Conscious Vision in Action

Cortical Visual Impairment in Childhood: 'Blindsight' and the Sprague Effect Revisited

The paper discusses and provides support for diverse processes of brain plasticity in visual function after damage in infancy and childhood in comparison with injury that occurs in the adult brain. We provide support and description of neuroplastic mechanisms in childhood that do not seemingly exist in the same way in the adult brain. Examples include the ability to foster the development of thalamocortical connectivities that can circumvent the lesion and reach their cortical destination in the occipital cortex as the developing brain is more efficient in building new connections. Supporting this claim is the fact that in those with central visual field defects we can note that the extrastriatal visual connectivities are greater when a lesion occurs earlier in life as opposed to in the neurologically mature adult. The result is a significantly more optimized system of visual and spatial exploration within the ‘blind’ field of view. The discussion is provided within the context of “blindsight” and the “Sprague Effect”.

A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former. This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from the 'Two Visual Systems Model', which is the main reference in the literature on affordance perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it actually entertains with affordance perception.

Intelligent action guidance and the use of mixed representational formats

My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information (often conceptually structured information) specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes.

Intentions: The dynamic hierarchical model revisited

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Motor Skill and Performance Philosophy > Action.