Persistence of cooperation in diffusive public goods games

The evolution of environmentally mediated social interactions and posthumous spite under isolation by distance

Many social interactions happen indirectly via modifications of the environment, e.g. through the secretion of functional compounds or the depletion of renewable resources. Here, we derive the selection gradient on a quantitative trait affecting dynamical environmental variables that feed back on reproduction and survival in a finite patch-structured population subject to isolation by distance. Our analysis shows that the selection gradient depends on how a focal individual influences the fitness of all future individuals in the population through modifications of the environmental variables they experience, weighted by the neutral relatedness between recipients and the focal. The evolutionarily relevant trait-driven environmental modifications are formalized as the extended phenotypic effects of an individual, quantifying how a trait change in an individual in the present affects the environmental variables in all patches at all future times. When the trait affects reproduction and survival through a payoff function, the selection gradient can be expressed in terms of extended phenotypic effects weighted by scaled relatedness. We show how to compute extended phenotypic effects, relatedness, and scaled relatedness using Fourier analysis, which allow us to investigate a broad class of environmentally mediated social interactions in a tractable way. We use our approach to study the evolution of a trait controlling the costly production of some lasting commons (e.g. a common-pool resource or a toxic compound) that can diffuse in space and persist in time. We show that indiscriminate posthumous spite readily evolves in this scenario. More generally, whether selection favours environmentally mediated altruism or spite is determined by the spatial correlation between an individual's lineage and the commons originating from its patch. The sign of this correlation depends on interactions between dispersal patterns and the commons' renewal dynamics. More broadly, we suggest that selection can favour a wide range of social behaviours when these have carry-over effects in space and time.

Hostility prevents the tragedy of the commons in metapopulation with asymmetric migration: A lesson from queenless ants

A colony of the queenless ant species, Pristomyrmex punctatus, can broadly be seen as consisting of small-body sized worker ants and relatively larger body-sized cheater ants. Hence, in the presence of intercolony migration, a set of constituent colonies act as a metapopulation exclusively composed of cooperators and defectors. Such a setup facilitates an evolutionary game-theoretic replication-selection model of population dynamics of the ants in a metapopulation. Using the model, we analytically probe the effects of territoriality induced hostility. Such hostility in the ant metapopulation proves to be crucial in preventing the tragedy of the commons, specifically, the workforce, a social good formed by cooperation. This mechanism applies to any metapopulation-not necessarily the ants-composed of cooperators and defectors where interpopulation migration occurs asymmetrically, i.e., cooperators and defectors migrate at different rates. Furthermore, our model validates that there is evolutionary benefit behind the queenless ants' behavior of showing more hostility towards the immigrants from nearby colonies than those from the far-off ones. In order to calibrate our model's parameters, we have extensively used the data available on the queenless ant species, P. punctatus.

Autocrine signaling can explain the emergence of Allee effects in cancer cell populations

In many human cancers, the rate of cell growth depends crucially on the size of the tumor cell population. Low, zero, or negative growth at low population densities is known as the Allee effect; this effect has been studied extensively in ecology, but so far lacks a good explanation in the cancer setting. Here, we formulate and analyze an individual-based model of cancer, in which cell division rates are increased by the local concentration of an autocrine growth factor produced by the cancer cells themselves. We show, analytically and by simulation, that autocrine signaling suffices to cause both strong and weak Allee effects. Whether low cell densities lead to negative (strong effect) or reduced (weak effect) growth rate depends directly on the ratio of cell death to proliferation, and indirectly on cellular dispersal. Our model is consistent with experimental observations from three patient-derived brain tumor cell lines grown at different densities. We propose that further studying and quantifying population-wide feedback, impacting cell growth, will be central for advancing our understanding of cancer dynamics and treatment, potentially exploiting Allee effects for therapy.

A common feature of tumor growth is the production, by the cancer cells themselves, of hormones known as growth factors that increase the rate of cell division. This type of signalling makes the growth rate of the tumor depend on the population size in a non-linear manner, and the growth rate might become low or negative for small population sizes. This is known as the Allee effect which has been studied extensively in ecology. We have developed a computational model that can explain the Allee effect in terms of growth factor signalling, and show by mathematical analysis of the model that the magnitude of the Allee effect depends on the ratio of cell death to proliferation, as well as the properties of the growth factor. In addition we show that the model is consistent with experimental observations from three different cell lines derived from the brain tumor glioblastoma. Our findings indicate that the Allee effect can be exploited in order to improve the treatment of glioblastoma patients.

Spatial segregation and cooperation in radially expanding microbial colonies under antibiotic stress

Antibiotic resistance in microbial communities reflects a combination of processes operating at different scales. In this work, we investigate the spatiotemporal dynamics of bacterial colonies comprised of drug-resistant and drug-sensitive cells undergoing range expansion under antibiotic stress. Using the opportunistic pathogen Enterococcus faecalis with plasmid-encoded β-lactamase, we track colony expansion dynamics and visualize spatial patterns in fluorescently labeled populations exposed to antibiotics. We find that the radial expansion rate of mixed communities is approximately constant over a wide range of drug concentrations and initial population compositions. Imaging of the final populations shows that resistance to ampicillin is cooperative, with sensitive cells surviving in the presence of resistant cells at otherwise lethal concentrations. The populations exhibit a diverse range of spatial segregation patterns that depend on drug concentration and initial conditions. Mathematical models indicate that the observed dynamics are consistent with global cooperation, despite the fact that β-lactamase remains cell-associated. Experiments confirm that resistant colonies provide a protective effect to sensitive cells on length scales multiple times the size of a single colony, and populations seeded with (on average) no more than a single resistant cell can produce mixed communities in the presence of the drug. While biophysical models of drug degradation suggest that individual resistant cells offer only short-range protection to neighboring cells, we show that long-range protection may arise from synergistic effects of multiple resistant cells, providing surprisingly large protection zones even at small population fractions.

Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time

Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge.

Evolution of cooperation under punishment

Punishment has been considered as an effective mechanism for promoting and sustaining cooperation. In most existing models, punishment always comes as a third strategy alongside cooperation and defection, and it is commonly assumed to be executed based on individual decision rules rather than collective decision rules. Differently from previous works, we employ a democratic procedure by which cooperators cast votes independently and simultaneously for whether to impose punishment on defectors, and we establish a relationship between the cooperators' willingness to punish defectors (WTPD) and whether the punishment is inflicted on defectors. The results illustrate that the population can evolve to full cooperation under consensual punishment. It is noteworthy that, compared with autonomous punishment, whether consensual punishment is more in favor of cooperation crucially depends on the minimum number of votes required for punishment execution as well as the cooperators' WTPD. Our findings highlight the importance of collective decision making in the evolution of cooperation and may provide a mathematical framework for explaining the prevalence of democracy in modern societies.

Time scales and wave formation in non-linear spatial public goods games

The co-evolutionary dynamics of competing populations can be strongly affected by frequency-dependent selection and spatial population structure. As co-evolving populations grow into a spatial domain, their initial spatial arrangement and their growth rate differences are important factors that determine the long-term outcome. We here model producer and free-rider co-evolution in the context of a diffusive public good (PG) that is produced by the producers at a cost but evokes local concentration-dependent growth benefits to all. The benefit of the PG can be non-linearly dependent on public good concentration. We consider the spatial growth dynamics of producers and free-riders in one, two and three dimensions by modeling producer cell, free-rider cell and public good densities in space, driven by the processes of birth, death and diffusion (cell movement and public good distribution). Typically, one population goes extinct, but the time-scale of this process varies with initial conditions and the growth rate functions. We establish that spatial variation is transient regardless of dimensionality, and that structured initial conditions lead to increasing times to get close to an extinction state, called ε-extinction time. Further, we find that uncorrelated initial spatial structures do not influence this ε-extinction time in comparison to a corresponding well-mixed (non-spatial) system. In order to estimate the ε-extinction time of either free-riders or producers we derive a slow manifold solution. For invading populations, i.e. for populations that are initially highly segregated, we observe a traveling wave, whose speed can be calculated. Our results provide quantitative predictions for the transient spatial dynamics of cooperative traits under pressure of extinction.

Evolutionary public good (PG) games capture the essence of production of growth-beneficial factors that are vulnerable to exploitation by free-riders who do not carry the cost of production. PGs emerge in cellular populations, for example in growing bacteria and cancer cells. We study the eco-evolutionary dynamics of a PG in populations that grow in space. In our model, PG-producer cells and free-rider cells can grow according to their own birth and death rates. Co-evolution occurs due to public good-driven surplus in the intrinsic growth rates at a cost to producers. A net growth rate-benefit to free-riders leads to the well-known tragedy of the commons in which producers go extinct. What is often omitted from discussions is the time scale on which this extinction can occur, especially in spatial populations. Here, we derive analytical estimates of the ε-extinction time in different spatial settings. As we do not consider a stochastic process, the ε-extinction time captures the time needed to approach an extinction state. We identify spatial scenarios in which extinction takes long enough such that the tragedy of the commons never occurs within a meaningful lifetime of the system. Using numerical simulations we analyze the deviations from our analytical predictions.