Fragmentation properties of two-dimensional proximity graphs considering random failures and targeted attacks

Large deviations of connected components in the stochastic block model

We study the stochastic block model, which is often used to model community structures and study community-detection algorithms. We consider the case of two blocks in regard to its largest connected component and largest biconnected component, respectively. We are especially interested in the distributions of their sizes including the tails down to probabilities smaller than 10^{-800}. For this purpose we use sophisticated Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations to sample graphs from the stochastic block model ensemble. We use these data to study the large-deviation rate function and conjecture that the large-deviation principle holds. Further we compare the distribution to the well-known Erdős-Rényi ensemble, where we notice subtle differences at and above the percolation threshold.

Collective effects of the cost of opinion change

We study the dynamics of opinion formation in the situation where changing opinion involves a cost for the agents. To do so we couple the dynamics of a heterogeneous bounded confidence Hegselmann-Krause model with that of the resources that the agents invest on each opinion change. The outcomes of the dynamics are non-trivial and strongly depend on the different regions of the confidence parameter space. In particular, a second order phase transition, for which we determine the corresponding critical exponents, is found in the region where a re-entrant consensus phase is observed in the heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model. For regions where consensus always exist in the heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model, the introduction of cost does not lead to a phase transition but just to a continuous decrease of the size of the largest opinion cluster. Finally in the region where fragmentation is expected in the heterogeneous HK model, the introduction of a very small cost surprisingly increases the size of the largest opinion cluster.

Critical behaviors of high-degree adaptive and collective-influence percolation

How the giant component of a network disappears under attacking nodes or links addresses a key aspect of network robustness, which can be framed into percolation problems. Various strategies to select the node to be deactivated have been studied in the literature, for instance, a simple random failure or high-degree adaptive (HDA) percolation. Recently, a new attack strategy based on a quantity called collective-influence (CI) has been proposed from the perspective of optimal percolation. By successively deactivating the node having the largest CI-centrality value, it was shown to be able to dismantle a network more quickly and abruptly than many of the existing methods. In this paper, we focus on the critical behaviors of the percolation processes following degree-based attack and CI-based attack on random networks. Through extensive Monte Carlo simulations assisted by numerical solutions, we estimate various critical exponents of the HDA percolation and those of the CI percolations. Our results show that these attack-type percolation processes, despite displaying apparently more abrupt collapse, nevertheless exhibit standard mean-field critical behaviors at the percolation transition point. We further discover an extensive degeneracy in top-centrality nodes in both processes, which may provide a hint for understanding the observed results.

Scaling of percolation transitions on Erdös-Rényi networks under centrality-based attacks

The study of network robustness focuses on the way the overall functionality of a network is affected as some of its constituent parts fail. Failures can occur at random or be part of an intentional attack and, in general, networks behave differently against different removal strategies. Although much effort has been put on this topic, there is no unified framework to study the problem. While random failures have been mostly studied under percolation theory, targeted attacks have been recently restated in terms of network dismantling. In this work, we link these two approaches by performing a finite-size scaling analysis to four dismantling strategies over Erdös-Rényi networks: initial and recalculated high degree removal and initial and recalculated high betweenness removal. We find that the critical exponents associated with the initial attacks are consistent with the ones corresponding to random percolation. For recalculated high degree, the exponents seem to deviate from mean field, but the evidence is not conclusive. Finally, recalculated betweenness produces a very abrupt transition with a hump in the cluster size distribution near the critical point, resembling some explosive percolation processes.