How Does the Mind Render Streaming Experience as Events?

Working memory capacity for continuous events: The root of temporal compression in episodic memory?

Remembering the unfolding of past episodes usually takes less time than their actual duration. In this study, we evaluated whether such temporal compression emerges when continuous events are too long to be fully held in working memory. To do so, we asked 90 young adults to watch and mentally replay video clips showing people performing a continuous action (e.g., turning a car jack) that lasted 3, 6, 9, 12, or 15 s. For each clip, participants had to carefully watch the event and then to mentally replay it as accurately and precisely as possible. Results showed that mental replay durations increased with event duration but in a non-linear manner: they were close to the actual event duration for short videos (3-9 s), but significantly smaller for longer videos (12 and 15 s). These results suggest that working memory is temporally limited in its capacity to represent continuous events, which could in part explain why the unfolding of events is temporally compressed in episodic memory.

Prediction error and event segmentation in episodic memory

Organizing the continuous flow of experiences into meaningful events is a crucial prerequisite for episodic memory. Prediction error and event segmentation both play important roles in supporting the genesis of meaningful mnemonic representations of events. We review theoretical contributions discussing the relationship between prediction error and event segmentation, as well as literature on episodic memory related to prediction error and event segmentation. We discuss the extent of overlap of mechanisms underlying memory emergence through prediction error and event segmentation, with a specific focus on attention and working memory. Finally, we identify areas in research that are currently developing and suggest future directions. We provide an overview of mechanisms underlying memory formation through predictions, violations of predictions, and event segmentation.

More than a moment: What does it mean to call something an 'event'?

Experiences are stored in the mind as discrete mental units, or 'events,' which influence-and are influenced by-attention, learning, and memory. In this way, the notion of an 'event' is foundational to cognitive science. However, despite tremendous progress in understanding the behavioral and neural signatures of events, there is no agreed-upon definition of an event. Here, we discuss different theoretical frameworks of event perception and memory, noting what they can and cannot account for in the literature. We then highlight key aspects of events that we believe should be accounted for in theories of event processing--in particular, we argue that the structure and substance of events should be better reflected in our theories and paradigms. Finally, we discuss empirical gaps in the event cognition literature and what the future of event cognition research may look like.

Bayesian Surprise Predicts Human Event Segmentation in Story Listening

Event segmentation theory posits that people segment continuous experience into discrete events and that event boundaries occur when there are large transient increases in prediction error. Here, we set out to test this theory in the context of story listening, by using a deep learning language model (GPT-2) to compute the predicted probability distribution of the next word, at each point in the story. For three stories, we used the probability distributions generated by GPT-2 to compute the time series of prediction error. We also asked participants to listen to these stories while marking event boundaries. We used regression models to relate the GPT-2 measures to the human segmentation data. We found that event boundaries are associated with transient increases in Bayesian surprise but not with a simpler measure of prediction error (surprisal) that tracks, for each word in the story, how strongly that word was predicted at the previous time point. These results support the hypothesis that prediction error serves as a control mechanism governing event segmentation and point to important differences between operational definitions of prediction error.

Grounding the Attentional Boost Effect in Events and the Efficient Brain

Attention and memory for everyday experiences vary over time, wherein some moments are better attended and subsequently better remembered than others. These effects have been demonstrated in naturalistic viewing tasks with complex and relatively uncontrolled stimuli, as well as in more controlled laboratory tasks with simpler stimuli. For example, in the attentional boost effect (ABE), participants perform two tasks at once: memorizing a series of briefly presented stimuli (e.g., pictures of outdoor scenes) for a later memory test, and responding to other concurrently presented cues that meet pre-defined criteria (e.g., participants press a button for a blue target square and do nothing for a red distractor square). However, rather than increasing dual-task interference, attending to a target cue boosts, rather than impairs, subsequent memory for concurrently presented information. In this review we describe current data on the extent and limitations of the attentional boost effect and whether it may be related to activity in the locus coeruleus neuromodulatory system. We suggest that insight into the mechanisms that produce the attentional boost effect may be found in recent advances in the locus coeruleus literature and from understanding of how the neurocognitive system handles stability and change in everyday events. We consequently propose updates to an early account of the attentional boost effect, the dual-task interaction model, to better ground it in what is currently known about event cognition and the role that the LC plays in regulating brain states.

Resourceful Event-Predictive Inference: The Nature of Cognitive Effort

Pursuing a precise, focused train of thought requires cognitive effort. Even more effort is necessary when more alternatives need to be considered or when the imagined situation becomes more complex. Cognitive resources available to us limit the cognitive effort we can spend. In line with previous work, an information-theoretic, Bayesian brain approach to cognitive effort is pursued: to solve tasks in our environment, our brain needs to invest information, that is, negative entropy, to impose structure, or focus, away from a uniform structure or other task-incompatible, latent structures. To get a more complete formalization of cognitive effort, a resourceful event-predictive inference model (REPI) is introduced, which offers computational and algorithmic explanations about the latent structure of our generative models, the active inference dynamics that unfold within, and the cognitive effort required to steer the dynamics-to, for example, purposefully process sensory signals, decide on responses, and invoke their execution. REPI suggests that we invest cognitive resources to infer preparatory priors, activate responses, and anticipate action consequences. Due to our limited resources, though, the inference dynamics are prone to task-irrelevant distractions. For example, the task-irrelevant side of the imperative stimulus causes the Simon effect and, due to similar reasons, we fail to optimally switch between tasks. An actual model implementation simulates such task interactions and offers first estimates of the involved cognitive effort. The approach may be further studied and promises to offer deeper explanations about why we get quickly exhausted from multitasking, how we are influenced by irrelevant stimulus modalities, why we exhibit magnitude interference, and, during social interactions, why we often fail to take the perspective of others into account.

Constructing Expertise: Surmounting Performance Plateaus by Tasks, by Tools, and by Techniques

Acquiring expertise in a task is often thought of as an automatic process that follows inevitably with practice according to the log-log law (aka: power law) of learning. However, as Ericsson, Chase, and Faloon (1980) showed, this is not true for digit-span experts and, as we show, it is certainly not true for Tetris players at any level of expertise. Although some people may simply "twitch" faster than others, the limit to Tetris expertise is not raw keypress time but the techniques acquired by players that allow them to use the tools provided by the hardware and software to compensate for the game's relentlessly increasing drop speed. Unfortunately, these increases in drop speed between Tetris levels make performance plateaus very short and quickly followed by game death. Hence, a player's success at discovering, exploring, and practicing new techniques for the tasks of board preparation, board maintenance, optimal placement discovery, zoid rotation, lateral movement of zoids, and other tasks important to expertise in Tetris is limited. In this paper, we analyze data collected from 492 Tetris players to reveal the challenges they confronted while constructing expertise via the discovery of new techniques for gameplay at increasingly difficult levels of Tetris.

Emergent Goal-Anticipatory Gaze in Infants via Event-Predictive Learning and Inference

From about 7 months of age onward, infants start to reliably fixate the goal of an observed action, such as a grasp, before the action is complete. The available research has identified a variety of factors that influence such goal-anticipatory gaze shifts, including the experience with the shown action events and familiarity with the observed agents. However, the underlying cognitive processes are still heavily debated. We propose that our minds (i) tend to structure sensorimotor dynamics into probabilistic, generative event-predictive, and event boundary predictive models, and, meanwhile, (ii) choose actions with the objective to minimize predicted uncertainty. We implement this proposition by means of event-predictive learning and active inference. The implemented learning mechanism induces an inductive, event-predictive bias, thus developing schematic encodings of experienced events and event boundaries. The implemented active inference principle chooses actions by aiming at minimizing expected future uncertainty. We train our system on multiple object-manipulation events. As a result, the generation of goal-anticipatory gaze shifts emerges while learning about object manipulations: the model starts fixating the inferred goal already at the start of an observed event after having sampled some experience with possible events and when a familiar agent (i.e., a hand) is involved. Meanwhile, the model keeps reactively tracking an unfamiliar agent (i.e., a mechanical claw) that is performing the same movement. We qualitatively compare these modeling results to behavioral data of infants and conclude that event-predictive learning combined with active inference may be critical for eliciting goal-anticipatory gaze behavior in infants.

The Development of Learning, Performing, and Controlling Repeated Sequential Actions in Young Children

Our daily lives are composed of several sequential actions that we perform routinely, such as making breakfast, taking a train, and changing clothes. Previous research has demonstrated that a routine system plays a role in performing and controlling repeated sequential actions in familiar situations, and a top-down control system involves the control of the routine system in novel situations. Specifically, most developmental studies have focused on the top-down control system (e.g., executive functions) as a factor enabling the control of goal-directed actions in novel situations. Yet, it has not been thoroughly examined how young children learn, perform, and control repeated sequential actions in familiar contexts. In this review, based on recent computational accounts for adults, we highlight two critical aspects of the routine system from a developmental perspective: (1) automatic flexible changes of contextual representations, which enables humans to select context-dependent actions appropriately; and (2) detection of deviant situations, which signals the need for control to avoid errors. In addition, we propose the developmental mechanism underlying the routine system and its potential driving factors such as statistical regularities and executive functions. Finally, we suggest that an investigation into the interplay between routine and executive functions can form foundations for understanding learning, performing, and controlling repeated sequential actions in young children and discuss future directions in this area.

Brain-environment alignment during movie watching predicts fluid intelligence and affective function in adulthood

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Functional brain connectivity (FC) patterns vary with changes in the environment.

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Adult FC variability is linked to age-specific network communication profiles.

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Across adulthood, the younger network interaction profile predicts higher fluid IQ.

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Yoked FC-concrete environmental changes predict poorer fluid IQ and anxiety.

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Brain areas linked to episodic memory underpin FC changes at multiple timescales.

BOLD fMRI studies have provided compelling evidence that the human brain demonstrates substantial moment-to-moment fluctuations in both activity and functional connectivity (FC) patterns. While the role of brain signal variability in fostering cognitive adaptation to ongoing environmental demands is well-documented, the relevance of moment-to-moment changes in FC patterns is still debated. Here, we adopt a graph theoretical approach in order to shed light on the cognitive-affective implications of FC variability and associated profiles of functional network communication in adulthood. Our goal is to identify brain communication pathways underlying FC reconfiguration at multiple timescales, thereby improving understanding of how faster perceptually bound versus slower conceptual processes shape neural tuning to the dynamics of the external world and, thus, indirectly, mold affective and cognitive responding to the environment. To this end, we used neuroimaging and behavioural data collected during movie watching by the Cambridge Center for Ageing and Neuroscience (N = 642, 326 women) and the Human Connectome Project (N = 176, 106 women). FC variability evoked by changes to both the concrete perceptual and the more abstract conceptual representation of an ongoing situation increased from young to older adulthood. However, coupling between variability in FC patterns and concrete environmental features was stronger at younger ages. FC variability (both moment-to-moment/concrete featural and abstract conceptual boundary-evoked) was associated with age-distinct profiles of network communication, specifically, greater functional integration of the default mode network in older adulthood, but greater informational flow across neural networks implicated in environmentally driven attention and control (cingulo-opercular, salience, ventral attention) in younger adulthood. Whole-brain communication pathways anchored in default mode regions relevant to episodic and semantic context creation (i.e., angular and middle temporal gyri) supported FC reconfiguration in response to changes in the conceptual representation of an ongoing situation (i.e., narrative event boundaries), as well as stronger coupling between moment-to-moment fluctuations in FC and concrete environmental features. Fluid intelligence/abstract reasoning was directly linked to levels of brain-environment alignment, but only indirectly associated with levels of FC variability. Specifically, stronger coupling between moment-to-moment FC variability and concrete environmental features predicted poorer fluid intelligence and greater affectively driven environmental vigilance. Complementarily, across the adult lifespan, higher fluid (but not crystallised) intelligence was related to stronger expression of the network communication profile underlying momentary and event boundary-based FC variability during youth. Our results indicate that the adaptiveness of dynamic FC reconfiguration during naturalistic information processing changes across the lifespan due to the associated network communication profiles. Moreover, our findings on brain-environment alignment complement the existing literature on the beneficial consequences of modulating brain signal variability in response to environmental complexity. Specifically, they imply that coupling between moment-to-moment FC variability and concrete environmental features may index a bias towards perceptually-bound, rather than conceptual processing, which hinders affective functioning and strategic cognitive engagement with the external environment.

Towards Strong AI

Strong AI—artificial intelligence that is in all respects at least as intelligent as humans—is still out of reach. Current AI lacks common sense, that is, it is not able to infer, understand, or explain the hidden processes, forces, and causes behind data. Main stream machine learning research on deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) may even be characterized as being behavioristic. In contrast, various sources of evidence from cognitive science suggest that human brains engage in the active development of compositional generative predictive models (CGPMs) from their self-generated sensorimotor experiences. Guided by evolutionarily-shaped inductive learning and information processing biases, they exhibit the tendency to organize the gathered experiences into event-predictive encodings. Meanwhile, they infer and optimize behavior and attention by means of both epistemic- and homeostasis-oriented drives. I argue that AI research should set a stronger focus on learning CGPMs of the hidden causes that lead to the registered observations. Endowed with suitable information-processing biases, AI may develop that will be able to explain the reality it is confronted with, reason about it, and find adaptive solutions, making it Strong AI. Seeing that such Strong AI can be equipped with a mental capacity and computational resources that exceed those of humans, the resulting system may have the potential to guide our knowledge, technology, and policies into sustainable directions. Clearly, though, Strong AI may also be used to manipulate us even more. Thus, it will be on us to put good, far-reaching and long-term, homeostasis-oriented purpose into these machines.

Tea With Milk? A Hierarchical Generative Framework of Sequential Event Comprehension

To make sense of the world around us, we must be able to segment a continual stream of sensory inputs into discrete events. In this review, I propose that in order to comprehend events, we engage hierarchical generative models that "reverse engineer" the intentions of other agents as they produce sequential action in real time. By generating probabilistic predictions for upcoming events, generative models ensure that we are able to keep up with the rapid pace at which perceptual inputs unfold. By tracking our certainty about other agents' goals and the magnitude of prediction errors at multiple temporal scales, generative models enable us to detect event boundaries by inferring when a goal has changed. Moreover, by adapting flexibly to the broader dynamics of the environment and our own comprehension goals, generative models allow us to optimally allocate limited resources. Finally, I argue that we use generative models not only to comprehend events but also to produce events (carry out goal-relevant sequential action) and to continually learn about new events from our surroundings. Taken together, this hierarchical generative framework provides new insights into how the human brain processes events so effortlessly while highlighting the fundamental links between event comprehension, production, and learning.

Event-Predictive Cognition: A Root for Conceptual Human Thought

Our minds navigate a continuous stream of sensorimotor experiences, selectively compressing them into events. Event-predictive encodings and processing abilities have evolved because they mirror interactions between agents and objects-and the pursuance or avoidance of critical interactions lies at the heart of survival and reproduction. However, it appears that these abilities have evolved not only to pursue live-enhancing events and to avoid threatening events, but also to distinguish food sources, to produce and to use tools, to cooperate, and to communicate. They may have even set the stage for the formation of larger societies and the development of cultural identities. Research on event-predictive cognition investigates how events and conceptualizations thereof are learned, structured, and processed dynamically. It suggests that event-predictive encodings and processes optimally mediate between sensorimotor processes and language. On the one hand, they enable us to perceive and control physical interactions with our world in a highly adaptive, versatile, goal-directed manner. On the other hand, they allow us to coordinate complex social interactions and, in particular, to comprehend and produce language. Event-predictive learning segments sensorimotor experiences into event-predictive encodings. Once first encodings are formed, the mind learns progressively higher order compositional structures, which allow reflecting on the past, reasoning, and planning on multiple levels of abstraction. We conclude that human conceptual thought may be grounded in the principles of event-predictive cognition constituting its root.

Events, Event Prediction, and Predictive Processing

Events and event prediction are pivotal concepts across much of cognitive science, as demonstrated by the papers in this special issue. We first discuss how the study of events and the predictive processing framework may fruitfully inform each other. We then briefly point to some links to broader philosophical questions about events.