Early knapping techniques do not necessitate cultural transmission

Correlates of Vocal Tract Evolution in Late Pliocene and Pleistocene Hominins

Despite decades of research on the emergence of human speech capacities, an integrative account consistent with hominin evolution remains lacking. We review paleoanthropological and archaeological findings in search of a timeline for the emergence of modern human articulatory morphological features. Our synthesis shows that several behavioral innovations coincide with morphological changes to the would-be speech articulators. We find that significant reductions of the mandible and masticatory muscles and vocal tract anatomy coincide in the hominin fossil record with the incorporation of processed and (ultimately) cooked food, the appearance and development of rudimentary stone tools, increases in brain size, and likely changes to social life and organization. Many changes are likely mutually reinforcing; for example, gracilization of the hominin mandible may have been maintainable in the lineage because food processing had already been outsourced to the hands and stone tools, reducing selection pressures for robust mandibles in the process. We highlight correlates of the evolution of craniofacial and vocal tract features in the hominin lineage and outline a timeline by which our ancestors became 'pre-adapted' for the evolution of fully modern human speech.

Human culture is uniquely open-ended rather than uniquely cumulative

Theories of how humans came to be so ecologically dominant increasingly centre on the adaptive abilities of human culture and its capacity for cumulative change and high-fidelity transmission. Here we revisit this hypothesis by comparing human culture with animal cultures and cases of epigenetic inheritance and parental effects. We first conclude that cumulative change and high transmission fidelity are not unique to human culture as previously thought, and so they are unlikely to explain its adaptive qualities. We then evaluate the evidence for seven alternative explanations: the inheritance of acquired characters, the pathways of inheritance, the non-random generation of variation, the scope of heritable variation, effects on organismal fitness, effects on genetic fitness and effects on evolutionary dynamics. From these, we identify the open-ended scope of human cultural variation as a key, but generally neglected, phenomenon. We end by articulating a hypothesis for the cognitive basis of this open-endedness.

Stone toolmaking energy expenditure differs between novice and expert toolmakers

OBJECTIVES

This study investigates the energetic costs associated with Oldowan-style flake production and how skill differences influence these costs.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Nine adult participants, including novice and expert toolmakers, underwent a 2-h experimental session where we measured energy expenditure and flaking outcomes. We measured body mass (kg), percent body fat, and fat-free mass (kg) and used open-circuit indirect calorimetry to quantify energy expenditure. The lithic analysis used standard linear and mass measurements on the resulting cores and flakes. Qualitative observations from the video recordings provide insight into the subject's body positions and hand grips.

RESULTS

Results reveal significant differences in energy expenditure between novice and expert toolmakers, with experts demonstrating lower overall energy expenditure. Additionally, experts produced more flakes, reduced greater core mass per unit of energy expenditure, and exhibited distinct body positions, hand grips, and core/flake morphologies compared with novices.

DISCUSSION

The study provides novel insights into the bio-cultural impacts of stone toolmaking skill acquisition, suggesting that skilled performance reduces the metabolic costs of stone tool production. These findings contribute to debates surrounding the origins of human cultural capacities and highlight the importance of including energy expenditure measures in knapping experiments. Moreover, the results suggest that the presence or absence of expertise in the Paleolithic would have fundamentally altered selective pressures and the reliability of skill reproduction. This study enhances our understanding of differences in stone toolmaking skill and their implications for human energy allocation strategies during early technological evolution.

"How handy was early hominin 'know-how'?" An experimental approach exploring efficient early stone tool use

OBJECTIVES

The appearance of early lithic industries has been associated with the gradual development of unique biomechanical and cognitive abilities in hominins, including human-like precision grasping and basic learning and/or communicating capacities. These include tools used for activities exclusively associated with hominin contexts (cutting flakes) and hammerstones utilized for behaviors shared with non-human primates (e.g., nut-cracking). However, no previous experimental research has focused on comparing the factors affecting efficiency between these two key behavioral patterns and their evolutionary implications.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Here, we address this gap with an experimental design involving participants with varying tool-related experience levels (i.e., no experience, theoretical-only experience, and extensive practical knapping expertise) to monitor their success rates, biometrics, and surface electromyography (sEMG) recordings from eight important hand and forearm muscles.

RESULTS

Our results showed that practical experience had a substantial impact on flake-cutting efficiency, allowing participants to achieve greater success rates with substantially less muscle effort. This relationship between success rates and muscle effort was not observed for the nut-cracking task. Moreover, even though practical experience did not significantly benefit nut-cracking success, experts exhibited increased rates of self-improvement in that task.

DISCUSSION

Altogether, these experimental findings suggest that the ability to practice and retain tool-using knowledge played a fundamental role in the subsistence strategies and adaptability of early hominins, potentially providing the cognitive basis for conceptualizing the first intentional tool production strategies.

Martinez L, Criado-Boado F, Müeller J, Clark A. A computational approach to selective attention in embodied approaches to cognitive archaeology

This article proposes a novel computational approach to embodied approaches in cognitive archaeology called computational cognitive archaeology (CCA). We argue that cognitive archaeology, understood as the study of the human mind based on archaeological findings such as artefacts and material remains excavated and interpreted in the present, can benefit from the integration of novel methods in computational neuroscience interested in modelling the way the brain, the body and the environment are coupled and parameterized to allow for adaptive behaviour. We discuss the kind of tasks that CCA may engage in with a narrative example of how one can model the cumulative cultural evolution of the material and cognitive components of technologies, focusing on the case of knapping technology. This article thus provides a novel theoretical framework to formalize research in cognitive archaeology using recent developments in computational neuroscience.

Design and development of a sensorized hammerstone for accurate force measurement in stone knapping experiments

The process of making stone tools, specifically knapping, is a hominin behaviour that typically involves using the upper limb to manipulate a stone hammer and apply concentrated percussive force to another stone, causing fracture and detachment of stone chips with sharp edges. To understand the emergence and subsequent evolution of tool-related behaviours in hominins, the connections between the mechanics of stone knapping, including the delivery of percussive forces, and biomechanics and hominin anatomy, especially in the upper limb, are required. However, there is an absence of direct experimental means to measure the actual forces generated and applied to produce flakes during knapping. Our study introduces a novel solution to this problem in the form of an ergonomic hand-held synthetic hammerstone that can record the percussive forces that occur during knapping experiments. This hammerstone is composed of a deformable pneumatic 3D-printed chamber encased within a 3D-printed grip and a stone-milled striker. During knapping, hammer impact causes the pneumatic chamber to deform, which leads to a change in pressure that is measured by a sensor. Comparisons of recorded pressure data against corresponding force values measured using a force plate show that the synthetic hammer quantifies percussion forces with relatively high accuracy. The performance of this hammerstone was further validated by conducting anvil-supported knapping experiments on glass that resulted in a root mean square error of under 6%, while recording forces up to 730 N with successful flake detachments. These validation results indicate that accuracy was not sensitive to variations up to 15° from the vertical in the hammer striking angle. Our approach allows future studies to directly examine the role of percussive force during the stone knapping process and its relationship with both anatomical and technological changes during human evolution.

3.3 million years of stone tool complexity suggests that cumulative culture began during the Middle Pleistocene

Cumulative culture, the accumulation of modifications, innovations, and improvements over generations through social learning, is a key determinant of the behavioral diversity across Homo sapiens populations and their ability to adapt to varied ecological habitats. Generations of improvements, modifications, and lucky errors allow humans to use technologies and know-how well beyond what a single naive individual could invent independently within their lifetime. The human dependence on cumulative culture may have shaped the evolution of biological and behavioral traits in the hominin lineage, including brain size, body size, life history, sociality, subsistence, and ecological niche expansion. Yet, we do not know when, in the human career, our ancestors began to depend on cumulative culture. Here, we show that hominins likely relied on a derived form of cumulative culture by at least ~600 kya, a result in line with a growing body of existing evidence. We analyzed the complexity of stone tool manufacturing sequences over the last 3.3 My of the archaeological record. We then compare these to the achievable complexity without cumulative culture, which we estimate using nonhuman primate technologies and stone tool manufacturing experiments. We find that archaeological technologies become significantly more complex than expected in the absence of cumulative culture only after ~600 kya.

The evolution of hierarchically structured communication

Human language sentences are standardly understood as exhibiting considerable hierarchical structure: they can and typically do contain parts that in turn contain parts, etc. In other words, sentences are thought to generally exhibit significant nested part-whole structure. As far as we can tell, this is not a feature of the gestural or vocal communication systems of our great ape relatives. So, one of the many challenges we face in providing a theory of human language evolution is to explain the evolution of hierarchically structured communication in our line. This article takes up that challenge. More specifically, I first present and motivate an account of hierarchical structure in language that departs significantly from the orthodox conception of such structure in linguistics and evolutionary discussions that draw on linguistic theory. On the account I propose, linguistic structure, including hierarchical structure, is treated as a special case of structured action. This account is rooted in the cognitive neuroscience of action, as opposed to (formal) linguistic theory. Among other things, such an account enables us to see how selection for enhanced capacities of act organization and act control in actors, and for act interpretation in observers, might have constructed the brain machinery necessary for the elaborate forms of hierarchically structured communication that we humans engage in. I flesh out this line of thought, emphasizing in particular the role of hominin technique and technology, and the social learning thereof, as evolutionary drivers of this brain machinery.

The transition from animal to human culture-simulating the social protocell hypothesis

The origin of human cumulative culture is commonly envisioned as the appearance (some 2.0-2.5 million years ago) of a capacity to faithfully copy the know-how that underpins socially learned traditions. While certainly plausible, this story faces a steep 'startup problem'. For example, it presumes that ape-like early Homo possessed specialized cognitive capabilities for faithful know-how copying and that early toolmaking actually required such a capacity. The social protocell hypothesis provides a leaner story, where cumulative culture may have originated even earlier-as cumulative systems of non-cumulative traditions ('institutions' and 'cultural lifestyles'), via an emergent group-level channel of cultural inheritance. This channel emerges as a side-effect of a specific but in itself unremarkable suite of social group behaviours. It is independent of faithful know-how copying, and an ancestral version is argued to persist in Pan today. Hominin cultural lifestyles would thereby have gained in complexity and sophistication, eventually becoming independent units of selection (socionts) via a cultural evolutionary transition in individuality, abstractly similar to the origin of early cells. We here explore this hypothesis by simulating its basic premises. The model produces the expected behaviour and reveals several additional and non-trivial phenomena as fodder for future work. This article is part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions'.

To copy or not to copy? That is the question! From chimpanzees to the foundation of human technological culture

A prerequisite for copying innovative behaviour faithfully is the capacity of observers' brains, regarded as 'hierarchically mechanistic minds', to overcome cognitive 'surprisal' (see 2.), by maximising the evidence for their internal models, through active inference. Unlike modern humans, chimpanzees and other great apes show considerable limitations in their ability, or 'Zone of Bounded Surprisal', to overcome cognitive surprisal induced by innovative or unorthodox behaviour that rarely, therefore, is copied precisely or accurately. Most can copy adequately what is within their phenotypically habitual behavioural repertoire, in which technology plays scant part. Widespread intra- and intergenerational social transmission of complex technological innovations is not a hall-mark of great-ape taxa. 3 Ma, precursors of the genus Homo made stone artefacts, and stone-flaking likely was habitual before 2 Ma. After that time, early Homo erectus has left traces of technological innovations, though faithful copying of these and their intra- and intergenerational social transmission were rare before 1 Ma. This likely owed to a cerebral infrastructure of interconnected neuronal systems more limited than ours. Brains were smaller in size than ours, and cerebral neuronal systems ceased to develop when early Homo erectus attained full adult maturity by the mid-teen years, whereas its development continues until our mid-twenties nowadays. Pleistocene Homo underwent remarkable evolutionary adaptation of neurobiological propensities, and cerebral aspects are discussed that, it is proposed here, plausibly, were fundamental for faithful copying, which underpinned social transmission of technologies, cumulative learning, and culture. Here, observers' responses to an innovation are more important for ensuring its transmission than is an innovator's production of it, because, by themselves, the minimal cognitive prerequisites that are needed for encoding and assimilating innovations are insufficient for practical outcomes to accumulate and spread intra- and intergenerationally.

The method of exclusion (still) cannot identify specific mechanisms of cultural inheritance

The method of exclusion identifies patterns of distributions of behaviours and/or artefact forms among different groups, where these patterns are deemed unlikely to arise from purely genetic and/or ecological factors. The presence of such patterns is often used to establish whether a species is cultural or not-i.e. whether a species uses social learning or not. Researchers using or describing this method have often pointed out that the method cannot pinpoint which specific type(s) of social learning resulted in the observed patterns. However, the literature continues to contain such inferences. In a new attempt to warn against these logically unwarranted conclusions, we illustrate this error using a novel approach. We use an individual-based model, focused on wild ape cultural patterns-as these patterns are the best-known cases of animal culture and as they also contain the most frequent usage of the unwarranted inference for specific social learning mechanisms. We built a model that contained agents unable to copy specifics of behavioural or artefact forms beyond their individual reach (which we define as "copying"). We did so, as some of the previous inference claims related to social learning mechanisms revolve around copying defined in this way. The results of our model however show that non-copying social learning can already reproduce the defining-even iconic-features of observed ape cultural patterns detected by the method of exclusion. This shows, using a novel model approach, that copying processes are not necessary to produce the cultural patterns that are sometimes still used in an attempt to identify copying processes. Additionally, our model could fully control for both environmental and genetic factors (impossible in real life) and thus offers a new validity check for the method of exclusion as related to general cultural claims-a check that the method passed. Our model also led to new and additional findings, which we likewise discuss.