From Baby Doe to Baby K: evolving challenges in pediatric ethics. Introduction

Moral Hazard in Pediatrics

"Moral hazard" is a term familiar in economics and business ethics that illuminates why rational parties sometimes choose decisions with bad moral outcomes without necessarily intending to behave selfishly or immorally. The term is not generally used in medical ethics. Decision makers such as parents and physicians generally do not use the concept or the word in evaluating ethical dilemmas. They may not even be aware of the precise nature of the moral hazard problem they are experiencing, beyond a general concern for the patient's seemingly excessive burden. This article brings the language and logic of moral hazard to pediatrics. The concept reminds us that decision makers in this context are often not the primary party affected by their decisions. It appraises the full scope of risk at issue when decision makers decide on behalf of others and leads us to separate, respect, and prioritize the interests of affected parties.

Medical futility in the natural attitude

Medical futility has a long history going back to Plato but continues to be a controversial topic. Patients, families, and health professionals are faced with decisions about which treatments and interventions may be futile, but such questions as who decides; how do competing values get resolved; what value is placed on human life; how are decisions balanced according to reason and, in some circumstances, faith; and who decides effect, benefit, and burdens of treatments are often difficult to answer. The naïve reality of medical futility is explored in the natural attitude to expose presumptions and facts related to both physiologic (fact-based) and evaluative (value-based) futility components. Highlights from the bioethical and clinical literature, a review of 3 landmark cases, and implications for nursing practice are presented. This natural attitude description could serve as what ought to be bracketed for a future phenomenology.

New and lingering controversies in pediatric end-of-life care

OBJECTIVES

Professional societies, ethics institutes, and the courts have recommended principles to guide the care of children with life-threatening conditions; however, little is known about the degree to which pediatric care providers are aware of or in agreement with these guidelines. The study's objectives were to determine the extent to which physicians and nurses in critical care, hematology/oncology, and other subspecialties are in agreement with one another and with widely published ethical recommendations regarding the withholding and withdrawing of life support, the provision of adequate analgesia, and the role of parents in end-of-life decision-making.

METHODS

Three children's hospitals and 4 general hospitals with PICUs in eastern, southwestern, and southern parts of the United States were surveyed. This population-based sample was composed of attending physicians, house officers, and nurses who cared for children (age: 1 month to 18 years) with life-threatening conditions in PICUs or in medical, surgical, or hematology/oncology units, floors, or departments. Main outcome measures included concerns of conscience, knowledge and beliefs, awareness of published guidelines, and agreement or disagreement with guidelines.

RESULTS

A total of 781 clinicians were sampled, including 209 attending physicians, 116 house officers, and 456 nurses. The overall response rate was 64%. Fifty-four percent of house officers and substantial proportions of attending physicians and nurses reported, "At times, I have acted against my conscience in providing treatment to children in my care." For example, 38% of critical care attending physicians and 25% of hematology/oncology attending physicians expressed these concerns, whereas 48% of critical care nurses and 38% of hematology/oncology nurses did so. Across specialties, approximately 20 times as many nurses, 15 times as many house officers, and 10 times as many attending physicians agreed with the statement, "Sometimes I feel we are saving children who should not be saved," as agreed with the statement, "Sometimes I feel we give up on children too soon." However, hematology/oncology attending physicians (31%) were less likely than critical care (56%) and other subspecialty (66%) attending physicians to report, "Sometimes I feel the treatments I offer children are overly burdensome." Many respondents held views that diverged widely from published recommendations. Despite a lack of awareness of key guidelines, across subspecialties the vast majority of attending physicians (range: 92-98%, depending on specialty) and nurses (range: 83-85%) rated themselves as somewhat to very knowledgeable regarding ethical issues.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a need for more hospital-based ethics education and more interdisciplinary and cross-subspecialty discussion of inherently complex and stressful pediatric end-of-life cases. Education should focus on establishing appropriate goals of care, as well as on pain management, medically supplied nutrition and hydration, and the appropriate use of paralytic agents. More research is needed on clinicians' regard for the dead-donor rule.

Attitudes of US neurologists concerning the ethical dimensions of managed care

We surveyed attitudes of US neurologists about the ethical dimensions of managed care by administering a written instrument containing paradigmatic cases portraying conflicts of physicians, patients, and managed care organizations (MCOs). After each case, we assessed neurologists' attitudes by asking them their degree of agreement with a series of statements. We found that neurologists (1) generally were willing to follow clinical practice guidelines if they were created by medical societies; (2) experienced frequent conflicts of interest or conflicts of obligation in the care of their MCO patients; (3) feared legal ramifications of their clinical decisions on MCO patients; (4) were unwilling to employ deception or gaming to achieve what they perceived to be good patient care; (5) believed that their professional prerogatives and autonomy were under attack by MCOs; and (6) felt that the good of their patients should not be sacrificed for the good of society.