Fractions We Cannot Ignore: The Nonsymbolic Ratio Congruity Effect

Is counting a bad idea? Complex relations among children's fraction knowledge, eye movements, and performance in visual fraction comparisons

Understanding fraction magnitudes is crucial for mathematical development but is challenging for many children. Visualizations, such as tape diagrams, are thought to leverage children's early proportional reasoning skills. However, depending on children's prior knowledge, these visualizations may encourage various strategies. Children with lower fraction knowledge might rely on counting, leading to natural number bias and low performance, whereas those with higher knowledge might rely on more efficient strategies based on magnitude. This study explores the relationship between students' general fraction knowledge and their ability to visually compare fraction magnitudes represented with tape diagrams. A total of 67 children completed a fraction knowledge test and a set of comparison tasks with discretized and continuous tape diagrams while their eye movements, accuracy, and response times were recorded. Cluster analysis identified three groups. The first group, high-achieving and applying magnitude-based strategies, showed high accuracy and short response times, indicating efficiency. A second high-achieving group frequently used counting strategies, which was unexpected. This group achieved the highest accuracy but the longest response times, indicating less efficiency. The third group, low-achieving and rarely using counting strategies, had the lowest accuracy and short response times. These students tended to compare absolute sizes rather than relative sizes (i.e., showing a size bias). None of the groups exhibited a natural number bias. The study suggests that counting, although inefficient, does not necessarily lead to bias or low performance. Instead, biased reasoning with fraction visualizations can originate from reliance on absolute sizes.

Heuristic strategy of intuitive statistical inferences in 7- to 10-year-old children

Intuitive statistical inferences refer to making inferences about uncertain events based on limited probabilistic information, which is crucial for both human and non-human species' survival and reproduction. Previous research found that 7- and 8-year-old children failed in intuitive statistical inference tasks after heuristic strategies had been controlled. However, few studies systematically explored children's heuristic strategies of intuitive statistical inferences and their potential numerical underpinnings. In the current research, Experiment 1 (N = 81) examined 7- to 10-year-olds' use of different types of heuristic strategies; results revealed that children relied more on focusing on the absolute number strategy. Experiment 2 (N = 99) and Experiment 3 (N = 94) added continuous-format stimuli to examine whether 7- and 8-year-olds could make genuine intuitive statistical inferences instead of heuristics. Results revealed that both 7- and 8-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds performed better in intuitive statistical inference tasks with continuous-format stimuli, even after focusing on the absolute number strategy had been controlled. The results across the three experiments preliminarily hinted that the ratio processing system might rely on the approximate number system. Future research could clarify what specific numerical processing mechanism may be used and how it might support children's statistical intuitions.

Questions About Quantifiers: Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Quantity Processing by the Brain

One approach to understanding how the human cognitive system stores and operates with quantifiers such as "some," "many," and "all" is to investigate their interaction with the cognitive mechanisms for estimating and comparing quantities from perceptual input (i.e., nonsymbolic quantities). While a potential link between quantifier processing and nonsymbolic quantity processing has been considered in the past, it has never been discussed extensively. Simultaneously, there is a long line of research within the field of numerical cognition on the relationship between processing exact number symbols (such as "3" or "three") and nonsymbolic quantity. This accumulated knowledge can potentially be harvested for research on quantifiers since quantifiers and number symbols are two different ways of referring to quantity information symbolically. The goal of the present review is to survey the research on the relationship between quantifiers and nonsymbolic quantity processing mechanisms and provide a set of research directions and specific questions for the investigation of quantifier processing.

Circling around number: People can accurately extract numeric values from circle area ratios

It has long been known that people have the ability to estimate numerical quantities without counting. A standard account is that people develop a sense of the size of symbolic numbers by learning to map symbolic numbers (e.g., 6) to their corresponding numerosities (e.g. :::) and concomitant approximate magnitude system (ANS) representations. However, we here demonstrate that adults are capable of extracting fractional numerical quantities from non-symbolic visual ratios (i.e., labeling a ratio of two circle areas with the appropriate symbolic fraction). Not only were adult participants able to perform this task, but they were remarkably accurate: linear regressions on median estimates yielded slopes near 1, and accounted for 97% of the variability. Participants also performed at least as well on line-estimation and ratio-estimation tasks using non-numeric circular stimuli as they did in earlier experiments using non-symbolic numerosities, which are frequently considered to be numeric stimuli. We discuss results as consistent with accounts suggesting that non-symbolic ratios have the potential to act as a reliable and stable ground for symbolic number, even when composed of non-numeric stimuli.

Math anxiety differentially impairs symbolic, but not nonsymbolic, fraction skills across development

Although important for the acquisition of later math skills, fractions are notoriously difficult. Previous studies have shown that higher math anxiety (MA) is associated with lower performance in symbolic fraction tasks in adults and have suggested that MA may negatively impact the acquisition of fractions in children. However, the effects of MA on fraction skills in school-aged children remain underexplored. We, therefore, investigated the impact of MA on the performance of younger (second and third graders) and older (fifth and sixth graders) children in math fluency (MF), written calculation, fraction knowledge (FK), and symbolic fraction and nonsymbolic ratio processing. On the basis of our prior work suggesting a perceptual foundation for fraction processing, we predicted that symbolic, but not nonsymbolic, math skills (especially fractions) would be impaired by MA. As predicted, higher MA was associated with lower performance in general mathematics achievement and symbolic fraction tasks, but nonsymbolic ratio processing was not affected by MA in either age group. Furthermore, working memory capacity partially mediated the effects of MA on general mathematics achievement, FK, and symbolic fraction processing. These results suggest that understanding the bidirectional interactions between MA and fractions may be important for helping children acquire these critical skills.

More than the sum of its parts: Exploring the development of ratio magnitude versus simple magnitude perception

Humans perceptually extract quantity information from our environments, be it from simple stimuli in isolation, or from relational magnitudes formed by taking ratios of pairs of simple stimuli. Some have proposed that these two types of magnitude are processed by a common system, whereas others have proposed separate systems. To test these competing possibilities, the present study examined the developmental trajectories of simple and relational magnitude discrimination and relations among these abilities for preschoolers (n = 42), 2nd-graders (n = 31), 5th-graders (n = 29), and adults (n = 32). Participants completed simple magnitude and ratio discrimination tasks in four different nonsymbolic formats, using dots, lines, circles, and irregular blobs. All age cohorts accurately discriminated both simple and ratio magnitudes. Discriminability differed by format such that performance was highest with line and lowest with dot stimuli. Moreover, developmental trajectories calculated for each format were similar across simple and ratio discriminations. Although some characteristics were similar for both types of discrimination, ratio acuity in a given format was more closely related with ratio acuities in alternate formats than to within-format simple magnitude acuity. Results demonstrate that ratio magnitude processing shares several similarities to simple magnitude processing, but is also substantially different.

Symbolic fractions elicit an analog magnitude representation in school-age children

A fundamental question about fractions is whether they are grounded in an abstract nonsymbolic magnitude code similar to that postulated for whole numbers. Mounting evidence suggests that symbolic fractions could be grounded in mechanisms for perceiving nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes. However, systematic examination of such mechanisms in children has been lacking. We asked second- and fifth-grade children (prior to and after formal instructions with fractions, respectively) to compare pairs of symbolic fractions, nonsymbolic ratios, and mixed symbolic-nonsymbolic pairs. This paradigm allowed us to test three key questions: (a) whether children show an analog magnitude code for rational numbers, (b) whether that code is compatible with mental representations of symbolic fractions, and (c) how formal education with fractions affects the symbolic-nonsymbolic relation. We examined distance effects as a marker of analog ratio magnitude processing and notation effects as a marker of converting across numerical codes. Second and fifth graders' reaction times and error rates showed classic distance and notation effects. Nonsymbolic ratios were processed most efficiently, with mixed and symbolic notations being relatively slower. Children with more formal instruction in symbolic fractions had a significant advantage in comparing symbolic fractions but had a smaller advantage for nonsymbolic ratio stimuli. Supplemental analyses showed that second graders relied on numerator distance more than holistic distance and that fifth graders relied on holistic fraction magnitude distance more than numerator distance. These results suggest that children have a nonsymbolic ratio magnitude code and that symbolic fractions can be translated into that magnitude code.

The Development of Nonsymbolic Probability Judgments in Children

Two experiments were designed to investigate the developmental trajectory of children's probability approximation abilities. In Experiment 1, results revealed 6- and 7-year-old children's (N = 48) probability judgments improve with age and become more accurate as the distance between two ratios increases. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with 7- to 12-year-old children (N = 130) while also accounting for the effect of the size and the perceived numerosity of target objects. Older children's performance suggested the correct use of proportions for estimating probability; but in some cases, children relied on heuristic shortcuts. These results suggest that children's nonsymbolic probability judgments show a clear distance effect and that the acuity of probability estimations increases with age.

Task Constraints Affect Mapping From Approximate Number System Estimates to Symbolic Numbers

The Approximate Number System (ANS) allows individuals to assess nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., the number of apples on a tree) without counting. Several prominent theories posit that human understanding of symbolic numbers is based – at least in part – on mapping number symbols (e.g., 14) to their ANS-processed nonsymbolic analogs. Number-line estimation – where participants place numerical values on a bounded number-line – has become a key task used in research on this mapping. However, some research suggests that such number-line estimation tasks are actually proportion judgment tasks, as number-line estimation requires people to estimate the magnitude of the to-be-placed value, relative to set upper and lower endpoints, and thus do not so directly reflect magnitude representations. Here, we extend this work, assessing performance on nonsymbolic tasks that should more directly interface with the ANS. We compared adults’ (n = 31) performance when placing nonsymbolic numerosities (dot arrays) on number-lines to their performance with the same stimuli on two other tasks: Free estimation tasks where participants simply estimate the cardinality of dot arrays, and ratio estimation tasks where participants estimate the ratio instantiated by a pair of arrays. We found that performance on these tasks was quite different, with number-line and ratio estimation tasks failing to the show classic psychophysical error patterns of scalar variability seen in the free estimation task. We conclude the constraints of tasks using stimuli that access the ANS lead to considerably different mapping performance and that these differences must be accounted for when evaluating theories of numerical cognition. Additionally, participants showed typical underestimation patterns in the free estimation task, but were quite accurate on the ratio task. We discuss potential implications of these findings for theories regarding the mapping between ANS magnitudes and symbolic numbers.

How the Abstract Becomes Concrete: Irrational Numbers Are Understood Relative to Natural Numbers and Perfect Squares

Mathematical cognition research has largely emphasized concepts that can be directly perceived or grounded in visuospatial referents. These include concrete number systems like natural numbers, integers, and rational numbers. Here, we investigate how a more abstract number system, the irrationals denoted by radical expressions like 2, is understood across three tasks. Performance on a magnitude comparison task suggests that people interpret irrational numbers (specifically, the radicands of radical expressions) as natural numbers. Strategy self-reports during a number line estimation task reveal that the spatial locations of irrationals are determined by referencing neighboring perfect squares. Finally, perfect squares facilitate the evaluation of arithmetic expressions. These converging results align with a constellation of related phenomena spanning tasks and number systems of varying complexity. Accordingly, we propose that the task-specific recruitment of more concrete representations to make sense of more abstract concepts (referential processing) is an important mechanism for teaching and learning mathematics.

Natural Alternatives to Natural Number: The Case of Ratio

The overwhelming majority of efforts to cultivate early mathematical thinking rely primarily on counting and associated natural number concepts. Unfortunately, natural numbers and discretized thinking do not align well with a large swath of the mathematical concepts we wish for children to learn. This misalignment presents an important impediment to teaching and learning. We suggest that one way to circumvent these pitfalls is to leverage students' non-numerical experiences that can provide intuitive access to foundational mathematical concepts. Specifically, we advocate for explicitly leveraging a) students' perceptually based intuitions about quantity and b) students' reasoning about change and variation, and we address the affordances offered by this approach. We argue that it can support ways of thinking that may at times align better with to-be-learned mathematical ideas, and thus may serve as a productive alternative for particular mathematical concepts when compared to number. We illustrate this argument using the domain of ratio, and we do so from the distinct disciplinary lenses we employ respectively as a cognitive psychologist and as a mathematics education researcher. Finally, we discuss the potential for productive synthesis given the substantial differences in our preferred methods and general epistemologies.

Executive Function in Learning Mathematics by Comparison: Incorporating Everyday Classrooms into the Science of Learning

Individual differences in Executive Function (EF) are well established to be related to overall mathematics achievement, yet the mechanisms by which this occurs are not well understood. Comparing representations (problems, solutions, concepts) is central to mathematical thinking, and relational reasoning is known to rely upon EF resources. The current manuscript explored whether individual differences in EF predicted learning from a conceptually demanding mathematics lesson that required relational reasoning. Analyses revealed that variations in EF predicted learning when measured at a delay, controlling for pretest scores. Thus, EF capacity may impact students' overall mathematics achievement by constraining their resources available to learn from cognitively demanding reasoning opportunities in everyday lessons. To assess the ecological validity of this interpretation, we report follow-up interviews with mathematics teachers who raised similar concerns that cognitively demanding activities such as comparing multiple representations in mathematics may differentially benefit their high versus struggling learners. Broader implications for ensuring that all students have access to, and benefit from, conceptually rich mathematics lessons are discussed. We also highlight the utility of integrating methods in Science of Learning (SL) research.