Pseudocontamination of blood components with Burkholderia cepacia during quality controls

Septic Transfusion Reactions Involving Burkholderia cepacia Complex: A Review

This review was conducted to assess the global incidence of transfusion-transmitted infections (TTIs) caused by contamination of blood components with the Burkholderia cepacia complex (Bcc). Our search encompassed various specialized databases such as Medline/PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, Scielo, ScienceDirect, and ClinicalKey. An analysis of the literature revealed a total of eleven reported cases where blood components contaminated with Bcc had been transfused, resulting in sepsis among the affected patients. Of these cases, eight were documented in the literature, while the remaining three occurred within the institution involving the authors of this review. A comparative examination was conducted, considering factors such as primary diagnosis, transfused blood component, time elapsed between transfusion and manifestation of symptoms, administration of antibiotics, and final outcome. Interestingly, regardless of the storage temperature, all blood components were found to be susceptible to Bcc contamination. Furthermore, the cases investigated revealed diverse sources of contamination, and it was observed that all the affected patients had compromised immune systems due to underlying illnesses. Based on these findings, a series of preventive strategies were derived to mitigate and decrease the occurrence of similar cases.

Quaternary ammonium disinfectants and antiseptics: tolerance, resistance and potential impact on antibiotic resistance

BACKGROUND

Due to the substantial increase in the use of disinfectants containing quaternary ammonion compounds (QACs) in healthcare and community settings during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is increased concern that heavy use might cause bacteria to develop resistance to QACs or contribute to antibiotic resistance. The purpose of this review is to briefly discuss the mechanisms of QAC tolerance and resistance, laboratory-based evidence of tolerance and resistance, their occurrence in healthcare and other real-world settings, and the possible impact of QAC use on antibiotic resistance.

METHODS

A literature search was conducted using the PubMed database. The search was limited to English language articles dealing with tolerance or resistance to QACs present in disinfectants or antiseptics, and potential impact on antibiotic resistance. The review covered the period from 2000 to mid-Jan 2023.

RESULTS

Mechanisms of QAC tolerance or resistance include innate bacterial cell wall structure, changes in cell membrane structure and function, efflux pumps, biofilm formation, and QAC degradation. In vitro studies have helped elucidate how bacteria can develop tolerance or resistance to QACs and antibiotics. While relatively uncommon, multiple episodes of contaminated in-use disinfectants and antiseptics, which are often due to inappropriate use of products, have caused outbreaks of healthcare-associated infections. Several studies have identified a correlation between benzalkonium chloride (BAC) tolerance and clinically-defined antibiotic resistance. The occurrence of mobile genetic determinants carrying multiple genes that encode for QAC or antibiotic tolerance raises the concern that widespread QAC use might facilitate the emergence of antibiotic resistance. Despite some evidence from laboratory-based studies, there is insufficient evidence in real-world settings to conclude that frequent use of QAC disinfectants and antiseptics has promoted widespread emergence of antibiotic resistance.

CONCLUSIONS

Laboratory studies have identified multiple mechanisms by which bacteria can develop tolerance or resistance to QACs and antibiotics. De novo development of tolerance or resistance in real-world settings is uncommon. Increased attention to proper use of disinfectants is needed to prevent contamination of QAC disinfectants. Additional research is needed to answer many questions and concerns related to use of QAC disinfectants and their potential impact on antibiotic resistance.

In-use contamination of a hospital-grade disinfectant

BACKGROUND

Microbiological monitoring of disinfection of high-touch surfaces identified heavy growth of Serratia marcescens and Achromobacter xylosoxidans not present on surfaces before disinfection, suggesting contamination of the disinfectant used.

METHODS

An investigation included interview of the housekeeper involved, level of bacterial contamination of the in-use quaternary ammonium (Quat) disinfectant, bactericidal activity of the contaminated disinfectant, pulsed field gel electrophoresis of S.marcescens and Achromobacter isolates, survival of S. marcescens on dry surfaces, and genome sequencing to identify possible Quat resistance genes.

RESULTS

The housekeeper, who seldom cleaned patient rooms, had used the disinfectant for months without emptying and drying the bucket between uses. The contaminated disinfectant contained 9.3 × 10⁴ CFU of S. marcescens plus A. xylosoxidans. The log₁₀ reduction of S. marcescens by fresh Quat was 10²-fold lower than that achieved against a control strain (S. marcescens ATCC 13380). Genome sequencing of S. marcescens isolates identified the following genes previously shown to encode for efflux pumps associated with Quat resistance: sdeXY, sdeAB, smfY, and a sugE-like gene.

CONCLUSIONS

Failure to follow existing guidelines and manufacturer's instructions for use resulted in contamination by A. xylosoxidans and by S. marcescens that possessed multiple genes associated with Quat resistance.

Monitoring and controlling bacteria in pharmaceutical industries water system

AIM

This research aimed to monitor pharmaceutical water system by sampling water from all treatment stages, identify bacterial isolates from each phase and determine the most suitable methods to control them.

METHODS AND RESULTS

Water samples were collected and examined from pharmaceutical water system in a pharmaceutical factory in Giza, Egypt during 12 months, once per month (from December 2017 to November 2018) from 15 points covering all stages of the treatment process starting from wells, pre-treatment points; treatment points ending with purified points which are the main source of water used in all pharmaceutical process. In all, 216 water samples were collected and examined, 156 isolates were selected according to morphological characteristics. VITEK system 2 (BioMérieux) was used for identification of all isolates resulting in 24 different identified bacteria. Antibiotic assay test using disc diffusion methods were carried out using seven antibiotics from different groups. Several disinfectants were also examined for efficacy against the isolates to control micro-organisms in water treatment stage and manufacturing area. The effect of different preservatives (parabens, acids and alcohols) in various pharmaceutical formulas was also tested on bacterial isolates, 63% of formulas were effective against all bacterial isolates.

CONCLUSION

Ciprofloxacin was the most effective antibiotic, mixture of 0·45% peracetic acid plus 2·2% of hydrogen peroxide (Minncare 1%) was maximally effective disinfectant, and Cronobacter sakazakii was the most resistant micro-organism against 22·7% of tested preservatives.

SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF THE STUDY

Controlling pharmaceutical manufacturing operation from pathogenic bacteria that affect the quality of drugs.

Delayed recognition of a pseudo-outbreak of Mycobacterium terrae

Pseudo-outbreaks of mycobacteria are difficult to recognize because of long incubation periods for growth and species identification. We report our experience with one clinical microbiology laboratory that isolated a species of nontuberculous mycobacteria from 14 patient specimens. These specimens came from 12 patients at 2 hospitals over a 6-day period and included 6 different fluids or tissues. Because of the delay between mycobacterial specimen submission and growth in culture, the outbreak was not noted until more than a month later. Initial species determination by a reference laboratory indicated that these isolates were Mycobacterium fortuitum. One patient received treatment for presumed M fortuitum brain infection, and it was not effective in changing her clinical course. The isolates were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for identification and typing by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The CDC determined that the isolates were an identical strain of M terrae, thus confirming a pseudo-outbreak. Combining pseudo-outbreak isolates with those correctly identified initially as M terrae during the 6-day period in question, there were 22 samples from 20 patients with M terrae. Since the pseudo-outbreak, the number of cultures of M terrae in the clinical laboratory has returned to baseline levels without any specific intervention.