punishment. We separately explore the effects of the fraction of fair umpires _ρ, the spatial distribution, and the fine cost α and bribe cost β. Our Monte Carlo simulation shows that the above factors have a significant impact on cooperation. Intervention by an umpire always improves social efficiency, even for an entirely corrupt system. Moreover, relatively developed systems can resist corruption. Staggered and centralized distributions always have opposite effects on cooperative behavior, and these effects depend on _ρ and r. We also find that whether cooperators fully occupy the player layer depends only on whether β reaches a certain threshold.

Defectors in bad circumstances possessing higher reputation can promote cooperation

In nature and human society, social relationships and behavior patterns are usually unpredictable. In any interaction, individuals will constantly have to deal with prior uncertainty. The concept of "reputation" can provide some information to mitigate such uncertainty. In previous studies, researchers have considered that only cooperators are able to maintain a high reputation; no matter the circumstances of a defector, they are classified as a faithless individual. In reality, however, some individuals will be forced to defect to protect themselves against exploitation. Therefore, it makes sense that defectors in bad circumstances could also obtain higher reputations, and cooperators can maintain higher reputations in comfortable circumstances. In this work, the reputations of individuals are calculated using the fraction of their neighbors who have the same strategy. In this way, some defectors in a population may obtain higher reputations than some cooperators. We introduce this reputation rule using heterogeneous investments in public goods games. Our numerical simulation results indicate that this reputation rule and heterogeneous investments can better stimulate cooperation. Additionally, stronger investment heterogeneity can further increase the level of cooperation. To explain this phenomenon, dynamical evolution is observed in Monte Carlo simulations. We also investigated the effects of the noise intensity of the irrational population and the original proportion of cooperation in the population. The robustness of this cooperation model was also considered with respect to the network structure and total investment, and we found that the conclusions remained the same.

Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks

Despite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual cooperative behaviors in the process of social interaction. This kind of pressure psychologically forces individuals to behave consistently with their partners, and partners with inconsistent behaviors may suffer psychological blows. As feedback, this psychological harm may in turn affect individual cooperative decisions. There is evidence that when peer pressure exists, partnerships can reduce free-riding in enterprise. Based on interdependent networks, this paper studies the impact of peer pressure on cooperation dynamics when the strategies of corresponding partners from different layers of the networks are inconsistent. We assume that when individuals are under peer pressure, their payoffs will be compromised. The simulation results show that the punishment effect will force the expulsion of partners with different strategies, which will further reduce the proportion of partners with inconsistent strategies in the system. However, in most cases, only moderate fines are most conductive to the evolution of cooperation, and the punishment mechanisms can effectively promote the interdependent network reciprocity. The results on the small world and random network prove the robustness of the result. In addition, under this mechanism, the greater the payoff dependence between partners, the better the effect of interdependent network reciprocity.

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the presence of policing

Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game as a basis for long-term apprehension of the essential social dilemma related to cooperation among unrelated individuals. We upgrade the contemporary PD game with an inclusion of evolution-induced act of punishment as a third competing strategy in addition to the traditional cooperators and defectors. In a population structure, the abundance of ecologically-viable free space often regulates the reproductive opportunities of the constituents. Hence, additionally, we consider the availability of free space as an ecological footprint, thus arriving at a simple eco-evolutionary model, which displays fascinating complex dynamics. As possible outcomes, we report the individual dominance of cooperators and defectors as well as a plethora of mixed states, where different strategies coexist followed by maintaining the diversity in a socio-ecological framework. These states can either be steady or oscillating, whereby oscillations are sustained by cyclic dominance among different combinations of cooperators, defectors, and punishers. We also observe a novel route to cyclic dominance where cooperators, punishers, and defectors enter a coexistence via an inverse Hopf bifurcation that is followed by an inverse period doubling route.