Reproductive skew, fighting costs, and winner-loser effects in social-dominance evolution

Distinct prefrontal projection activity and transcriptional state conversely orchestrate social competition and hierarchy

Social animals compete for limited resources, resulting in a social hierarchy. Although different neuronal subpopulations in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which has been mechanistically implicated in social dominance behavior, encode distinct social competition behaviors, their identities and associated molecular underpinnings have not yet been identified. In this study, we found that mPFC neurons projecting to the nucleus accumbens (mPFC-NAc) encode social winning behavior, whereas mPFC neurons projecting to the ventral tegmental area (mPFC-VTA) encode social losing behavior. High-throughput single-cell transcriptomic analysis and projection-specific genetic manipulation revealed that the expression level of POU domain, class 3, transcription factor 1 (Pou3f1) in mPFC-VTA neurons controls social hierarchy. Optogenetic activation of mPFC-VTA neurons increases Pou3f1 expression and lowers social rank. Together, these data demonstrate that discrete activity and gene expression in separate mPFC projections oppositely orchestrate social competition and hierarchy.

Is this worth the trouble? Strategic conflict management in Tonkean macaques

Conflict management entails preventing and repairing damages resulting from social conflicts. While previous research has emphasized post-conflict actions like reconciliation, the understanding of how primates weigh the costs and benefits of conflict remains limited. Uncovering this hidden but fundamental aspect of conflict management requires addressing actively avoided social conflicts. In a study involving semi-free ranging Tonkean macaques, individuals were presented with social dilemmas: displacing a peer to access a preferred juice reward or opting for a peer-free but less preferred one to avoid conflict. The results showed that subjects attributed a cost to the social conflict and did not demonstrate a systematic drive to dominate. Decision modeling revealed integration of peer hierarchy and reward subjective value, with subjects' own social rank impacting the balance between these social and economic dimensions. Overall, this research highlights how primates strategically address group cohesion and peacekeeping, sometimes at the expense of personal preferences.

Game theory in biology: 50 years and onwards

Game theory in biology gained prominence 50 years ago, when Maynard Smith & Price formulated the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Their aim was to explain why conflicts between animals of the same species usually are of a 'limited war' type, not causing serious injury. They emphasized that game theory is an alternative to previous ideas about group selection, which were used by ethologists to explain limited aggression. Subsequently, the ESS concept was applied to many phenomena with frequency dependence in the evolutionary success of strategies, including sex allocation, alternative mating types, contest behaviour and signalling, cooperation, and parental care. Both the analyses of signalling and cooperation were inspired by similar problems in economics and attracted much attention in biology. Here we give a perspective on which of the ambitions in the field have been achieved, with a focus on contest behaviour and cooperation. We evaluate whether the game-theoretical study of the evolution of cooperation has measured up to expectations in explaining the behaviour of non-human animals. We also point to potentially fruitful directions for the field, and emphasize the importance of incorporating realistic behavioural mechanisms into models. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Effects of local versus global competition on reproductive skew and sex differences in social dominance behaviour

Social hierarchies are often found in group-living animals. The hierarchy position can influence reproductive success (RS), with a skew towards high-ranking individuals. The amount of aggression in social dominance varies greatly, both between species and between males and females within species. Using game theory we study this variation by taking into account the degree to which reproductive competition in a social group is mainly local to the group, emphasizing within-group relative RS, or global to a larger population, emphasizing an individual's absolute RS. Our model is similar to recent approaches in that reinforcement learning is used as a behavioural mechanism allowing social-hierarchy formation. We test two hypotheses. The first is that local competition should favour the evolution of mating or foraging interference, and thus of reproductive skew. Second, decreases in reproductive output caused by an individual's accumulated fighting damage, such as reduced parenting ability, will favour less intense aggression but should have little influence on reproductive skew. From individual-based simulations of the evolution of social dominance and interference, we find support for both hypotheses. We discuss to what extent our results can explain observed sex differences in reproductive skew and social dominance behaviour.

Reproductive skew, fighting costs, and winner-loser effects in social-dominance evolution

1. Social hierarchies are often found in group-living animals and can be formed through pairwise aggressive interactions. The dominance rank can influence reproductive success (RS) with a skew towards high-ranking individuals. 2. Using game theory we investigate how the opportunity for differently ranked individuals to achieve RS influences the costs of hierarchy formation and the strength of winner and loser effects. 3. In our model, individuals adjust their aggressive and submissive behaviour towards others through reinforcement learning. The learning is based on rewards and penalties, which depend on relative fighting ability. From individual-based simulations we determine evolutionary equilibria of traits such as learning rates. We examine situations that differ in the extent of monopolisation of contested RS by dominants and in the proportion of total RS that is contested. 4. The model implements two kinds of fighting costs: a decrease in effective fighting ability from damage (loss of condition), and a risk of mortality that increases with the total accumulated damage. Either of these costs can limit the amount of fighting. 5. We find that stable dominance hierarchies form, with a positive correlation between dominance position and fighting ability. The accumulated costs differ between dominance positions, with the highest costs paid by low or intermediately ranked individuals. Costs tend to be higher in high-skew situations. 6. We identify a 'stay-in, opt-out' syndrome, comprising a range from weaker (stay-in) to stronger (opt-out) winner-loser effects. We interpret the opt-out phenotype to be favoured by selection on lower-ranked individuals to opt out of contests over social dominance, because it is more pronounced when more of the total RS is uncontested. 7. We discuss our results in relation to field and experimental observations and argue that there is a need for empirical investigation of the behaviour and reproductive success of lower-ranked individuals.