Who Deserves Help? Evolutionary Psychology, Social Emotions, and Public Opinion about Welfare

Through a Tainted Lens: A Qualitatve Study of Medical Learners' Thinking About Patient 'Deservingness' of Health Advocacy

Introduction

While health advocacy is a key component of many competency frameworks, mounting evidence suggests that learners do not see it as core to their learning and future practice. When learners do advocate for their patients, they characterize this work as 'going above and beyond' for a select few patients. When they think about advocacy in this way, learners choose who deserves their efforts. For educators and policymakers to support learners in making these decisions thoughtfully and ethically, we must first understand how they are currently thinking about patient deservingness.

Methods

We conducted qualitative interviews with 29 undergraduate and postgraduate medical learners, across multiple sites and disciplines, to discuss their experiences of and decision-making about health advocacy. We then carried out a thematic analysis to understand how learners decided when and for whom to advocate. Stemming from initial inductive coding, we then developed a deductive coding framework, based in existing theory conceptualizing 'deservingness.'

Results

Learners saw their patients as deserving of advocacy if they believed that the patient: was not responsible for their condition, was more in need of support than others, had a positive attitude, was working to improve their health, and shared similarities to the learner. Learners noted the tensions inherent in, and discomfort with, their own thinking about patient deservingness.

Discussion

Learners' decisions about advocacy deservingness are rooted in their preconceptions about the patient. Explicit curriculum and conversations about advocacy decisions are needed to support learners in making advocacy decisions equitably.

Policy-makers' conception of patient non-attendance fees in specialist healthcare: a qualitative document analysis

OBJECTIVES

Patients missing their scheduled appointments in specialist healthcare without giving notice can undermine efficient care delivery. To reduce patient non-attendance and possibly compensate healthcare providers, policy-makers have noted the viability of implementing patient non-attendance fees. However, these fees may be controversial and generate public resistance. Identifying the concepts attributed to non-attendance fees is important to better understand the controversies surrounding the introduction and use of these fees. Patient non-attendance fees in specialist healthcare have been extensively debated in Norway and Denmark, two countries that are fairly similar regarding political culture, population size and healthcare system. However, although Norway has implemented a patient non-attendance fee scheme, Denmark has not. This study aimed to identify and compare how policy-makers in Norway and Denmark have conceptualised patient non-attendance fees over three decades.

DESIGN

A qualitative document study with a multiple-case design.

METHODS

A theory-driven qualitative analysis of policy documents (n=55) was performed.

RESULTS

Although patient non-attendance fees were seen as a measure to reduce non-attendance rates in both countries, the specific conceptualisation of the fees differed. The fees were understood as a monetary disincentive in Norwegian policy documents. In the Danish documents, the fees were framed as an educative measure to foster a sense of social responsibility, as well as serving as a monetary disincentive. The data suggest, however, a recent change in the Danish debate emphasising fees as a disincentive. In both countries, fees were partly justified as a means of compensating providers for the loss of income.

CONCLUSIONS

The results demonstrate how, as a regulative policy tool, patient non-attendance fees have been conceptualised and framed differently, even in apparently similar contexts. This suggests that a more nuanced and complex understanding of why such fees are debated is needed.

Prioritization preferences for COVID-19 vaccination are consistent across five countries

Vaccination against COVID-19 is making progress globally, but vaccine doses remain a rare commodity in many parts of the world. New virus variants require vaccines to be updated, hampering the availability of effective vaccines. Policymakers have defined criteria to regulate who gets priority access to the vaccination, such as age, health complications, or those who hold system-relevant jobs. But how does the public think about vaccine allocation? To explore those preferences, we surveyed respondents in Brazil, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United States from September to December of 2020 using ranking and forced-choice tasks. We find that public preferences are consistent with expert guidelines prioritizing health-care workers and people with medical preconditions. However, the public also considers those signing up early for vaccination and citizens of the country to be more deserving than later-comers and non-citizens. These results hold across measures, countries, and socio-demographic subgroups.

A Recast Framework for Welfare Deservingness Perceptions

Many important societal debates revolve around questions of deservingness, especially when it comes to debates related to inequality and social protection. It is therefore unsurprising that a growing body of research spanning the social and political sciences is concerned with the determinants of deservingness perceptions. In this contribution, we engage with the currently central theoretical framework used in deservingness research and point out an important weakness: Partly ambiguous definitions of the framework's central concepts, the criteria for perceived deservingness. We also highlight the negative consequences this has for empirical research, including notably varying and overlapping operationalizations and thereby a lacking comparability of results across studies. Our main contribution is a redefinition of the criteria for perceived deservingness and a demonstration of the empirical implications of using this new set of criteria via original vignette survey experiments conducted in Germany and the United States in 2019. Our results provide a clearer image of which criteria drive deservingness perceptions.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11205-021-02774-9.

Popular Attitudes Toward the Distribution of Vaccines Against COVID-19: The Swiss Case

With the arrival of vaccines against the novel coronavirus in late 2020, the issue of how vaccines should be distributed and which groups should be prioritized has become salient. We study popular attitudes toward the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and how these have changed over the course of the pandemic in Switzerland, drawing on data from two rounds of an original public opinion survey conducted in the spring and winter of 2020. We find that the public supports prioritizing vulnerable groups such as health care workers or the elderly. We also find a notable degree of cross-generational solidarity: younger age cohorts prioritize the elderly, while older groups prioritize (typically younger) health care workers. We then examine whether this finding is not in fact driven by vaccine hesitancy. This is not the case for older age groups, whose solidarity thus seems to be genuine. Vaccine hesitancy is an issue among younger groups, however.

Are Emotions Natural Kinds After All? Rethinking the Issue of Response Coherence

The synchronized co-activation of multiple responses-motivational, behavioral, and physiological-has been taken as a defining feature of emotion. Such response coherence has been observed inconsistently however, and this has led some to view emotion programs as lacking biological reality. Yet, response coherence is not always expected or desirable if an emotion program is to carry out its adaptive function. Rather, the hallmark of emotion is the capacity to orchestrate multiple mechanisms adaptively-responses will co-activate in stereotypical fashion or not depending on how the emotion orchestrator interacts with the situation. Nevertheless, might responses cohere in the general case where input variables are specified minimally? Here we focus on shame as a case study. We measure participants' responses regarding each of 27 socially devalued actions and personal characteristics. We observe internal and external coherence: The intensities of felt shame and of various motivations of shame (hiding, lying, destroying evidence, and threatening witnesses) vary in proportion (i) to one another, and (ii) to the degree to which audiences devalue the disgraced individual-the threat shame defends against. These responses cohere both within and between the United States and India. Further, alternative explanations involving the low-level variable of arousal do not seem to account for these results, suggesting that coherence is imparted by a shame system. These findings indicate that coherence can be observed at multiple levels and raise the possibility that emotion programs orchestrate responses, even in those situations where coherence is low.

How pride works

The emotion of pride appears to be a neurocognitive guidance system to capitalize on opportunities to become more highly valued and respected by others. Whereas the inputs and the outputs of pride are relatively well understood, little is known about how the pride system matches inputs to outputs. How does pride work? Here we evaluate the hypothesis that pride magnitude matches the various outputs it controls to the present activating conditions - the precise degree to which others would value the focal individual if the individual achieved a particular achievement. Operating in this manner would allow the pride system to balance the competing demands of effectiveness and economy, to avoid the dual costs of under-deploying and over-deploying its outputs. To test this hypothesis, we measured people's responses regarding each of 25 socially valued traits. We observed the predicted magnitude matchings. The intensities of the pride feeling and of various motivations of pride (communicating the achievement, demanding better treatment, investing in the valued trait and pursuing new challenges) vary in proportion: (a) to one another; and (b) to the degree to which audiences value each achievement. These patterns of magnitude matching were observed both within and between the USA and India. These findings suggest that pride works cost-effectively, promoting the pursuit of achievements and facilitating the gains from others' valuations that make those achievements worth pursuing.

An Adaptationist Framework for Personality Science

The field of personality psychology aspires to construct an overarching theory of human nature and individual differences: one that specifies the psychological mechanisms that underpin both universal and variable aspects of thought, emotion, and behaviour. Here, we argue that the adaptationist toolkit of evolutionary psychology provides a powerful meta–theory for characterizing the psychological mechanisms that give rise to within–person, between–person, and cross–cultural variations. We first outline a mechanism–centred adaptationist framework for personality science, which makes a clear ontological distinction between (i) psychological mechanisms designed to generate behavioural decisions and (ii) heuristic trait concepts that function to perceive, describe, and influence others behaviour and reputation in everyday life. We illustrate the utility of the adaptationist framework by reporting three empirical studies. Each study supports the hypothesis that the anger programme—a putative emotional adaptation—is a behaviour–regulating mechanism whose outputs are described in the parlance of the person description factor called ‘Agreeableness’. We conclude that the most productive way forward is to build theory–based models of specific psychological mechanisms, including their culturally evolved design features, until they constitute a comprehensive depiction of human nature and its multifaceted variations. © 2020 European Association of Personality Psychology

Impact of Race/Ethnicity, Veteran Status, and Place of Birth on Attitudes Towards Welfare Recipients: An Experimental Approach

The current study explored the differences in the public's attitudes and emotions towards welfare recipients based on their race/ethnicity, birthplace, and veteran status. Participants read a mock news story created for the current study about a woman labeled as a "welfare queen" who was receiving assistance, but persuaded the reader to be sympathetic to her case. The mock news story varied based on the race/ethnicity, veteran status, and birthplace of the welfare recipient. Participants assessed the welfare recipient on various evaluative measures. A 4 (race/ethnicity: White/Black/Hispanic/Asian) × 2 (veteran status: veteran/not veteran) × 2 (country of origin: born in the US/not born in the US) between-subjects ANOVA was performed on the attitude and personality evaluations of the welfare recipient. The general pattern of results showed that welfare recipients were evaluated more positively when they were veterans, born in the United States, or were White or Asian. Conversely, the public evaluated the welfare recipient more negatively or held more aversive emotions towards them when they were Hispanic, Black, not born in the United States, or not a veteran. This research adds to the psychological literature and nonprofit sector by testing the persistence of stereotypes on the perception of individual welfare recipients.

Ideology and social cognition Are liberals and conservatives differentially affected by social cues about group inequality?

Research links liberal and conservative ideological orientations with variation on psychological and cognitive characteristics that are important for perceptual processes and decision-making. This study investigates whether this variation can impact the social behaviors of liberals and conservatives. A sample of subjects (n = 1,245) participated in a modified public goods game in which an intragroup inequality was introduced to observe the effect on individuals' tendency toward self-interested versus prosocial behavior. Overall, the contributions of neither liberal- nor conservative-oriented individuals were affected by conditions of a general intragroup inequality. However, in response to the knowledge that group members voted to redress the inequality, levels of contribution among liberals significantly increased in comparison to the control. This was not true for conservatives. The results provide evidence that differences in ideological orientation are associated with individual differences in social cognition.

The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology

Research over the last fifty years has suggested that political attitudes and values around the globe are shaped by two ideological dimensions, often referred to as economic and social conservatism. However, it remains unclear why this ideological structure exists. Here we highlight the striking concordance between these dual dimensions of ideology and independent convergent evidence for two key shifts in the evolution of human group living. First, humans began to cooperate more and across wider interdependent networks. Second, humans became more group-minded, conforming to social norms in culturally marked groups and punishing norm-violators. We propose that fitness trade-offs and behavioural plasticity have maintained functional variation in willingness to cooperate and conform within modern human groups, naturally giving rise to the two dimensions of political ideology. Supported by evidence from across the behavioural sciences, this evolutionary framework provides insight into the biological and cultural basis of political ideology.

Deservingness put into practice: Constructing the (un)deservingness of migrants in four European countries

The increased comparative research on perceptions of public welfare deservingness studies the extent to which different subgroups of citizens are deemed worthy or unworthy of receiving help from the welfare state. The concept of deservingness criteria plays a crucial role in this research, as it theorizes a universal heuristic that citizens apply to rank people in terms of their welfare deservingness. Due to the mainly quantitative nature of the research and despite the indisputable progress it has made, the subjective existence and actual application of these deservingness criteria remain a bit of a black box. What criteria of deservingness do citizens actually apply, and how do they apply them? This article opens the black box of welfare deservingness and sheds light on the nature and practice of deservingness criteria. Empirically, the paper explores how the deservingness of immigrants is discussed and established within 20 focus groups conducted in Slovenia, Denmark, UK, and Norway in 2016 with a total of 160 participants. All 20 focus groups discussed the welfare deservingness of immigrants based on similar vignette stimuli. Our analysis shows that (1) deservingness criteria are used both to construct images of target groups and as normative yardsticks; (2) deservingness criteria do not work independently of each other, but rather co-function in specific hybridized discourses; and (3) the moral logic of deservingness is supplemented by alternative moral logics, at least in the case of migrants.

Moral Foundations in the 2015-16 U.S. Presidential Primary Debates: The Positive and Negative Moral Vocabulary of Partisan Elites

Moral foundations theory (MFT) suggests that individuals on the political left draw upon moral intuitions relating primarily to care and fairness, whereas conservatives are more motivated than liberals by authority, ingroup, and purity concerns. The theory of conservatism as motivated social cognition (CMSC) suggests that conservatives are more attuned than liberals to threat and to negative stimuli. Because evidence for both accounts rests on studies of mass publics, however, it remains unclear whether political elites of the left and right exhibit these inclinations. Thus, this analysis uses the 2015-16 United States presidential primary season as an occasion to explore partisan differences in candidates’ moral rhetoric. The analysis focuses on verbal responses to questions posed during party primary debates, a setting that is largely unscripted and thus potentially subject to intuitive influences. The Moral Foundations Dictionary is employed to analyze how frequently candidates used words representing various moral foundations, distinguishing between positive and negative references to each. Consistent with CMSC, the Republican candidates were more likely to use negative-valence moral terminology, describing violations of moral foundations. The direction of some partisan differences contradicts the expectations of MFT. Donald Trump, a novice candidate, was an exception to the typical Republican pattern, making markedly lower overall use of moral-foundations vocabulary.

Reward circuitry activation reflects social preferences in the face of cognitive effort

Research at the intersection of social neuroscience and cognitive effort is an interesting new area for exploration. There is great potential to broaden our understanding of how social context and cognitive effort processes, currently addressed in disparate literatures, interact with one another. In this paper, we briefly review the literature on cognitive effort, focusing on effort-linked valuation and the gap in the literature regarding cognitive effort in the social domain. Next, we present a study designed to explore valuation processes linked to cognitive effort within the social context of an inequality manipulation. More specifically, we created monetary inequality among the participant (SELF, endowed with $50) and two confederates: one also endowed with $50 (OTHER HIGH) and another with only $5 (OTHER LOW). We then scanned participants using fMRI as they attempted to earn bonus payments for themselves and others through a cognitively effortful feedback-based learning task. Positive feedback produced significantly greater activation than negative feedback in key valuation regions, the ventral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), both when participants were performing the task on their own behalf and when earning rewards for others. While reward-related activity in the VS was exaggerated for SELF compared to OTHER HIGH for both positive and negative feedback, activity in the vmPFC did not distinguish between recipients in the group-level results. Furthermore, participants naturally fell into two groups: those most engaged when playing for themselves and those who reported engagement for others. While Self-Engaged participants showed differences between the SELF and both OTHER conditions in the VS and vmPFC, Other-Engaged participants only showed an attenuated response to negative feedback for OTHER HIGH compared to SELF in the VS and no differences between recipient conditions in the vmPFC. Together, this work shows the importance of individual differences and the fragility of advantageous inequality aversion in the face of cognitive effort, highlighting the need to study cognitive effort in the social domain.

Understanding the development of folk-economic beliefs

Developmental psychology can shed light on (1) the intuitive systems that underlie folk-economic beliefs (FEBs), and (2) how FEBs are created and revised. Boyer & Petersen (B&P) acknowledge the first, but we argue that they do not seriously consider the second. FEBs vary across people (and within a person), and much of this variation may be explained by socialization, social context, and social learning.

Why do people think that others should earn this or that?

Some questions, such as when a statistical distribution of incomes becomes too unequal, seem highly attention-grabbing, inferentially productive, and morally vexing. Yet many other questions that are crucial to the functioning of a modern economy seem uninteresting non-issues. An evolutionary-psychological framework to study folk-economic beliefs has the potential to illuminate this puzzle.

What is seen and what is not seen in the economy: An effect of our evolved psychology

Specific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are "seen" and others are "not seen." Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary psychology (sect. R3). We also comment on the difficulty of explaining folk-economic beliefs in terms of domain-general processes or biases (sect. R4), as developmental studies show how encounters with specific environments calibrate domain-specific systems (sect. R5). We offer a more detailed description of the connections between economic beliefs and political psychology (sect. R6) and of the probable causes of individual variation in that domain (sect. R7). Taken together, these arguments point to a better integration or consilience between economics and human evolution (sect. R8).

Folk-economic beliefs: An evolutionary cognitive model

The domain of "folk-economics" consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices.

Support for redistribution is shaped by compassion, envy, and self-interest, but not a taste for fairness

Why do people support economic redistribution? Hypotheses include inequity aversion, a moral sense that inequality is intrinsically unfair, and cultural explanations such as exposure to and assimilation of culturally transmitted ideologies. However, humans have been interacting with worse-off and better-off individuals over evolutionary time, and our motivational systems may have been naturally selected to navigate the opportunities and challenges posed by such recurrent interactions. We hypothesize that modern redistribution is perceived as an ancestral scene involving three notional players: the needy other, the better-off other, and the actor herself. We explore how three motivational systems-compassion, self-interest, and envy-guide responses to the needy other and the better-off other, and how they pattern responses to redistribution. Data from the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel support this model. Endorsement of redistribution is independently predicted by dispositional compassion, dispositional envy, and the expectation of personal gain from redistribution. By contrast, a taste for fairness, in the sense of (i) universality in the application of laws and standards, or (ii) low variance in group-level payoffs, fails to predict attitudes about redistribution.

Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm

The merit-based equity norm is a widely observed principle of fairness in resource distribution, in which the resources acquired by each individual are expected to be proportional to the contribution. Despite the empirical significance of this principle, theoretical progress in evolutionary explanations of the fairness norm has been limited to an egalitarian norm. In this study, we examined the effect of partner selection on the evolution of the merit-based equity norm in a simple bargaining game. Our agent-based model demonstrates that the merit-based equity norm emerges when the agent can choose to continue the current partnership based on the bargaining result, whereas the egalitarian norm arises in a random matching situation.

The Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.

Validation of the Novaco Anger Scale–Provocation Inventory (Danish) With Nonclinical, Clinical, and Offender Samples

Anger has high prevalence in clinical and forensic settings, and it is associated with aggressive behavior and ward atmosphere on psychiatric units. Dysregulated anger is a clinical problem in Danish mental health care systems, but no anger assessment instruments have been validated in Danish. Because the Novaco Anger Scale and Provocation Inventory (NAS-PI) has been extensively validated with different clinical populations and lends itself to clinical case formulation, it was selected for translation and evaluation in the present multistudy project. Psychometric properties of the NAS-PI were investigated with samples of 477 nonclinical, 250 clinical, 167 male prisoner, and 64 male forensic participants. Anger prevalence and its relationship with other anger measures, anxiety/depression, and aggression were examined. NAS-PI was found to have high reliability, concurrent validity, and discriminant validity, and its scores discriminated the samples. High scores in the offender group demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining self-report assessments of anger with this population. Retrospective and prospective validity of the NAS were tested with the forensic patient sample regarding physically aggressive behavior in hospital. Regression analyses showed that higher scores on NAS increase the risk of having acted aggressively in the past and of acting aggressively in the future.

Human cooperation shows the distinctive signatures of adaptations to small-scale social life

The properties of individual carbon atoms allow them to chain into complex molecules of immense length. They are not limited to structures involving only a few atoms. The design features of our evolved neural adaptations appear similarly extensible. Individuals with forager brains can link themselves together into unprecedentedly large cooperative structures without the need for large group-beneficial modifications to evolved human design. Roles need only be intelligible to our social program logic, and judged better than alternatives.

Patterns of Welfare Attitudes in the Australian Population

The study of community attitudes toward welfare and welfare recipients is an area of increasing interest. This is not only because negative attitudes can lead to stigmatization and discrimination, but because of the relevance of social attitudes to policy decisions. We quantify the attitudes toward welfare in the Australian population using attitude data from a nationally representative survey (N = 3243). Although there was broad support for the social welfare system, negative attitudes are held toward those who receive welfare benefits. Using canonical correlation analysis we identify multivariate associations between welfare attitudes and respondent demographic characteristics. A primary attitudinal dimension of welfare positivity was found amongst those with higher levels of education, life instability, and personal exposure to the welfare system. Other patterns of negative welfare attitudes appeared to be motivated by beliefs that the respondent's personal circumstances indicate their deservingness. Moreover, a previously unidentified and unconsidered subset of respondents was identified. This group had positive attitudes toward receiving government benefits despite having no recent experience of welfare. They did, however, possess many of the characteristics that frequently lead to welfare receipt. These results provide insights into not only how attitudinal patterns segment across the population, but are of relevance to policy makers considering how to align welfare reform with community attitudes.

Gender differences in emotional responses to cooperative and competitive game play

Previous research indicates that males prefer competition over cooperation, and it is sometimes suggested that females show the opposite behavioral preference. In the present article, we investigate the emotions behind the preferences: Do males exhibit more positive emotions during competitive than cooperative activities, and do females show the opposite pattern? We conducted two experiments where we assessed the emotional responses of same-gender dyads (in total 130 participants, 50 female) during intrinsically motivating competitive and cooperative digital game play using facial electromyography (EMG), skin conductance, heart rate measures, and self-reported emotional experiences. We found higher positive emotional responses (as indexed by both physiological measures and self-reports) during competitive than cooperative play for males, but no differences for females. In addition, we found no differences in negative emotions, and heart rate, skin conductance, and self-reports yielded contradictory evidence for arousal. These results support the hypothesis that males not only prefer competitive over cooperative play, but they also exhibit more positive emotional responses during them. In contrast, the results suggest that the emotional experiences of females do not differ between cooperation and competition, which implies that less competitiveness does not mean more cooperativeness. Our results pertain to intrinsically motivated game play, but might be relevant also for other kinds of activities.

Individual differences in political ideology are effects of adaptive error management

We apply error management theory to the analysis of individual differences in the negativity bias and political ideology. Using principles from evolutionary psychology, we propose a coherent theoretical framework for understanding (1) why individuals differ in their political ideology and (2) the conditions under which these individual differences influence and fail to influence the political choices people make.

Fear and Anger in Great Britain: Blame Assignment and Emotional Reactions to the Financial Crisis

While we know that emotional reactions are important influences on political behavior, we know far less about the sources of these emotions. This paper studies the causes of fear and anger in reaction to a negative stimulus: the financial crisis. Anger should have been experienced among individuals who believed a specific actor was to blame for the crisis. Moreover, individuals should have been particularly angry if they blamed an actor who should be accountable to them, for example the national government. I test these expectations using a panel survey run in Britain between 2005 and 2010. This data shows that British citizens experienced anger if they held an actor responsible for the crisis. Moreover, they felt particularly angry if they held the Labour government (and to a lesser extent the European Union) responsible. These findings underline the importance of studying the causes of emotional reactions and show how these may be linked to common institutional distinctions between political systems.

The ancestral logic of politics: upper-body strength regulates men's assertion of self-interest over economic redistribution

Over human evolutionary history, upper-body strength has been a major component of fighting ability. Evolutionary models of animal conflict predict that actors with greater fighting ability will more actively attempt to acquire or defend resources than less formidable contestants will. Here, we applied these models to political decision making about redistribution of income and wealth among modern humans. In studies conducted in Argentina, Denmark, and the United States, men with greater upper-body strength more strongly endorsed the self-beneficial position: Among men of lower socioeconomic status (SES), strength predicted increased support for redistribution; among men of higher SES, strength predicted increased opposition to redistribution. Because personal upper-body strength is irrelevant to payoffs from economic policies in modern mass democracies, the continuing role of strength suggests that modern political decision making is shaped by an evolved psychology designed for small-scale groups.

Is the political animal politically ignorant? Applying evolutionary psychology to the study of political attitudes

As evidenced by research in evolutionary psychology, humans have evolved sophisticated psychological mechanisms tailored to solve enduring adaptive problems of social life. Many of these social problems are political in nature and relate to the distribution of costs and benefits within and between groups. In that sense, evolutionary psychology suggests that humans are, by nature, political animals. By implication, a straightforward application of evolutionary psychology to the study of public opinion seems to entail that modern individuals find politics intrinsically interesting. Yet, as documented by more than fifty years of research in political science, people lack knowledge of basic features of the political process and the ability to form consistent political attitudes. By reviewing and integrating research in evolutionary psychology and public opinion, we describe (1) why modern mass politics often fail to activate evolved mechanisms and (2) the conditions in which these mechanisms are in fact triggered.

Is the Political Animal Politically Ignorant? Applying Evolutionary Psychology to the Study of Political Attitudes

As evidenced by research in evolutionary psychology, humans have evolved sophisticated psychological mechanisms tailored to solve enduring adaptive problems of social life. Many of these social problems are political in nature and relate to the distribution of costs and benefits within and between groups. In that sense, evolutionary psychology suggests that humans are, by nature, political animals. By implication, a straightforward application of evolutionary psychology to the study of public opinion seems to entail that modern individuals find politics intrinsically interesting. Yet, as documented by more than fifty years of research in political science, people lack knowledge of basic features of the political process and the ability to form consistent political attitudes. By reviewing and integrating research in evolutionary psychology and public opinion, we describe (1) why modern mass politics often fail to activate evolved mechanisms and (2) the conditions in which these mechanisms are in fact triggered.

Social welfare as small-scale help: evolutionary psychology and the deservingness heuristic

Public opinion concerning social welfare is largely driven by perceptions of recipient deservingness. Extant research has argued that this heuristic is learned from a variety of cultural, institutional, and ideological sources. The present article provides evidence supporting a different view: that the deservingness heuristic is rooted in psychological categories that evolved over the course of human evolution to regulate small-scale exchanges of help. To test predictions made on the basis of this view, a method designed to measure social categorization is embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted in different countries. Across the national- and individual-level differences that extant research has used to explain the heuristic, people categorize welfare recipients on the basis of whether they are lazy or unlucky. This mode of categorization furthermore induces people to think about large-scale welfare politics as its presumed ancestral equivalent: small-scale help giving. The general implications for research on heuristics are discussed.