Linking signal fidelity and the efficiency costs of communication

The evolutionary stability of attenuators that mask information about animals that social partners can exploit

Signals and cues are fundamental to social interactions. A well-established concept in the study of animal communication is an amplifier, defined as a trait that does not add extra information to that already present in the original cue or signal, but rather enhances the fidelity with which variation in the original cue or signal is correctly perceived. Attenuators as the logical compliment of amplifiers: attenuators act to reduce the fidelity with which variation in a signal or cue can be reliably evaluated by the perceivers. Where amplifiers reduce the effect of noise on the perception of variation, attenuators add noise. Attenuators have been subject to much less consideration than amplifiers; however, they will be the focus of our theoretical study. We utilize an extension of a well-established model incorporated signal or cue inaccuracy and costly investments by emitter and perceiver in sending and attending to the signal or cue. We present broad conditions involving some conflict of interest between emitter and perceiver where it may be advantageous for emitters to invest in costly attenuators to mask cues from potential perceivers, and a subset of these conditions where the perceiver may be willing to invest in costly anti-attenuators to mitigate the loss of information to them. We demonstrate that attenuators can be evolutionary stable even if they are costly, even if they are sometimes disadvantageous and even if a perceiver can mount counter-measures to them. As such, we feel that attenuators of cues may be deserving of much more research attention.

Investment in attending to cues and the evolution of amplifiers

Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. Here, we extend an existing theoretical framework to explore investment by emitters and perceivers in the fidelity with which cues and signals associated with the former are detected by the latter. Traits of the emitter that improve cue or signal fidelity without adding information are termed 'amplifiers'. We assume that each party can invest in improving fidelity but that it is increasingly costly the more fidelity is improved. Our model predicts that evolution of amplifier traits of a pre-existing cue occurs over a broader range of circumstances than evolution of signalling in situations where the emitter offered no pre-existing cue to the perceiver. It further predicts that the greater the intrinsic informational value of a cue, the more likely it is that the perceiver (and not the emitter) will invest in the fidelity of detecting that cue. A consequence of this predicted asymmetry is that true communication with reciprocal adaptations in emitters and perceivers to improve signal fidelity is likely to occur predominantly for traits of intermediate reliability. The corollary is that uncertainty of the perceiver will then be a key feature of communication. Uncertainty can arise because perceivers misinterpret signals or do not perceive them correctly, but here we argue that uncertainty is more fundamentally at the root of communication because traits that are intrinsically highly informative will induce only the perceiver and not the emitter to invest in improved fidelity of perception of that trait.