Anthropological taxonomy as subject and object

Moving beyond the adaptationist paradigm for human evolution, and why it matters

The Journal of Human Evolution (JHE) was founded 50 years ago when much of the foundation for how we think about human evolution was in place or being put in place, providing the main framework for how we consider our origins today. Here, we will explore historical developments, including early JHE outputs, as they relate to our understanding of the relationship between phenotypic variation and evolutionary process, and use that as a springboard for considering our current understanding of these links as applied to human evolution. We will focus specifically on how the study of variation itself has shifted us away from taxonomic and adaptationist perspectives toward a richer understanding of the processes shaping human evolutionary history, using literature searches and specific test cases to highlight this. We argue that natural selection, gene exchange, genetic drift, and mutation should not be considered individually when considering the production of hominin diversity. In this context, we offer suggestions for future research directions and reflect on this more complex understanding of human evolution and its broader relevance to society. Finally, we end by considering authorship demographics and practices in the last 50 years within JHE and how a shift in these demographics has the potential to reshape the science of human evolution going forward.

Conceptual issues in hominin taxonomy: Homo heidelbergensis and an ethnobiological reframing of species

Efforts to name and classify Middle Pleistocene Homo, often referred to as "Homo heidelbergensis" are hampered by confusing patterns of morphology but also by conflicting paleoanthropological ideologies that are embedded in approaches to hominin taxonomy, nomenclature, and the species concept. We deconstruct these issues to show how the field's search for a "real" species relies on strict adherence to pre-Darwinian essentialist naming rules in a post-typological world. We then examine Middle Pleistocene Homo through the framework of ethnobiology, which examines on how Indigenous societies perceive, classify, and name biological organisms. This research reminds us that across human societies, taxonomies function to (1) identify and classify organisms based on consensus pattern recognition and (2) construct a stable nomenclature for effective storage, retrieval and communication of information. Naming Middle Pleistocene Homo as a "real" species cannot be verified with the current data; and separating regional groups into distinct evolutionary lineages creates taxa that are not defined by readily perceptible or universally salient differences. Based on ethnobiological studies of this kind of patterning, referring to these hominins above the level of the species according to their generic category with modifiers (e.g., "European Middle Pleistocene Homo") is consistent with observed human capabilities for cognitive differentiation, is both necessary and sufficient given the current data, and will allow for the most clear communication across ideologies going forward.

The Nature/Culture of Genetic Facts

This review aims to explore the relationship between anthropology and genetics, an intellectual zone that has been occupied in different ways over the past century. One way to think about it is to contrast a classical “anthropological genetics” ( Roberts 1965 ), that is to say, a genetics that presumably informs anthropological issues or questions, with a “genomic anthropology” ( Pálsson 2008 ), that is to say, an anthropology that complements and relativizes modern genomics (on the model of, say, medical anthropology and legal anthropology). 1 This review argues that a principal contribution of anthropology to the study of human heredity lies in the ontology of genetic facts. For anthropology, genetic facts are not natural, with meanings inscribed on them, but are instead natural/cultural: The natural facts have cultural information (values, ideologies, meanings) integrated into them, not layered on them. To understand genetic facts involves confronting their production, which has classically been restricted to questions of methodology but which may be conceptualized more broadly. This review is not intended as a critique of the field of anthropological genetics, but as a reformulation of its central objects of study. I argue for reconceptualizing the ontology of scientific facts in anthropological genetics, not as (value-neutral) biological facts situated in a cultural context, but instead as inherently biocultural facts.