Perspective in statements of quantity, with implications for consumer psychology

How Should Doctors Frame the Risk of a Vaccine's Adverse Side Effects? It Depends on How Trustworthy They Are

BACKGROUND

How health workers frame their communication about vaccines' probability of adverse side effects could play an important role in people's intentions to be vaccinated (e.g., positive frame: side effects are unlikely v. negative frame: there is a chance of side effects). Based on the pragmatic account of framing as implicit advice, we expected that participants would report greater vaccination intentions when a trustworthy physician framed the risks positively (v. negatively), but we expected this effect would be reduced or reversed when the physician was untrustworthy.

DESIGN

In 4 online experiments (n = 191, snowball sampling and n = 453, 451, and 464 UK residents via Prolific; Mage≈ 34 y, 70% women, 84% White British), we manipulated the trustworthiness of a physician and how they framed the risk of adverse side effects in a scenario (i.e., a chance v. unlikely adverse side effects). Participants reported their vaccination intention, their level of distrust in health care systems, and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs.

RESULTS

Physicians who were trustworthy (v. untrustworthy) consistently led to an increase in vaccination intention, but the way they described adverse side effects mattered too. A positive framing of the risks given by a trustworthy physician consistently led to increased vaccination intention relative to a negative framing, but framing had no effect or the opposite effect when given by an untrustworthy physician. The exception to this trend occurred in unvaccinated individuals in experiment 3, following serious concerns about one of the COVID vaccines. In that study, unvaccinated participants responded more favorably to the negative framing of the trustworthy physician.

CONCLUSIONS

Trusted sources should use positive framing to foster vaccination acceptance. However, in a situation of heightened fears, a negative framing-attracting more attention to the risks-might be more effective.

HIGHLIGHTS

How health workers frame their communication about a vaccine's probability of adverse side effects plays an important role in people's intentions to be vaccinated.In 4 experiments, we manipulated the trustworthiness of a physician and how the physician framed the risk of adverse side effects of a COVID vaccine.Positive framing given by a trustworthy physician promoted vaccination intention but had null effect or did backfire when given by an untrustworthy physician.The effect occurred over and above participants' attitude toward the health care system, risk perceptions, and beliefs in COVID misinformation.

The framing of decisions “leaks” into the experiencing of decisions

We connect Bermúdez's arguments to previous theorizing about “leaky” rationality, emphasizing that the decision process (including decision frames) “leaks” into the experience of decision outcomes. We suggest that the implications of Bermúdez's analysis are broadly applicable to the study of virtually all real-world decision making, and that the field needs a substantive and not just a formal theory of rationality.

Testing the adaptability of people's use of attribute frame information

The informational leakage account of attribute framing effects proposes that a communicator's choice of frame provides informational value, such that different frames are not informationally equivalent. Across five studies communicating food risks, we investigated the adaptability of communication recipients' (our participants) use of frame information by manipulating the degree to which the communicator ostensibly had a choice over how the information was framed. Within-participants framing effects were observed across all conditions of all studies. Only in Study 4 (the only study in which communicator choice was manipulated within-participants) was there any evidence for an attenuation of framing effects where the communicator was not responsible for how the information was framed. Overall, regardless of whether or not framing effects are driven by the informational value contained in a communicator's choice of frame, people show little sensitivity to situations where that choice is removed.

Focus to an attribute with verbal or numerical quantifiers affects the attribute framing effect

People find positive attribute frames (e.g., 75% lean) more persuasive than negative ones (e.g., 25% fat). In three pre-registered experiments, we tested whether this effect would be magnified by using verbal quantifiers instead of numerical ones (e.g., 'high % lean' vs. '75% lean'). This moderating effect of quantifier format was predicted based on previous empirical work and two non-exclusive accounts of framing effects. First, verbal quantifiers are presumed to be a more intuitive format than numerical quantifiers, so might predispose people more to judgement biases such as the framing effect. Second, verbal quantifiers draw a greater focus to the attributes they describe. This could provide a linguistic signal that the positive frame is better than the negative one. In three experiments, we manipulated the attribute frame (positive or negative) and the quantifier format (verbal or numerical) between-subjects, and quantity pairs (e.g., 5% fat and 95% lean or 25% fat and 75% lean) within-subjects. We also tested if participants focused more on the attributes in the frame, by measuring whether participants selected causal sentence completions about the beef that focused on why it had fat meat or lean meat. Results showed a robust framing effect, which was partially mediated by the focus of the sentence completions. However, the verbal format did not increase the magnitude of the framing effect. These results suggest that a focus on the attribute contributes to the framing effect, but contrary to past work, this focus is not different between verbal and numerical quantifiers.

When more is less in financial decision-making: financial literacy magnifies framing effects

In recent years, the financial world has become more complex and intricate. In this context, numeracy and, particularly, financial literacy, are seen as paramount in providing consumers with the knowledge and confidence required to take part in financial markets. Despite some indicative empirical findings, it is still to be ascertained how the two competences differentially contribute to the quality of decision-making in financial contexts. Furthermore, it is still unknown to what degree financial literacy and numeracy, taken as relevant mind-ware for financial decision-making, are effective in guarding against well-documented biases such as loss aversion and framing effects. This study aims to clarify these issues by employing an experimental task, conceived as an approximation to real-world decision-making involving the sale of shares. Our results suggest that numeracy and financial literacy affect decision-making differently in a pattern that, in part, runs counter to conventional economic theory. The data indicate that numeracy promotes a pattern of choices closer to economic rationality, while financial literacy can prove counterproductive and may amplify cognitive biases, namely framing effects and loss aversion. The outcomes are interpreted in light of dual-process theories, and the political implications discussed.

New Perspectives on the Expression of Quantity

The expression of quantity is central to many acts of communication, both formal and casual. Expressions of quantity, whether in numbers and percentages or in language, are used to convey information about frequency, certainty, risk, and degrees of association. It has typically been supposed that the many linguistic expressions that convey quantities are merely vague ways of indicating information that would be better conveyed by numbers and percentages, whenever possible. However, we show that such a view is too simplistic and is misleading. Language expressions can be more informative than numerical information alone. Language expressions carry built-in perspectives that affect the inferences and decisions made by listeners and readers. We also show that information presented through numbers (e.g., the depiction of fat content of foods) is not necessarily neutral, but also induces perspective. Failure to recognize effects of perspective may have led to some false conclusions about how people attribute causation.

“Leaky” Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to “irrational” decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to “leak” into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.

Responsibility judgments of wins and losses in the 2013 chess championship

We report two studies on the perceived responsibility of opponents competing for a goal that can be attained by only one of them. Responsibility judgments were collected in seven samples of lay people and experts before, during, and after the World Chess Championship in 2013. Participants assessed the responsibility of the two players, their supporting teams, local conditions, and chance factors for four hypothetical outcomes (large and small loss/win for each player), along with probabilities for these outcomes, demonstrating subadditivity (sums exceeding 100%) in all samples, even among chess experts. The winner was consistently perceived to be more responsible than the loser, and more for outcomes with large than small margins. There was also an effect of focal player, as Carlsen was given more responsibility both for losses and wins than Anand, by the present (Norwegian) pro-Carlsen samples. However, this effect could be modified by describing the outcomes as Anand’s (rather than Carlsen’s) wins and losses. Thus the study adds to the valence framing literature by showing how responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are framed.

The Eyes and Ears of Status

To those with high status, abundance is granted. Moving beyond the multitude of objective benefits, the authors explore how status, once conferred, colors the perceptual world people inhabit. In four experiments, participants’ status state influenced their judgments of status-relevant features in their environment. Participants in a state of high status reported hearing applause (Experiment 1) and seeing facial expressions (Experiment 2), in reaction to their performance, as louder and more favorable. In addition, expectations of how others will respond—expectations stemming from one’s current status state—accounted for this effect (Experiment 3). Finally, differences in judgments between participants experiencing high versus low status were observed only when the target of the evaluation was the self (Experiment 4). These results advance scholars’ understanding of the psychological experience of status and contribute to the growing literature on the dominant influence psychological states have on people’s judgments of their social world.

Framing effects in inference tasks--and why they are normatively defensible

Framing effects occur when logically equivalent redescriptions of objects or outcomes lead to different behaviors, and, traditionally, such effects have been seen as irrational. However, recent evidence has shown that a speaker's choice among logically equivalent attribute frames can implicitly convey (or "leak") normatively relevant information about the speaker's reference point, among other things. In a reinterpretion of data published elsewhere, in this article it is shown that some common effects in inference tasks (covariation assessment and hypothesis testing) can also be seen as framing effects, thereby expanding the domain of framing. It is also shown that these framing effects are normatively defensible because normatively relevant information about event rarity is leaked through the description of data and through the phrasing of hypotheses, thereby broadening the information leakage approach to explaining framing effects. Information leakage can also explain why framing effects in such inference tasks disappear under certain conditions.

What a speaker’s choice of frame reveals: Reference points, frame selection, and framing effects

Framing effects are well established: Listeners' preferences depend on how outcomes are described to them, or framed. Less well understood is what determines how speakers choose frames. Two experiments revealed that reference points systematically influenced speakers' choices between logically equivalent frames. For example, speakers tended to describe a 4-ounce cup filled to the 2-ounce line as half full if it was previously empty but described it as half empty if it was previously full. Similar results were found when speakers could describe the outcome of a medical treatment in terms of either mortality or survival (e.g., 25% die vs. 75% survive). Two additional experiments showed that listeners made accurate inferences about speakers' reference points on the basis of the selected frame (e.g., if a speaker described a cup as half empty, listeners inferred that the cup used to be full). Taken together, the data suggest that frames reliably convey implicit information in addition to their explicit content, which helps explain why framing effects are so robust.