Intervening causation and the mitigation of responsibility for harm

Evaluative Deflation, Social Expectations, and the Zone of Moral Indifference

Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted.

Mutual entailment between causation and responsibility

The standard view in philosophy is that responsibility entails causation. Most philosophers treat this entailment claim as an evident insight into the ordinary concepts of responsibility and causation. Further, it is taken to be equally obvious that the reversal of this claim does not hold: causation does not entail responsibility. In contrast, Sytsma and Livengood have put forward an account of the use of ordinary causal attributions (statements like "X caused Y") that contends that they are typically used interchangeably with responsibility attributions (statements like "X is responsible for Y"). Put in terms of the concepts at play in these attributions, this account suggests that the reversal of the entailment claim may also hold, and, a fortiori, there would be mutual entailment between the ordinary concepts of responsibility and causation. Using the cancellability test, we report the results of three pre-registered studies providing empirical evidence that causation and responsibility are mutually entailed by each other.

The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm

The nature of harm—and therefore moral judgment—may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism—the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and—importantly—perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the “dyadic loop,” explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular “foundations,” but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.

An Integrated Model of Attribution of Responsibility for Wrongdoing in Organizations

Sociologists and psychologists have spent several decades attempting to improve our understanding of the factors that influence how people attribute responsibility for outcomes of social action, particularly wrongdoing. Members of two disciplines continue to refine Heider's seminal work in distinct ways, but have not developed a definitive test of attribution of responsibility (AOR) because of the ad hoc nature of existing research. To move towards a definitive test of AOR, we propose an integrated AOR model that is especially well suited to a neglected substantive concern: wrongdoing within organizations. In constructing our integrated model, we synthesize insights from the sociological and psychological research on AOR, while also incorporating concepts from organizational studies. An integrated model has the potential to provide a more stringent test of AOR in cases of organizational wrongdoing, which would move the field beyond its current stagnation and would carry important legal implications.

Benefiting from misfortune: when harmless actions are judged to be morally blameworthy

Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, the current four studies demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless deemed worthy of blame. Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions that enable them to benefit from another's misfortune (e.g., betting that a company's stock will decline or that a natural disaster will occur). Evidence is presented suggesting that perceptions of the actor's wicked desires are responsible for this phenomenon. It is argued that these results are consistent with a growing literature demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to evaluations of acts.

An Attributional Sequence Model of Jury Decision Making in Civil Torts

A jury simulation study was designed to replicate and extend prior research on attributional decision-making sequences in a litigation context. Although previous studies implicated injury severity, causality, responsibility, and punishment, a maximum of three stages in various combinations were tested, and only occasionally in the context of civil litigation. The present effort integrated all four stages into a more inclusive model focused on civil jury decision making. Undergraduate participants ( N = 91) read six case vignettes and responded to attribution questions in each of four categories. Path analyses supported the hypothesized 4-stage attributional sequence.

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.

It's not my fault: when and why attributions to prejudice protect self-esteem

This study tested the hypothesis that awareness of the possibility of being a target of discrimination can provide individuals with a means of self-esteem protection when they are faced with negative outcomes. Men and women contemplated being rejected from a course due to sexism, personal deservingness, or an exclusively external cause. Regardless of gender, participants in the sexism condition blamed themselves less, attributed the rejection less to internal causes, and anticipated feeling less depressed than those in the personal deservingness condition. Furthermore, the more participants discounted the rejection--blamed it more on discrimination than themselves--the less depressed emotions they anticipated feeling. Discounting did not buffer participants from feeling hostility or anxiety. These findings advance our understanding of when and why attributions to prejudice protect emotional well-being.

Culpable control and the psychology of blame

A culpable control model is advanced to describe the conditions that encourage as well as mitigate blame and to assess the process by which blame and mitigation occur. The fundamental assumptions of the model are that evidence concerning harmful events is scrutinized for its contribution to personal control and spontaneously evaluated for its favorableness or unfavorableness. Spontaneous evaluations encourage a blame-validation mode of processing in which evidence concerning the event is reviewed in a manner that favors ascribing blame to the person or persons who evoke the most negative affect or whose behavior confirms unfavorable expectations. The author delineates the elements of perceived control and then discusses spontaneous evaluation influences on control and blame assessments. The blame-validation process is described next. Finally, the culpable control model is compared with extant theories of blame and responsibility and its basic tenets summarized.