Health information exchange network under collaboration, cooperation, and competition: A game-theoretic approach

Health Information Exchange (HIE) network allows securely accessing and sharing healthcare-related information among healthcare providers (HCPs) and payers. HIE services are provided by a non-profit/profit organizations under several subscription plans options. A few studies have addressed the sustainability of the HIE network such that HIE providers, HCPs, and payers remain profitable in the long term. However, none of these studies addressed the coexistence of multiple HIE providers in the network. Such coexistence may have a huge impact on the behavior of healthcare systems in terms of adoption rate and HIE pricing strategies. In addition, in spite of all the effort to maintain cooperation between HIE providers, there is still a chance of competition among them in the market. Possible competition among service providers leads to many concerns about the HIE network sustainability and behavior. In this study, a game-theoretic approach to model the HIE market is proposed. Game-theory is used to simulate the behavior of the three different HIE network agents in the HIE market: HIE providers, HCPs, and payers. Pricing strategies and adoption decisions are optimized using a Linear Programming (LP) mathematical model. Results show that the relation between HIEs in the market is crucial to HCP/Payer adoption decision specially to small HCPs. A small change in the discount rate proposed by a competitive HIE provider will highly affect the decision of HCP/payers to join the HIE network. Finally, competition opened the opportunity for more HCPs to join the network due to reduced pricing. Furthermore, collaborative HIEs provided better performance compared to cooperative in terms of profit and HCP adoption rate by sharing their overall costs and revenues.

A strategic gaming model for health information exchange markets

Current market conditions create incentives for some providers to exercise control over patient data in ways that unreasonably limit its availability and use. Here we develop a game theoretic model for estimating the willingness of healthcare organizations to join a health information exchange (HIE) network and demonstrate its use in HIE policy design. We formulated the model as a bi-level integer program. A quasi-Newton method is proposed to obtain a strategy Nash equilibrium. We applied our modeling and solution technique to 1,093,177 encounters for exchanging information over a 7.5-year period in 9 hospitals located within a three-county region in Florida. Under a set of assumptions, we found that a proposed federal penalty of up to $2,000,000 has a higher impact on increasing HIE adoption than current federal monetary incentives. Medium-sized hospitals were more reticent to adopt HIE than large-sized hospitals. In the presence of collusion among multiple hospitals to not adopt HIE, neither federal incentives nor proposed penalties increase hospitals' willingness to adopt. Hospitals' apathy toward HIE adoption may threaten the value of inter-connectivity even with federal incentives in place. Competition among hospitals, coupled with volume-based payment systems, creates no incentives for smaller hospitals to exchange data with competitors. Medium-sized hospitals need targeted actions (e.g., outside technological assistance, group purchasing arrangements) to mitigate market incentives to not adopt HIE. Strategic game theoretic models help to clarify HIE adoption decisions under market conditions at play in an extremely complex technology environment.

Optimizing financial effects of HIE: a multi-party linear programming approach

OBJECTIVE

To describe an analytical framework for quantifying the societal savings and financial consequences of a health information exchange (HIE), and to demonstrate its use in designing pricing policies for sustainable HIEs.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We developed a linear programming model to (1) quantify the financial worth of HIE information to each of its participating institutions and (2) evaluate three HIE pricing policies: fixed-rate annual, charge per visit, and charge per look-up. We considered three desired outcomes of HIE-related emergency care (modeled as parameters): preventing unrequired hospitalizations, reducing duplicate tests, and avoiding emergency department (ED) visits. We applied this framework to 4639 ED encounters over a 12-month period in three large EDs in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, using Medicare/Medicaid claims data, public reports of hospital admissions, published payer mix data, and use data from a not-for-profit regional HIE.

RESULTS

For this HIE, data accesses produced net financial gains for all providers and payers. Gains, due to HIE, were more significant for providers with more health maintenance organizations patients. Reducing unrequired hospitalizations and avoiding repeat ED visits were responsible for more than 70% of the savings. The results showed that fixed annual subscriptions can sustain this HIE, while ensuring financial gains to all participants. Sensitivity analysis revealed that the results were robust to uncertainties in modeling parameters.

DISCUSSION

Our specific HIE pricing recommendations depend on the unique characteristics of this study population. However, our main contribution is the modeling approach, which is broadly applicable to other populations.

Health information exchange: persistent challenges and new strategies

Recent federal policies and actions support the adoption of health information exchange (HIE) in order to improve healthcare by addressing fragmented personal health information. However, concerted efforts at facilitating HIE have existed for over two decades in this country. The lessons of these experiences include a recurrence of barriers and challenges beyond those associated with technology. Without new strategies, the current support and methods of facilitating HIE may not address these barriers.

Hierarchical combinatorial planning of medical treatment

The paper addresses a problem of constructing a composite plan for a medical treatment on the basis of hierarchical morphological approach, multicriteria ranking, and morphological clique problem. The approach consists of the following phases: (a) hierarchical description of the medical plan; (b) generation of local alternative actions; (c) multicriteria selection of the local actions; and (d) composition of the best local actions into the global composite medical plan. An illustrative numerical example for children asthma describes the problem and solving processes.