Ectogenesis and the case against the right to the death of the foetus

Regulating abortion after ectogestation

A few decades from now, it might become possible to gestate fetuses in artificial wombs. Ectogestation as this is called, raises major legal and ethical issues, especially for abortion rights. In countries allowing abortion, regulation often revolves around the viability threshold-the point in fetal development after which the fetus can survive outside the womb. How should viability be understood-and abortion thus regulated-after ectogestation? Should we ban, allow or require the use of artificial wombs as an alternative to standard abortions? Drawing on Cohen, I evaluate three possible positions for the post-ectogestative abortion laws: restrictive, conservative and liberal. While the restrictive position appears untenable, I argue that the liberal and conservative positions can be combined to form a legally and morally coherent basis for post-ectogestative abortion legislation, offering an improvement from the point of both prolife and prochoice positions.

Ethical, Translational, and Legal Issues Surrounding the Novel Adoption of Ectogestative Technologies

Increasing numbers of research teams are investigating the feasibility of developing artificial amnion and placenta technology (AAPT), commonly referred to as "artificial womb technology". This technology, aimed at supporting ex vivo gestation, has not yet been tested in humans, but it has been stated that we are closer to clinical application than ever before as breakthroughs in animal studies demonstrate good proof of principle. With these proof-of-concept models, further dissemination of AAPT as a research modality is expected. In this review article, we consider the ethical implications of the most imminent anticipated applications for AAPT. We focus specifically on the specific ethical complications regarding the improvements this technology may offer to conventional neonatal intensive care, its potential utility in facilitating prenatal interventions, and some of the broader socio-legal implications such as the debates about abortion access and reproductive and gestational choices. We discuss translational and societal questions when it comes to designing and developing this technology, like commitments to value-sensitive design, along with an examination of the legal and moral status of the entity gestating ex utero, which will be relevant for how it ought to be treated in the context of these various applications. From these perspectives, this review identifies the ethical questions that we believe to be most pressing in the development and potential introduction of AAPT, with due attention to their manifestation as translational and legal issues.

The path toward ectogenesis: looking beyond the technical challenges

BACKGROUND

Breakthroughs in animal studies make the topic of human application of ectogenesis for medical and non-medical purposes more relevant than ever before. While current data do not yet demonstrate a reasonable expectation of clinical benefit soon, several groups are investigating the feasibility of artificial uteri for extracorporeal human gestation.

MAIN TEXT

This paper offers the first comprehensive and up to date discussion of the most important pros and cons of human ectogenesis in light of clinical application, along with an examination of crucial ethical (and legal) issues that continued research into, and the clinical translation of, ectogenesis gives rise to. The expected benefits include advancing prenatal medicine, improving neonatal intensive care, and providing a novel pathway towards biological parenthood. This comes with important future challenges. Prior to human application, important questions have to be considered concerning translational research, experimental use of human fetuses and appropriate safety testing. Key questions are identified regarding risks to ectogenesis' subjects, and the physical impact on the pregnant person when transfer from the uterus to the artificial womb is required. Critical issues concerning proportionality have to be considered, also in terms of equity of access, relative to the envisaged application of ectogenesis. The advent of ectogenesis also comes with crucial issues surrounding abortion, extended fetal viability and moral status of the fetus.

CONCLUSIONS

The development of human ectogenesis will have numerous implications for clinical practice. Prior to human testing, close consideration should be given to whether (and how) ectogenesis can be introduced as a continuation of existing neonatal care, with due attention to both safety risks to the fetus and pressures on pregnant persons to undergo experimental and/or invasive procedures. Equally important is the societal debate about the acceptable applications of ectogenesis and how access to these usages should be prioritized. It should be anticipated that clinical availability of ectogenesis, possibly first as a way to save extremely premature fetuses, may spark demand for non-medical purposes, like avoiding physical and social burdens of pregnancy.

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation-recently termed a 'gestateling' by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis-prior to 'birth'. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is as morally serious as infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings.