Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past-Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods

Discounting past experience and the utility of memory: an empirical study

It has been argued that adult humans are absolutely time biased towards the future, at least as far as purely hedonic experiences (pain/pleasure) are concerned. What this means is that they assign zero value to them once they are in the past. Recent empirical studies have cast doubt on this claim, suggesting that while adults hold asymmetrical hedonic preferences - preferring painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future - these preferences are not absolute and are often abandoned when the quantity of pain or pleasure under consideration is greater in the past than in the future. Research has also examined whether such preferences might be affected by the utility people assign to experiential memories, since the recollection of past events can itself be pleasurable or aversive. We extend this line of research, investigating the utility people assign to experiential memories regardless of tense, and provide - to our knowledge - the first quantitative attempt at directly comparing the relative subjective weightings given to 'primary' experiences (i.e., living through the event first-hand) and 'secondary' (i.e., recollective or anticipatory) experiences. We find that when painful events are located in the past, the importance of the memory of the pain appears to be enhanced relative to its importance when they are located in the future. We also find extensive individual differences in hedonic preferences, reasons to adopt them, and willingness to trade them off. This research allows for a clearer picture of the utility people assign to the consumption of recollective experiences and of how this contributes to, or perhaps masks, time biases.

The Prioritization of Prospection

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT

Humans frequently engage in mental time travel, reflecting on the past and anticipating the future. Although these processes may seem similar, research documents systematic differences between retrospection and prospection. We propose a conceptual framework to organize and explain these differences based on three axiomatic temporal asymmetries: The past occurs before the future; the past is more certain than the future; and the past is less controllable than the future. People's experience with these axiomatic differences is internalized and overgeneralized to shape mental representations of the past and future. Our review shows that people generally prioritize prospection over retrospection, attending more to the future than the past and reacting more intensely to future events than to past events. We consider potential moderators of and constraints on the generality of prioritizing prospection. We explore the implications of these temporal asymmetries, emphasizing their theoretical and practical significance.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

While daily life centers on the present, people often reflect on the past and anticipate the future. But which direction of mental time travel-backward or forward-has more influence? We identify three key differences that shape how people engage with the past and future: time flows from past to future, the future is more uncertain, and people have more control over the future. These differences affect the frequency, intensity, and nature of thoughts and feelings, leading to predictable biases in how we mentally represent and emotionally engage with events over time. Because focusing on the future often provides greater benefits, people tend to prioritize prospection over retrospection in everyday life.

Toward an Account of Intuitive Time

People hold intuitive theories of the physical world, such as theories of matter, energy, and motion, in the sense that they have a coherent conceptual structure supporting a network of beliefs about the domain. It is not yet clear whether people can also be said to hold a shared intuitive theory of time. Yet, philosophical debates about the metaphysical nature of time often revolve around the idea that people hold one or more “common sense” assumptions about time: that there is an objective “now”; that the past, present, and future are fundamentally different in nature; and that time passes or flows. We empirically explored the question of whether people indeed share some or all of these assumptions by asking adults to what extent they agreed with a set of brief statements about time. Across two analyses, subsets of people's beliefs about time were found consistently to covary in ways that suggested stable underlying conceptual dimensions related to aspects of the “common sense” assumptions described by philosophers. However, distinct subsets of participants showed three mutually incompatible profiles of response, the most frequent of which did not closely match all of philosophers’ claims about common sense time. These exploratory studies provide a useful starting point in attempts to characterize intuitive theories of time.