Egocentrism shapes moral judgements

Hypocrisy moderates self-interest bias in moral character judgments

Self-interest bias describes an observer's tendency to judge moral transgression leniently when they benefit from it. However, what factors moderate the self-interest bias is an open empirical question. Here, we investigated to what extent hypocrisy moderates the self-interest bias. Preregistered Study 1a (N = 194) and replication in Study 1b (N = 193) demonstrated that observers' interest impacts moral character judgments of hypocritical transgressors. This effect was explained by observers' goal attainment due to transgression (Study 2, N = 713) and agreement to aid observers' or ingroup interests (Study 3, N = 634). Importantly, transgressors' hypocrisy moderated the impact of observers' interests in moral character judgments (Studies 2 & 3). In summary, when judging hypocritical transgressors, peoples' moral character judgments tend to be biased by their or their group's interests. However, in comparison to non-hypocritical transgressors, this impact is less pronounced.

Moral conformity in a digital world: Human and nonhuman agents as a source of social pressure for judgments of moral character

Could judgments about others' moral character be changed under group pressure produced by human and virtual agents? In Study 1 (N = 103), participants first judged targets' moral character privately and two weeks later in the presence of real humans. Analysis of how many times participants changed their private moral judgments under group pressure showed that moral conformity occurred, on average, 43% of the time. In Study 2 (N = 138), we extended this using Virtual Reality, where group pressure was produced either by avatars allegedly controlled by humans or AI. While replicating the effect of moral conformity (at 28% of the time), we find that the moral conformity for the human and AI-controlled avatars did not differ. Our results suggest that human and nonhuman groups shape moral character judgments in both the physical and virtual worlds, shedding new light on the potential social consequences of moral conformity in the modern digital world.

The Influence of Group Favoritism on Moral Judgment -- Evidence From Event-Related Potential

When judging the morality of an action, individuals may exhibit a bias stemming from group favoritism. It leads to the expression of different moral evaluations of the same behaviors performed by different social groups. The current study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the influence of in-group favoritism (in-group vs. homogeneous out-group) and out-group favoritism (in-group vs. high-quality out-group) on moral judgments. Two experiments were conducted, showing a higher moral score of the in-group compared to the homogeneous out-group by participants. ERP data indicated that in-group stimulation triggered larger P2 amplitudes than homogeneous out-group. Additionally, a larger N400-like amplitude, localized to the right hemisphere, was observed during the evaluation of the homogeneous out-group. Significantly, when comparing the in-group to the high-quality out-group, there was no discernible difference in moral scores or ERP amplitudes. Overall, the results indicate that in-group favoritism can affect moral judgments, especially when assessing homogeneous out-groups, but it can be reduced by the characteristics of groups.

Motivations to learn genomic information are not exceptional: Lessons from behavioral science

Whether to undergo genome sequencing in a clinical or research context is generally a voluntary choice. Individuals are often motivated to learn genomic information even when clinical utility-the possibility that the test could inform medical recommendations or health outcomes-is low or absent. Motivations to seek one's genomic information can be cognitive, affective, social, or mixed (e.g., cognitive and affective) in nature. These motivations are based on the perceived value of the information, specifically, its clinical utility and personal utility. We suggest that motivations to learn genomic information are no different from motivations to learn other types of personal information, including one's health status and disease risk. Here, we review behavioral science relevant to motivations that may drive engagement with genome sequencing, both in the presence of varying degrees of clinical utility and in the absence of clinical utility. Specifically, we elucidate 10 motivations that are expected to underlie decisions to undergo genome sequencing. Recognizing these motivations to learn genomic information will guide future research and ultimately help clinicians to facilitate informed decision making among individuals as genome sequencing becomes increasingly available.

Egocentric norm in health-based decision making of patients on the autistic spectrum

BACKGROUND

Individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) without intellectual disability (ID) may have advanced mental reasoning; however, symptomology may vary within the population. Possible symptomology includes communication problems, difficulty relating to people, things, and events, and sensory sensitivity. Current concepts in determining health behavior are not applicable to the ASD without ID population.

AIM

The aim of this analysis is to define the concept of egocentric norm in the context of health-based decisions of adults diagnosed with ASD without ID and to support improved nursing practice with this population.

DESIGN

The Walker and Avant approach was used. Model, borderline, and contrary cases are offered.

DATA SOURCE

Literature search yielded 47 peer reviewed papers that were included in the analysis.

REVIEW METHODS

Uses of the concept were reviewed, following the Walker and Avant approach.

RESULTS

Egocentric norm is defined as an individual's ability to perceive, adapt, and respond to information and potential consequences of personal health behavior based on self-evaluation and the immediate environment with limited regard to peer and family influence.

CONCLUSIONS

The new concept of egocentric norm may account for the unique dynamics presented by adults with ASD without ID, which may impact health behaviors and actions.

Moderators of the Liking Bias in Judgments of Moral Character

Previous research found evidence for a liking bias in moral character judgments because judgments of liked people are higher than those of disliked or neutral ones. This article sought conditions moderating this effect. In Study 1 (N = 792), the impact of the liking bias on moral character judgments was strongly attenuated when participants were educated that attitudes bias moral judgments. In Study 2 (N = 376), the influence of liking on moral character attributions was eliminated when participants were accountable for the justification of their moral judgments. Overall, these results suggest that although liking biases moral character attributions, this bias might be reduced or eliminated when deeper information processing is required to generate judgments of others’ moral character.

Partner in crime: Beneficial cooperation overcomes children's aversion to antisocial others

Young children display strong aversion toward antisocial individuals, but also feel responsible for joint activities and express a strong sense of group loyalty. This paper aims to understand how beneficial cooperation with an antisocial partner shapes preschoolers' attitudes, preferences, and moral judgments concerning antisocial individuals. We argue that although young children display a strong aversion to antisocial characters, children may overcome this aversion when they stand to personally benefit. In Study 1a (N = 62), beneficial cooperation with an antisocial partner resulted in the children's later preference for the antisocial partner over the neutral partner. Study 1b (N = 91) replicated this effect with discrete measurement of liking (resource distribution) and showed that children rewarded more and punished less the antisocial partner in the beneficial cooperation setting. In Study 2, (N = 58), children's aversion to an antisocial in-group member decreased when the cooperation benefited other in-group members. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 62), when children passively observed the antisocial individual, personal benefits from the antisocial behavior did not change their negative attitude toward the antisocial individual. Overall, beneficial cooperation with the antisocial partner increased the children's liking and preference for the antisocial partner, but did not affect the children's moral judgments. Presented evidence suggests that by the age of 4, children develop a strong obligation to collaborate with partners who help them to acquire resources-even when these partners harm third parties, which children recognize as immoral.