Critics see only risks, no benefits in horsepox paper

[Dual-use research on modified pathogens in the laboratory: What framework for what issue?]

Technological advances in synthetic biology have made in vitro modification, or even creation, of viruses easier and more affordable. Several research studies using synthesis of potential pandemic pathogens led to controversies in the 2010's. More recently, the hypothesis that Covid-19 pandemics could originate from a lab escape is still under debate. In France, a legislative vacuum remains concerning the synthesis of modified pathogens. Initiating a collective reflection process towards setting of a legal framework on this type of work is timely so that research continues to provide profit to society rather than hazard.

Virus Eradication and Synthetic Biology: Changes with SARS-CoV-2?

The eradication of infectious diseases has been achieved only once in history, in 1980, with smallpox. Since 1988, significant effort has been made to eliminate poliomyelitis viruses, but eradication is still just out of reach. As the goal of viral disease eradication approaches, the ability to recreate historically eradicated viruses using synthetic biology has the potential to jeopardize the long-term sustainability of eradication. However, the emergence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus (SARS-CoV)-2 pandemic has highlighted our ability to swiftly and resolutely respond to a potential outbreak. This virus has been synthetized faster than any other in the past and is resulting in vaccines before most attenuated candidates reach clinical trials. Here, synthetic biology has the opportunity to demonstrate its truest potential to the public and solidify a footing in the world of vaccines.

The Vulnerability Scan, a Web Tool to Increase Institutional Biosecurity Resilience

The importance of vigilance within organizations working with high-risk biological material receives increasing attention. However, an in-depth and comprehensive tool, dedicated to increase awareness of potential risks and to assess an organization's current biosecurity vulnerabilities, has not been available yet. We developed the "Biosecurity Vulnerability Scan," a web tool that identifies biosecurity gaps in an organization based on eight biosecurity pillars of good practice. Although the tool aims primarily to assist biosafety and biosecurity officers, it can also be useful to researchers working with dangerous pathogens, their principal investigators, management, or those responsible for security issues in the life sciences. Results are only stored locally and are provided in an "overview report," which includes information on relevant risks and control measures. This can support well-substantiated decision-making on strengthening biosecurity measures within a specific organization. With this article, we aim to support institutes to increase their overall security resilience and to improve institutional biosecurity in particular by providing practical recommendations. The Biosecurity Vulnerability Scan is available at www.biosecurityvulnerabilityscan.nl.

[The eradication of infectious viral diseases endangered by advances in synthetic biology]

The eradication of infectious diseases is one of the oldest dreams of mankind. It has been materialized only once in History with smallpox in 1980. Considerable efforts are being developed against poliomyelitis viruses since 1988, but the ultimate goal of eradication is not yet achieved. Paradoxically, while the objective of having eradicated these two viral diseases is approaching, synthetic biology multiplies the prowesses of virus "neosynthesis", imperiling at least virtually the durability of these advances. This article emphasizes the potential of a new biology on one side, and the difficult reality of the fight against infections on the other.

Does Biotechnology Pose New Catastrophic Risks?

Advances in biotechnology in the twenty-first century, fueled in large part by the field of synthetic biology, have greatly accelerated capabilities to manipulate and re-program bacteria, viruses, and other organisms. These genetic engineering capabilities are driving innovation and progress in drug manufacturing, bioremediation, and tissue engineering, as well as biosecurity preparedness. However, biotechnology is largely dual use, holding the potential of misuse for deliberate harm along with positive applications; defenses against those threats need to be anticipated and prepared. This chapter describes the challenges of managing dual-use capabilities enabled by modern biotechnology and synthetic biology and highlights a framework tool developed by a National Academies committee to aid analysis of the security effects of new scientific discoveries and prioritization of concerns. The positive aspects of synthetic biology in preparedness are also detailed, and policy directions are highlighted for taking advantage of the positive aspects of these emerging technologies while minimizing risks.

Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards

The recent de novo assembly of horsepox is an instructive example of an information hazard: published methods enabling poxvirus synthesis led to media coverage spelling out the implications, efficiently disseminating true information that might be used to cause harm. Whether or not the benefits justified the risks, the horsepox saga provides ample reason to upgrade the current system for screening synthesized DNA for hazardous sequences, which does not cover the majority of firms and cannot reliably prevent the assembly of potentially pandemic pathogens. An upgraded system might leverage one-way encryption to confidentially scrutinize virtually all commercial production by a cooperative international network of servers whose integrity can be verified by third parties. Funders could support participating institutions to ease the transition or outright subsidize the market to make clean DNA cheaper, while boycotts by journals, institutions, and funders could ensure compliance and require hardware-level locks on future DNA synthesizers. However, the underlying problem is that security and safety discussions among experts typically follow potentially hazardous events rather than anticipating them. Changing norms and incentives to favor preregistration and advisory peer review of planned experiments could test alternatives to the current closeted research model in select areas of science. Because the fields of synthetic mammalian virology and especially gene drive research involve technologies that could be unilaterally deployed and may self-replicate in the wild, they are compelling candidates for initial trials of early-stage peer review.