Bifurcations in models of a society of reasonable contrarians and conformists

Unanimity, Coexistence, and Rigidity: Three Sides of Polarization

Political polarization is perceived as a threat to democracies. Using the Galam model of opinion dynamics deployed in a five-dimensional parameter space, I show that polarization is the byproduct of an essential hallmark of a vibrant democratic society, namely open and informal discussions among agents. Indeed, within a homogeneous social community with floaters, the dynamics lead gradually toward unanimity (zero entropy). Polarization can eventually appear as the juxtaposition of non-mixing social groups sharing different prejudices about the issue at stake. On the other hand, the inclusion of contrarian agents produces a polarization within a community that mixes when their proportion x is beyond a critical value xc=16≈0.167 for discussing groups of size three and four. Similarly, the presence of stubborn agents also produces a polarization of a community that mixes when the proportion of stubborn agents is greater than some critical value. For equal proportions of stubborn agents a along each opinion, ac=29≈0.22 for group size four against ac=14=0.25 for group size three. However, the evaluation of the proportion of individual opinion shifts at the attractor 12 and indicates that the polarization produced by contrarians is fluid with a good deal of agents who keep shifting between the two opposed blocks (high entropy). That favors a coexistence of opposite opinions in a divided community. In contrast, the polarization created by stubborn agents is found to be frozen with very few individuals shifting opinion between the two opinions (low entropy). That yields a basis for the emergence of hate between the frozen opposed blocks.

Radicalism: The asymmetric stances of radicals versus conventionals

We study the conditions of propagation of an initial emergent practice qualified as extremist within a population adept at a practice perceived as moderate, whether political, societal, or religious. The extremist practice is carried by an initial ultraminority of radicals (R) dispersed among conventionals (C) who are the overwhelming majority in the community. Both R and C are followers, that is, agents who, while having arguments to legitimize their current practice, are likely to switch to the other practice if given more arguments during a debate. The issue being controversial, most C tend to avoid social confrontation with R about it. They maintain a neutral indifference, assuming it is none of their business. On the contrary, R aim to convince C through an expansion strategy to spread their practice as part of a collective agenda. However, aware of being followers, they implement an appropriate strategy to maximize their expansion and determine when to force a debate with C. The effect of this asymmetry between initiating or avoiding an update debate among followers is calculated using a weighted version of the Galam model of opinion dynamics. An underlying complex landscape is obtained as a function of the respective probabilities to engage in a local discussion by R and C. It discloses zones where R inexorably expand and zones where they get extinct. The results highlight the instrumental character of the above asymmetry in providing a decisive advantage to R against C. It also points to a barrier in R initial support to reach the extension zone. In parallel, the landscape reveals a path for C to counter R expansion, pushing them back into their extinction zone. It relies on the asymmetry of C being initially a large majority which puts the required involvement of C at a rather low level.

The dual problems of coordination and anti-coordination on random bipartite graphs

In some scenarios ("anti-coordination games"), individuals are better off choosing different actions than their neighbors while in other scenarios ("coordination games"), it is beneficial for individuals to choose the same strategy as their neighbors. Despite having different incentives and resulting population dynamics, it is largely unknown which collective outcome, anti-coordination or coordination, is easier to achieve. To address this issue, we focus on the distributed graph coloring problem on bipartite graphs. We show that with only two strategies, anti-coordination games (2-colorings) and coordination games (uniform colorings) are dual problems that are equally difficult to solve. To prove this, we construct an isomorphism between the Markov chains arising from the corresponding anti-coordination and coordination games under certain specific individual stochastic decision-making rules. Our results provide novel insights into solving collective action problems on networks.

The role of timescale separation in oscillatory ensembles with competitive coupling

We study a heterogeneous population consisting of two groups of oscillatory elements, one with attractive and one with repulsive coupling. Moreover, we set different internal timescales for the oscillators of the two groups and concentrate on the role of this timescale separation in the collective behavior. Our results demonstrate that it may significantly modify synchronization properties of the system, and the implications are fundamentally different depending on the ratio between the group timescales. For the slower attractive group, synchronization properties are similar to the case of equal timescales. However, when the attractive group is faster, these properties significantly change and bistability appears. The other collective regimes such as frozen states and solitary states are also shown to be crucially influenced by timescale separation.

Asymmetric Contrarians in Opinion Dynamics

Asymmetry in contrarian behavior is investigated within the Galam model of opinion dynamics using update groups of size 3 with two competing opinions A and B. Denoting x and y the respective proportions of A and B contrarians, four schemes of implementations are studied. The first scheme activates contrarians after each series of updates with probabilities x and y for agents holding respectively opinion A and B. Second scheme activates contrarians within the update groups only against global majority with probability x when A is the majority and y when B is the majority. The third scheme considers in-group contrarians acting prior to the local majority update against both local majority and minority opinions. The last scheme activates in-group contrarians prior to the local majority update but only against the local majority. The main result is the loss of the fifty–fifty attractor produced by symmetric contrarians. Producing a bit less contrarians on its own side than the other side becomes the key to win a public debate, which in turn can guarantee an election victory. The associated phase diagram of opinion dynamics is found to exhibit a rich variety of counterintuitive results.

Stochastic bifurcations in the nonlinear parallel Ising model

We investigate the phase transitions of a nonlinear, parallel version of the Ising model, characterized by an antiferromagnetic linear coupling and ferromagnetic nonlinear one. This model arises in problems of opinion formation. The mean-field approximation shows chaotic oscillations, by changing the couplings or the connectivity. The spatial model shows bifurcations in the average magnetization, similar to that seen in the mean-field approximation, induced by the change of the topology, after rewiring short-range to long-range connection, as predicted by the small-world effect. These coherent periodic and chaotic oscillations of the magnetization reflect a certain degree of synchronization of the spins, induced by long-range couplings. Similar bifurcations may be induced in the randomly connected model by changing the couplings or the connectivity and also the dilution (degree of asynchronism) of the updating. We also examined the effects of inhomogeneity, mixing ferromagnetic and antiferromagnetic coupling, which induces an unexpected bifurcation diagram with a "bubbling" behavior, as also happens for dilution.