Jumping to conclusions is associated with paranoia but not general suspiciousness: a comparison of two versions of the probabilistic reasoning paradigm

Psychotic-Like Reasoning Styles in Patients With Borderline Personality Disorder? An Experimental Investigation of the Jumping to Conclusions Bias

INTRODUCTION

Patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) commonly display psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations or delusional/paranoid ideas. We used the fish task to investigate cognitive biases (jumping to conclusions and overcorrection) implicated in the aetiology of psychotic symptoms in patients with BPD.

METHODS

Participants received consecutive pieces of information to determine which of two lakes a fisherman was catching fish from. Outcome measures were draws to decision and frequency of premature decisions after just one and after not more than two fish (jumping to conclusions), probability estimate at the time of the decision (decision threshold) and adjustment of the probability estimate after receiving disconfirmatory information (overcorrection). With data aggregated from multiple studies, a total of 170 patients with BPD and 72 healthy controls (parallelized by age, gender and education) participated.

RESULTS

The two groups showed similar draws to decision and frequencies of premature decisions. The decision threshold was also comparable across the groups. However, the patients with BPD showed overcorrection.

CONCLUSIONS

The experimental study found no evidence for a jumping to conclusions bias or a lower decision threshold in patients with BPD. The stronger adjustment of probability estimates (overcorrection) in patients with BPD is compatible with the unstable affect, self-image and interpersonal relationships observed in patients with BPD.

Cross-cultural validation of the revised Green et al., paranoid thoughts scale

BACKGROUND

With efforts increasing worldwide to understand and treat paranoia, there is a pressing need for cross-culturally valid assessments of paranoid beliefs. The recently developed Revised Green et al., Paranoid Thoughts Scale (R-GPTS) constitutes an easy to administer self-report assessment of mild ideas of reference and more severe persecutory thoughts. Moreover, it comes with clinical cut-offs for increased usability in research and clinical practice. With multiple translations of the R-GPTS already available and in use, a formal test of its measurement invariance is now needed.

METHODS

Using data from a multinational cross-sectional online survey in the UK, USA, Australia, Germany, and Hong Kong (N = 2510), we performed confirmatory factory analyses on the R-GPTS and tested for measurement invariance across sites.

RESULTS

We found sufficient fit for the two-factor structure (ideas of reference, persecutory thoughts) of the R-GPTS across cultures. Measurement invariance was found for the persecutory thoughts subscale, indicating that it does measure the same construct across the tested samples in the same way. For ideas of reference, we found no scalar invariance, which was traced back to (mostly higher) item intercepts in the Hong Kong sample.

CONCLUSION

We found sufficient invariance for the persecutory thoughts scale, which is of substantial practical importance, as it is used for the screening of clinical paranoia. A direct comparison of the ideas of reference sum-scores between cultures, however, may lead to an over-estimation of these milder forms of paranoia in some (non-western) cultures.

The contributions of risk-taking and impulsivity to jumping to conclusions in the psychosis spectrum

The jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias has been linked to the formation and maintenance of delusions across the psychosis spectrum. However, it remains unclear whether this bias reflects a primary cognitive deviation or is secondary to other cognitive processes. To this end, we investigated the relationship between JTC, risk-taking, impulsivity, and sensation seeking in individuals with psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) and controls. A large online community sample (N = 1151) completed the Fish Task as a measure for the JTC bias, as well as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) and the Brief Risk-Taking Propensity Scale (R-1) as measures of the propensity to take risks. Measures assessing impulsivity (Impulsive Behavior Scale-8, I-8), sensation seeking (Brief Sensation Seeking Scale, BSSS-4), and verbal intelligence (12-item Wordsum test) were also administered. We dichotomized the sample into extreme groups based on the positive subscale of the Community Assessment of Psychotic Experiences (CAPE). The present study confirms the existence of a JTC bias in psychosis-prone individuals. Of note, PLE-high individuals self-reported higher risk-taking propensity in the R-1 while at the same time displaying higher objective risk aversion in the BART relative to controls, speaking for a dissociation of subjective versus objective risk-taking behavior. PLE-high individuals showed deviances in other psychological traits (impulsivity, sensation seeking), but these were not associated with hasty decision-making as measured by JTC or risk-taking propensity. The results speak against impulsivity, sensation seeking, or verbal intelligence as driving mechanisms of JTC and risky decision-making.

Relationship between jumping to conclusions and clinical outcomes in people at clinical high-risk for psychosis

BACKGROUND

Psychosis is associated with a reasoning bias, which manifests as a tendency to 'jump to conclusions'. We examined this bias in people at clinical high-risk for psychosis (CHR) and investigated its relationship with their clinical outcomes.

METHODS

In total, 303 CHR subjects and 57 healthy controls (HC) were included. Both groups were assessed at baseline, and after 1 and 2 years. A 'beads' task was used to assess reasoning bias. Symptoms and level of functioning were assessed using the Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States scale (CAARMS) and the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF), respectively. During follow up, 58 (16.1%) of the CHR group developed psychosis (CHR-T), and 245 did not (CHR-NT). Logistic regressions, multilevel mixed models, and Cox regression were used to analyse the relationship between reasoning bias and transition to psychosis and level of functioning, at each time point.

RESULTS

There was no association between reasoning bias at baseline and the subsequent onset of psychosis. However, when assessed after the transition to psychosis, CHR-T participants showed a greater tendency to jump to conclusions than CHR-NT and HC participants (55, 17, 17%; χ2 = 8.13, p = 0.012). There was a significant association between jumping to conclusions (JTC) at baseline and a reduced level of functioning at 2-year follow-up in the CHR group after adjusting for transition, gender, ethnicity, age, and IQ.

CONCLUSIONS

In CHR participants, JTC at baseline was associated with adverse functioning at the follow-up. Interventions designed to improve JTC could be beneficial in the CHR population.

People with jumping to conclusions bias tend to make context-independent decisions rather than context-dependent decisions

Beads task (BT) uses a probabilistic reasoning paradigm and reveals jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias, the tendency to make premature judgments based on insufficient information (i.e., making fewer draws to decision-DTD). In this study, healthy participants (N = 207) were tested on the 80:20 and 60:40 color ratio versions of BT. We investigated associations of JTC bias with a set of cognitive bias problems and Cognitive Bias Task (CBT), a non-veridical (agent-centered) decision-making task that determines context-dependent and context-independent decision-making bias.Results showed that the converted CBT scores were negatively, and cognitive bias scores were positively correlated with JTC bias (DTD ≤ 2) on both versions of the BT. The CBT demonstrated to have satisfactory convergent and predictive validity for JTC bias. The findings suggest that people with JTC bias fail to solve cognitive bias problems and are more likely to make context-independent response selections than context-dependent response selections.

Probing the Hypersalience Hypothesis-An Adapted Judge-Advisor System Tested in Individuals With Psychotic-Like Experiences

Individuals with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis gather and use information differently than controls; in particular they seek and rely on less information or over-weight currently available information. A new paradigm, the judge-advisor system, has previously been used to investigate these processes. Results showed that psychosis-prone individuals tend to seek less advice but at the same time use the available advice more. Some theoretical models, like the hypersalience of evidence-matching hypothesis, predict that psychosis-prone individuals weight recently available information to a greater extent and thus provide an explanation for increased advice-weighting scores in psychosis-prone individuals. To test this model, we adapted the previously used judge-advisor system by letting participants receive consecutively multiple pieces of advice. To meet this aim, we recruited a large MTurk community sample (N = 1,396), which we split in a group with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 80) and a group with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1,107), using the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences' positive subscale. First, participants estimated five people's age based on photographs. Then, they received consecutive advice in the form of manipulated age estimates by allegedly previous participants, with outliers in some trials. After each advice, participants could adjust their estimate. This procedure allowed us to investigate how participants weighted each currently presented advice. In addition to being more confident in their final estimates and in line with our preregistered hypothesis, participants with more frequent psychotic-like experiences did weight currently available advice more than participants with less frequent psychotic-like experiences. This effect was especially pronounced in response to outliers, as fine-grained post-hoc analysis suggested. Result thus support models predicting an overcorrection in response to new incoming information and challenges an assumed general belief inflexibility in people with psychotic experiences.

Problems in measuring the JTC-bias in patients with psychotic disorders with the fish task: a secondary analysis of a baseline assessment of a randomized controlled trial

BACKGROUND

The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC) is considered to be an important causal factor in theoretical models for the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, recent meta-analytic findings show a rather equivocal pattern of results regarding associations between JTC and delusions. Thus, the present study aims to investigate in a large sample whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in patients with psychotic disorders in comparison to controls and whether the JTC bias is associated with a more severe delusional conviction, persecutory delusions, and positive symptoms in general.

METHODS

Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 300) enrolled in a therapy trial and healthy controls (n = 51) conducted a variant of the beads task (fish task) as a measure for the JTC-bias at the start of the trial. Further, clinical interviews were used to assess patients' delusional severity and delusional conviction.

RESULTS

There were no statistically significant differences between patients with psychotic disorders (with 53% displaying the JTC-bias) and controls (41%). Furthermore, there were no statistically significant correlations between JTC measures and persecutory delusions, delusional conviction, and positive symptoms.

CONCLUSIONS

We found no differences in JTC between patients with psychotic disorders and healthy controls, which is in part in line with meta-analytic findings using a wide range of JTC task variants. Interestingly, patients with psychotic disorders displayed JTC rates commonly found in the literature, while healthy control subjects showed an unexpectedly high level of JTC. The task variant we used in the present study (fish task) is discussed as a potential reason for our results, as it may induce a more deliberative reasoning style in controls as compared to the traditional beads task. Furthermore, possible implications for the measurement of the JTC-bias, in general, are discussed.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

ISRCTN29242879 ( isrctn.com ), date of registration: April 12th 2006, retrospectively registered.

Reduction in social learning and increased policy uncertainty about harmful intent is associated with pre-existing paranoid beliefs: Evidence from modelling a modified serial dictator game

Current computational models suggest that paranoia may be explained by stronger higher-order beliefs about others and increased sensitivity to environments. However, it is unclear whether this applies to social contexts, and whether it is specific to harmful intent attributions, the live expression of paranoia. We sought to fill this gap by fitting a computational model to data (n = 1754) from a modified serial dictator game, to explore whether pre-existing paranoia could be accounted by specific alterations to cognitive parameters characterising harmful intent attributions. We constructed a ‘Bayesian brain’ model of others’ intent, which we fitted to harmful intent and self-interest attributions made over 18 trials, across three different partners. We found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with greater uncertainty about other’s actions. It moderated the relationship between learning rates and harmful intent attributions, making harmful intent attributions less reliant on prior interactions. Overall, the magnitude of harmful intent attributions was directly related to their uncertainty, and importantly, the opposite was true for self-interest attributions. Our results explain how pre-existing paranoia may be the result of an increased need to attend to immediate experiences in determining intentional threat, at the expense of what is already known, and more broadly, they suggest that environments that induce greater probabilities of harmful intent attributions may also induce states of uncertainty, potentially as an adaptive mechanism to better detect threatening others. Importantly, we suggest that if paranoia were able to be explained exclusively by core domain-general alterations we would not observe differential parameter estimates underlying harmful-intent and self-interest attributions.

A great deal of work has tried to explain paranoia through general cognitive principles, although relatively little has tried to understand whether paranoia may be explained by specific changes to social learning processes. This question is crucial, as paranoia is inherently a social phenomenon, and requires mechanistic explanations to match with its dynamic phenomenology. In this paper we wanted to test whether pre-existing and live paranoid beliefs about others specifically altered how an individual attributed harmful intent–the live expression of paranoia–to partners over a series of live interactions. To do this we applied a novel computational model and network analysis to behavioural data from a large sample of participants in the general population that had played a modified Dictator game online, and required them to attribute whether the behaviour of their partner was due to their intent to harm, or their self-interest, on two mutually exclusive scales. Pre-existing paranoid beliefs about others reduced the value of new partner behaviours on evolving attributions of harmful intent. We suggest that both pre-existing paranoid beliefs and momentary paranoia may incur an adaptive cognitive state to better track potentially threatening others, and demonstrate phenomenological specificity associated with mechanisms of live paranoia.

Cognitive biases are associated with clinical and functional variables in psychosis: A comparison across schizophrenia, early psychosis and healthy individuals

OBJECTIVE

We investigated the presence of cognitive biases in people with a recent-onset psychosis (ROP), schizophrenia and healthy adolescents and explored potential associations between these biases and psychopathology.

METHODS

Three groups were studied: schizophrenia (N=63), ROP (N=43) and healthy adolescents (N=45). Cognitive biases were assessed with the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQ). Positive, negative and depressive symptoms were assessed with the PANSS and Calgary Depression Scale (ROP; schizophrenia) and with the CAPE-42 (healthy adolescents). Cannabis use was registered. The association between CBQ and psychopathology scales was tested with multiple linear regression analyses.

RESULTS

People with schizophrenia reported more cognitive biases (46.1±9.0) than ROP (40±5.9), without statistically significant differences when compared to healthy adolescents (43.7±7.3). Cognitive biases were significantly associated with positive symptoms in both healthy adolescents (Standardized β=0.365, p=0.018) and people with psychotic disorders (β=0.258, p=0.011). Cognitive biases were significantly associated with depressive symptoms in healthy adolescents (β=0.359, p=0.019) but in patients with psychotic disorders a significant interaction between schizophrenia diagnosis and CBQ was found (β=1.804, p=0.011), which suggests that the pattern differs between ROP and schizophrenia groups (positive association only found in the schizophrenia group). Concerning CBQ domains, jumping to conclusions was associated with positive and depressive symptoms in people with schizophrenia and with cannabis use in ROP individuals. Dichotomous thinking was associated with positive and depressive symptoms in all groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Cognitive biases contribute to the expression of positive and depressive symptoms in both people with psychotic disorders and healthy individuals.

Temporal dynamics of suspiciousness and hallucinations in clinical high risk and first episode psychosis

The objective of the current study is to elucidate the temporal dynamics of suspiciousness and hallucinations as they occur in daily life in the early stages of psychosis. Their prevalence and co-occurrence, as well as their temporal relation to affect and delusions, were compared between patients with a first psychotic episode (FEP) and individuals at clinical high risk for psychosis (CHRp). The Experience Sampling Method was used to investigate suspiciousness and hallucinatory experiences, delusions, and affect at semi-random moments throughout six days in 33 CHRp and 34 FEP. Overall, 91% of CHRp and 59% of FEP reported suspiciousness, and 24% and 39% reported hallucinations, respectively. Hallucinations almost always co-occurred with suspiciousness, whereas suspiciousness was often present without hallucinations. Suspicious episodes in CHRp occurred with marked increases in delusional intensity, while hallucinatory experiences were mostly absent. In FEP, a decrease of positive affect preceded suspicious episodes, while an increase of negative affect preceded hallucinatory episodes. Our results indicated the presence of a delusional mood (atmosphere) in CHRp as an experience in itself, without co-occurring or following hallucinations, thus refuting the anomalous experience hypothesis of psychosis. The co-occurrence of hallucinations, on the other hand, indicates a more severe stage of symptomatology.

The Effect of Transcutaneous Auricular Vagal Nerve Stimulation (taVNS) on P3 Event-Related Potentials during a Bayesian Oddball Task

Transcutaneous auricular Vagal Nerve Stimulation (taVNS) is a non-invasive brain stimulation technique associated with possible modulation of norepinephrinergic (NE) activity. NE is suspected to contribute to generation of the P3 event-related potential. Recent evidence has produced equivocal evidence whether taVNS influences the P3 in healthy individuals during oddball tasks. We examined the effect of taVNS on P3 amplitudes using a novel visual Bayesian oddball task, which presented 200 sequences of three stimuli. The three consecutive stimuli in each sequence are labelled Draw 1, Draw 2 and Draw 3. In total, 47 Subjects completed this visual Bayesian oddball task under randomised sham and active taVNS stimulation in parallel with an electroencephalographic (EEG) recording. We conducted exploratory analyses of the effect of taVNS on P3 amplitudes separately for Draws. We found typical oddball effects on P3 amplitudes at Draws 1 and 2, but not Draw 3. At Draw 2, the oddball effect was enhanced during active compared to sham taVNS stimulation. These data provide evidence that taVNS influences parietal P3 amplitudes under specific circumstances. Only P3 amplitudes at Draw 2 were affected, which may relate to closure of Bayesian inference after Draw 2. Our findings seemingly support previously reported links between taVNS and the NE system.

Paranoia, sensitization and social inference: findings from two large-scale, multi-round behavioural experiments

The sensitization model suggests that paranoia is explained by over-sensitivity to social threat. However, this has been difficult to test experimentally. We report two preregistered social interaction studies that tested (i) whether paranoia predicted overall attribution and peak attribution of harmful intent and (ii) whether anxiety, interpersonal sensitivity and worry predicted the attribution of harmful intent. In Study 1, we recruited a large general population sample (N = 987) who serially interacted with other participants in multi-round dictator games and matched to fair, partially fair or unfair partners. Participants rated attributions of harmful intent and self-interest after each interaction. In Study 2 (N = 1011), a new sample of participants completed the same procedure and additionally completed measures of anxiety, worry and interpersonal sensitivity. As predicted, prior paranoid ideation was associated with higher and faster overall harmful intent attributions, whereas attributions of self-interest were unaffected, supporting the sensitization model. Contrary to predictions, neither worry, interpersonal sensitivity nor anxiety was associated with harmful intent attributions. In a third exploratory internal meta-analysis, we combined datasets to examine the effect of paranoia on trial-by-trial attributional changes when playing fair and unfair dictators. Paranoia was associated with a greater reduction in harmful intent attributions when playing a fair but not unfair dictator, suggesting that paranoia may also exaggerate the volatility of beliefs about the harmful intent of others.

Inflexibility of beliefs and jumping to conclusions in active schizophrenia

Jumping to conclusions (JTC) has been questioned as sufficient cognitive bias for the onset, maintenance, and severity of delusions compared to the bias of inflexibility of beliefs. The WIT (What is this?) test was designed to evaluate JTC and its capacity for classifying participants into a group of patients with active schizophrenia and a comparison group. It was also attempted to determine whether the presence/absence of answer choices, considered a measure of induced inflexibility of beliefs, influences decision-making and is related to the tendency to repeat the first decision, or spontaneous inflexibility of beliefs. The sample was made up of 160 participants, 80 patients with schizophrenia diagnosed at hospital admission and 80 healthy controls. The Beads Task and the WIT test were administered. The WIT classified the participants reasonably well (82.7%) compared to the Beads Task (86.3%). The presence of answer choices favored JTC (d = 0.33), decreasing the number of lines necessary to make a decision (d = 1.78), and influencing keeping to the original answer (d = 1.36), in interaction with the group (d = 0.42). The WIT test overcame some limitations of the Beads Task. The presence/absence of answer choices influenced decision-making and how thinking was flexibilized, more clearly in the case of controls.

Does uncertainty breed conviction? On the possible role of compensatory conviction in jumping to conclusions and overconfidence in psychosis

Background: Jumping to conclusions (JTC) and overconfidence in errors are well established in individuals with a liability to psychosis. Experimental research suggests that subjecting individuals to dilemmas and doubt prompts a subsequent hardening of attitudes and may foster delusion-like convictions. For the present study, we examined whether this compensatory conviction process is exaggerated in individuals with a liability to psychosis and might in part explain JTC and overconfidence. Methods: A large sample of participants from the general population were screened for psychotic experiences with the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences scale (CAPE) and then randomly allocated to either a condition in which they should experience doubt or a control condition. Participants (final sample, n = 650) were then tested on JTC and overconfidence. Results: Participants who scored high on the positive subscale of the CAPE made fewer draws to decision, showed greater confidence, and made more errors relative to low scorers. Yet, none of the parameters was modulated by experimental condition. Conclusions: Our results at present do not support the idea that JTC is elevated by a prior experience of a dilemma or doubt. Yet, this possibility should not be entirely dismissed as the presumed process may take time to evolve and perhaps needs to be more pervasive.

The impact of social and sensory stress on cognitive biases and delusions in schizophrenia

INTRODUCTION

Stress aggravates delusional symptoms, but the exact underlying mechanisms are still not fully understood. One of the routes may be via exacerbation of information processing distortions frequently observed in psychosis. The aim of the present study was thus to investigate the impact of social and sensory stress on specific cognitive processes along with different dimensions of delusional thinking.

METHODS

Nineteen individuals affected by schizophrenia and 15 healthy controls were assessed under 3 experimental conditions (social stress, neutral, noise stress), with counter-balanced presentation of stress conditions across participants of both groups. Under each condition participants performed parallel versions of experimental tasks and had to report their level of paranoid thinking and subjective distress.

RESULTS

Irrespective of condition, patients showed significant impairments in metacognitive accuracy compared with controls. When social stress was applied first, mentalising accuracy decreased significantly in the subsequent condition among patients only. Following exposure to either social or sensory stress, patients reported significantly higher conviction in their paranoid ideas in the subsequent condition.

CONCLUSIONS

Only limited evidence was found for the negative impact of stress on cognitive processes in schizophrenia patients. However, this may not be true for those with more severe information processing abnormalities and/or delusions.

Thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection performance in schizotypy

Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10, Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition (FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets and refinements for cognitive therapies.

Examining reasoning biases in schizophrenia using a modified "Jumping to Conclusions" probabilistic reasoning task

Although the Jumping To Conclusion (JTC) bias has been extensively studied in relation to schizophrenia and persecutory delusions, the relationship between JTC and other reasoning biases implicated in delusional ideation is not fully understood. We modified the traditional JTC task to assess co-occurrence of reasoning biases in decision making. Forty-six patients with schizophrenia and 46 healthy controls completed two versions [neutral colored beads and salient comments] of the modified task. We replicated previous findings indicating that patients showed a greater JTC bias, and in both groups, the JTC bias was more pronounced for the salient task. However, we observed a significant effect for non-Bayesian judgments, indicating that patients showed greater difficulty in probabilistic reasoning. When controlling for probabilistic reasoning ability, the observed JTC bias effects were diminished. Our findings that faulty probability assessment accounts for the JTC bias indicates that the traditional JTC bias task may not represent an inherent hasty decision-making bias, but rather an inability to fully understand and execute the stated goals of the task. These results call into question the current understanding of the JTC bias and the independence of this bias apart from the cognitive demands of the task.

Data gathering ability contributes to visual organization and probabilistic reasoning

Individuals use data gathering methods to inform judgments and behaviors. Effective interaction with the environment depends on these having high accuracy and low noise, but when they become abnormal, aberrant thoughts and perceptions can occur. In this study, we examined if data gathering methods were consistent across tasks that relied on different cognitive abilities, specifically visual perception and probabilistic reasoning. Thirty-four non-clinical participants engaged in the Ebbinghaus Illusion and the Jumping to Conclusions tasks, while also completing questionnaires concerning aspects of delusion formation. A significant, positive correlation was observed between performance on the Ebbinghaus Illusion and the Jumping to Conclusions tasks. Both tasks were negatively correlated with the General Conspiracy Belief Scale. The results suggest an underlying mechanism for data gathering that is consistent across behavioral domains and exists on a continuum in the general population.

Expressive suppression is associated with state paranoia in psychosis: An experience sampling study on the association between adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and paranoia

OBJECTIVES

Although emotional instability and problems in emotion regulation (ER) are known to be linked to the formation and maintenance of psychosis and paranoia, it remains unclear whether the use of specific ER strategies is associated with it. The first aim of the study was to explore the association between emotional instability and paranoia. The second and third aims were to investigate whether the use of maladaptive ER strategies leads to paranoia in patients with psychosis in daily life and whether the use of more adaptive ER strategies reduces paranoia.

DESIGN

A prospective momentary assessment study over the course of 6 days was performed.

METHOD

Participants with psychosis (n = 32) reported repeatedly over six consecutive days on the presence and instability of positive and negative emotions, their use of adaptive (reappraisal, acceptance, distraction, social sharing, reflection) and maladaptive ER strategies (rumination, expressive suppression) and momentary paranoia in their daily life.

RESULTS

Hierarchical linear regression analysis revealed that patients with psychosis who presented pronounced instability of negative emotions showed more severe levels of state paranoia. In addition, patients with psychosis who used expressive suppression when confronted with negative emotions at one point in time presented more pronounced levels of state paranoia at the following point in time.

CONCLUSION

The results presented here suggest that both emotional instability and the use of expressive suppression might cause state paranoia and thus add to our understanding of causal mechanisms related to paranoia such as instability of negative emotions and the use of less adaptive ER strategies.

PRACTITIONER POINTS

Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and more pronounced instability of negative emotions are relevant to paranoia in patients with psychosis and should be a special focus of CBTp interventions. Future interventions designed for patients suffering from paranoia should promote coping with unstable negative emotions and replacing or reducing maladaptive emotion regulation strategies with adaptive ones.

Self-reported cognitive distortions in the psychosis continuum: A Polish 18-item version of the Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS-18)

AIM

The aim of this study was to provide a short version of the Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS), which is a self-report tool to assess cognitive distortions related to psychosis.

METHODS

A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on a large non-clinical sample (n=1207) and cross-validated with a confirmatory factor analysis on an independent non-clinical sample (n=653). Discriminative validity was performed by contrasting the high risk for psychosis non-clinical sample (n=63), low risk for psychosis non-clinical sample (n=152), patients with schizophrenia (n=105), and patients with depression (n=56). Correlations between symptoms, cognitive functions, source monitoring deficits, and jumping to conclusions were performed among a subgroup of patients with schizophrenia.

RESULTS

An 18-item scale (DACOBS-18) with a four-factor solution was established. Internal consistency (α=0.84) and test-retest reliability (r=0.84, p<0.001) were good. The DACOBS-18 has satisfactory discriminative power, with 99.1% sensitivity and 74.3% specificity in discriminating low risk for psychosis from schizophrenia patients. The DACOBS-18 subscales correlate significantly with psychotic symptoms and psychotic-like experiences. After Bonferroni correction, significant correlations between Safety Behaviors and neuropsychological functioning were found.

CONCLUSIONS

The DACOBS-18 is a reliable scale with satisfactory discriminative power and thus may be a valuable self-report screening tool for use in everyday clinical practice with psychotic patients and with people at risk for psychosis. Further research on its relationship to objective cognitive measures is needed.

A two-stage cognitive theory of the positive symptoms of psychosis. Highlighting the role of lowered decision thresholds

OBJECTIVES

We outline a two-stage heuristic account for the pathogenesis of the positive symptoms of psychosis.

METHODS

A narrative review on the empirical evidence of the liberal acceptance (LA) account of positive symptoms is presented.

HYPOTHESIS

At the heart of our theory is the idea that psychosis is characterized by a lowered decision threshold, which results in the premature acceptance of hypotheses that a nonpsychotic individual would reject. Once the hypothesis is judged as valid, counterevidence is not sought anymore due to a bias against disconfirmatory evidence as well as confirmation biases, consolidating the false hypothesis. As a result of LA, confidence in errors is enhanced relative to controls. Subjective probabilities are initially low for hypotheses in individuals with delusions, and delusional ideas at stage 1 (belief formation) are often fragile. In the course of the second stage (belief maintenance), fleeting delusional ideas evolve into fixed false beliefs, particularly if the delusional idea is congruent with the emotional state and provides "meaning". LA may also contribute to hallucinations through a misattribution of (partially) normal sensory phenomena. Interventions such as metacognitive training that aim to "plant the seeds of doubt" decrease positive symptoms by encouraging individuals to seek more information and to attenuate confidence. The effect of antipsychotic medication is explained by its doubt-inducing properties.

LIMITATIONS

The model needs to be confirmed by longitudinal designs that allow an examination of causal relationships. Evidence is currently weak for hallucinations.

CONCLUSIONS

The theory may account for positive symptoms in a subgroup of patients. Future directions are outlined.

Negative affect and a fluctuating jumping to conclusions bias predict subsequent paranoia in daily life: An online experience sampling study

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Negative affect and a tendency to "jump to conclusions" (JTC) are associated with paranoia. So far, only negative affect has been examined as a precursor of subsequent paranoia in daily life using experience sampling (ESM). We addressed this research gap and used ESM to test whether JTC fluctuates in daily life, whether it predicts subsequent paranoia, and whether it mediates the effect of negative affect on paranoia.

METHODS

Thirty-five participants with schizophrenia spectrum disorders repeatedly self-reported negative affect, JTC, and paranoia via online questionnaires on two consecutive days. We measured JTC with a paradigm consisting of ambiguous written scenarios. Multilevel linear models were conducted.

RESULTS

Most participants showed JTC consistently on two days rather than only on one day. When time was used as a predictor of JTC, significant slope variance indicated that for a subgroup of participants JTC fluctuated over time. For 48% of participants, these fluctuations equaled changes of approximately ±1 point on the four-point JTC scale within one day. There was no mediation. However, negative affect and JTC both significantly predicted subsequent paranoia.

LIMITATIONS

The ESM assessment period was short and encompassed few assessments (8 in total).

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings indicate that JTC is both stable (regarding its mere occurrence) and fluctuating simultaneously (regarding its magnitude). Although JTC was not a mediator linking negative affect and paranoia, it did predict paranoia. Further ESM studies on JTC are needed to confirm our findings in longer assessment periods and with other JTC paradigms.

Individualized metacognitive therapy for delusions: A randomized controlled rater-blind study

BACKGROUND

Theory-driven interventions targeting specific factors that contribute to delusions are receiving increased interest. The present study aimed to assess the efficacy of individualized metacognitive therapy (MCT+), a short manualized intervention that addresses delusion-associated cognitive biases.

METHODS

92 patients with current or past delusions were randomized to receive 12 twice-weekly sessions of either MCT+ or a control intervention within a randomized controlled rater-blind design. Psychopathology and cognitive biases were assessed at baseline, 6 weeks and 6 months. ANCOVAs adjusted for baseline scores were used to assess differences between groups regarding outcome variables. Both per-protocol and intention-to-treat analyses were conducted.

RESULTS

At 6 weeks, there was a significant difference in favor of MCT+ regarding decrease in delusion severity and improvement of self-reflectiveness (medium effect size), and a trend-wise difference regarding probability thresholds to decision. These effects increased, when only patients attending a minimum of 4 therapy sessions were considered. Control group patients subsequently showed further improvement while patients in the MCT+ group remained stable, such that there were no differences between groups at the 6-month follow-up.

LIMITATIONS

Lower attendance rates in the control group possibly leading to unequal therapeutic effort; lower baseline delusion severity in the MCT+ group.

CONCLUSIONS

The result pattern suggests that MCT+ led to earlier improvement in delusions and cognitive biases compared to the control intervention. The absence of a long-term effect might reflect floor effects in the MCT+ group, but may also indicate the need for further measures to promote sustainability of MCT+ effects.

Subjective versus objective cognition: Evidence for poor metacognitive monitoring in schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

Patients with schizophrenia display a number of cognitive biases, particularly a tendency to jump to conclusions, which are implicated in the pathogenesis of the disorder. The present study contrasted the degree of objective reasoning biases with subjective cognitive insight. We expected that patients with schizophrenia would display greater objective than subjective impairment suggestive of poor metacognitive awareness.

METHODS

Patients with schizophrenia (n=140) and healthy controls (n=60) underwent a test battery encompassing a cognitive bias paradigm (beads task) as well as neurocognitive tests (story recall, trail-making tests). In addition, they were administered the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS), a subjective measure of (meta)cognitive awareness.

RESULTS

Corroborating prior research on decision making, draws to decisions were significantly delayed in controls relative to patients, whereas the core jumping to conclusion parameter (i.e., decision after one or two pieces of information) bordered significance. Patients with schizophrenia showed a lowered decision threshold and impaired neurocognition relative to nonclinical controls. Despite poor cognitive performance and prior psychotic episodes, patients with schizophrenia showed similar scores on the self-confidence subscale of the BCIS and reported even higher levels of self-reflectiveness relative to healthy controls.

DISCUSSION

The study demonstrates that patients with schizophrenia show severe cognitive biases and neurocognitive deficits but display only partial awareness herein. Raising cognitive insight in a non-insulting fashion and elevating patients' corrigibility as well as willingness to consider others' feedback and advice may help to narrow this gap and improve psychiatric symptomatology.

More adaptive versus less maladaptive coping: What is more predictive of symptom severity? Development of a new scale to investigate coping profiles across different psychopathological syndromes

BACKGROUND

Lack of adaptive and enhanced maladaptive coping with stress and negative emotions are implicated in many psychopathological disorders. We describe the development of a new scale to investigate the relative contribution of different coping styles to psychopathology in a large population sample. We hypothesized that the magnitude of the supposed positive correlation between maladaptive coping and psychopathology would be stronger than the supposed negative correlation between adaptive coping and psychopathology. We also examined whether distinct coping style patterns emerge for different psychopathological syndromes.

METHODS

A total of 2200 individuals from the general population participated in an online survey. The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9), the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory revised (OCI-R) and the Paranoia Checklist were administered along with a novel instrument called Maladaptive and Adaptive Coping Styles (MAX) questionnaire. Participants were reassessed six months later.

RESULTS

MAX consists of three dimensions representing adaptive coping, maladaptive coping and avoidance. Across all psychopathological syndromes, similar response patterns emerged. Maladaptive coping was more strongly related to psychopathology than adaptive coping both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. The overall number of coping styles adopted by an individual predicted greater psychopathology. Mediation analysis suggests that a mild positive relationship between adaptive and certain maladaptive styles (emotional suppression) partially accounts for the attenuated relationship between adaptive coping and depressive symptoms.

LIMITATIONS

Results should be replicated in a clinical population.

CONCLUSIONS

Results suggest that maladaptive and adaptive coping styles are not reciprocal. Reducing maladaptive coping seems to be more important for outcome than enhancing adaptive coping. The study supports transdiagnostic approaches advocating that maladaptive coping is a common factor across different psychopathologies.

Dopamine effects on evidence gathering and integration

BACKGROUND

Disturbances in evidence gathering and disconfirmatory evidence integration have been associated with the presence of or propensity for delusions. Previous evidence suggests that these 2 types of reasoning bias might be differentially affected by antipsychotic medication. We aimed to investigate the effects of a dopaminergic agonist (L-dopa) and a dopaminergic antagonist (haloperidol) on evidence gathering and disconfirmatory evidence integration after single-dose administration in healthy individuals.

METHODS

The study used a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, 3-way crossover design. Participants were healthy individuals aged 18-40 years. We administered a new data-gathering task designed to increase sensitivity to change compared with traditional tasks. The Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task was used as a measure of disconfirmatory evidence integration.

RESULTS

We included 30 individuals in our study. In the data-gathering task, dopaminergic modulation had no significant effect on the amount of evidence gathered before reaching a decision. In contrast, the ability of participants to integrate disconfirmatory evidence showed a significant linear dopaminergic modulation pattern (highest with haloperidol, intermediate with placebo, lowest with L-dopa), with the difference between haloperidol and L-dopa marginally reaching significance.

LIMITATIONS

Although the doses used for haloperidol and L-dopa were similar to those used in previous studies, drug plasma level measurements would have added to the validity of findings.

CONCLUSION

Evidence gathering and disconfirmatory evidence integration might be differentially influenced by dopaminergic agents. Our findings are in support of a dual-disturbance account of delusions and provide a plausible neurobiological basis for the use of interventions targeted at improving reasoning biases as an adjunctive treatment in patients with psychotic disorders.

Subjective competence breeds overconfidence in errors in psychosis. A hubris account of paranoia

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Overconfidence in errors is a well-replicated cognitive bias in psychosis. However, prior studies have sometimes failed to find differences between patients and controls for more difficult tasks. We pursued the hypothesis that overconfidence in errors is exaggerated in participants with a liability to psychosis relative to controls only when they feel competent in the respective topic and/or deem the question easy. Whereas subjective competence likely enhances confidence in those with low psychosis liability as well, we still expected to find more 'residual' caution in the latter group.

METHODS

We adopted a psychometric high-risk approach to circumvent the confounding influence of treatment. A total of 2321 individuals from the general population were administered a task modeled after the "Who wants to be a millionaire" quiz. Participants were requested to endorse one out of four response options, graded for confidence, and were asked to provide ratings regarding subjective competence for the knowledge domain as well as the subjective difficulty of each item.

RESULTS

In line with our assumption, overconfidence in errors was increased overall in participants scoring high on the Paranoia Checklist core paranoia subscale (2 SD above the mean). This pattern of results was particularly prominent for items for which participants considered themselves competent and which they rated as easy.

LIMITATIONS

Results need to be replicated in a clinical sample.

DISCUSSION

In support of our hypothesis, subjective competence and task difficulty moderate overconfidence in errors in psychosis. Trainings that teach patients the fallibility of human cognition may help reduce delusional ideation.

Metacognition-augmented cognitive remediation training reduces jumping to conclusions and overconfidence but not neurocognitive deficits in psychosis

The majority of patients with schizophrenia display neurocognitive deficits (e.g., memory impairment) as well as inflated cognitive biases (e.g., jumping to conclusions). Both cognitive domains are implicated in the pathogenesis of the disorder and are known to compromise functional outcome. At present, there is a dearth of effective treatment options. A total of 90 patients with schizophrenia were recruited online (a diagnosis of schizophrenia had been confirmed in a large subgroup during a previous hospital admission). Subsequent to a baseline assessment encompassing psychopathology, self-reported cognition as well as objective memory and reasoning tests, patients were randomized to one of three conditions: standard cognitive remediation (mybraintraining), metacognition-augmented cognition remediation (CR) condition (variant of mybraintraining which encouraged patients to reduce speed of decision-making and attenuate response confidence when participants made high-confidence judgements and hasty incorrect decisions) and a waitlist control group. Patients were retested after 6 weeks and again 3 months after the second assessment. Groups did not differ on psychopathology and neurocognitive parameters at any timepoint. However, at follow-up the metacognitive-augmented CR group displayed a significant reduction on jumping to conclusions and overconfidence. Treatment adherence correlated with a reduction of depression; gains in the training exercises from the standard mybraintraining condition were correlated with improved objective memory performance. The study suggests that metacognition-augmented CR may ameliorate cognitive biases but not neurocognition. The study ties in well with prior research showing that neurocognitive dysfunctions are rather resistant to change; the failure to detect significant improvement of CR or metacognition-augmented CR on psychopathology and neurocognition over time may partly be attributed to a number of methodological limitations of our study (low psychopathology and chronicity of participants, low “dosage,” narrow range of tests, self-report psychopathology scales).

Cognitive bias and unusual experiences in childhood

Cognitive therapy is recommended for children with psychotic-like, or unusual, experiences associated with distress or impairment (UEDs; UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2013 [1]). Accurate models of the psychological underpinnings of childhood UEDs are required to effectively target therapies. Cognitive biases, such as the jumping to conclusions data-gathering bias (JTC), are implicated in the development and maintenance of psychosis in adults. In this study, we aimed to establish the suitability for children of a task developed to assess JTC in adults. Eighty-six participants (aged 5-14 years) were recruited from Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) and community (school) settings, and completed the probabilistic reasoning ('Beads') task, alongside measures of intellectual functioning, general psychopathology, and UEDs. Self-reported reasoning strategy was coded as 'probabilistic' or 'other'. Younger children (5-10 years) were more likely than older children (11-14 years) to JTC (OR = 2.7, 95 % CI = 1.1-6.5, p = 0.03); and to use non-probabilistic reasoning strategies (OR = 9.4, 95 % CI = 1.7-48.8, p = 0.008). Both UED presence (OR = 5.1, 95 % CI = 1.2-21.9, p = 0.03) and lower IQ (OR = 0.9, 95 % CI = 0.9-1.0, p = 0.02) were significantly and independently associated with JTC, irrespective of age and task comprehension. Findings replicate research in adults, indicating that the 'Beads' task can be reliably employed in children to assess cognitive biases. Psychological treatments for children with distressing unusual experiences might usefully incorporate reasoning interventions.

Data Gathering Bias: Trait Vulnerability to Psychotic Symptoms?

Background

Jumping to conclusions (JTC) is associated with psychotic disorder and psychotic symptoms. If JTC represents a trait, the rate should be (i) increased in people with elevated levels of psychosis proneness such as individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD), and (ii) show a degree of stability over time.

Methods

The JTC rate was examined in 3 groups: patients with first episode psychosis (FEP), BPD patients and controls, using the Beads Task. PANSS, SIS-R and CAPE scales were used to assess positive psychotic symptoms. Four WAIS III subtests were used to assess IQ.

Results

A total of 61 FEP, 26 BPD and 150 controls were evaluated. 29 FEP were revaluated after one year. 44% of FEP (OR = 8.4, 95% CI: 3.9–17.9) displayed a JTC reasoning bias versus 19% of BPD (OR = 2.5, 95% CI: 0.8–7.8) and 9% of controls. JTC was not associated with level of psychotic symptoms or specifically delusionality across the different groups. Differences between FEP and controls were independent of sex, educational level, cannabis use and IQ. After one year, 47.8% of FEP with JTC at baseline again displayed JTC.

Conclusions

JTC in part reflects trait vulnerability to develop disorders with expression of psychotic symptoms.

Jumping to conclusions, neuropsychological functioning, and delusional beliefs in first episode psychosis

BACKGROUND

The "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) data-gathering bias is implicated in the development and maintenance of psychosis but has only recently been studied in first episode psychosis (FEP). In this study, we set out to establish the relationship of JTC in FEP with delusions and neuropsychological functioning.

METHODS

One hundred and eight FEP patients and 101 age-matched controls completed assessments of delusions, general intelligence (IQ), working memory (WM), and JTC (the probabilistic reasoning "beads" task).

RESULTS

Half the FEP participants jumped to conclusions on at least 1 task, compared with 25% of controls (OR range 2.1 to 3.9; 95% CI range 1.5 to 8.0, P values ≤ .02). JTC was associated with clinical, but not nonclinical delusion severity, and with neuropsychological functioning, irrespective of clinical status. Both IQ and delusion severity, but not WM, were independently associated with JTC in the FEP group.

CONCLUSIONS

JTC is present in FEP. The specific association of JTC with clinical delusions supports a state, maintaining role for the bias. The associations of JTC with neuropsychological functioning indicate a separable, trait aspect to the bias, which may confer vulnerability to psychosis. The work has potential to inform emerging interventions targeting reasoning biases in early psychosis.

Overconfidence in incorrect perceptual judgments in patients with schizophrenia

Background

Patients with schizophrenia show overconfidence in memory and social cognition errors. The present investigation examined whether this cognitive distortion also manifests in perceptual tasks.

Methods

A total of 55 individuals with schizophrenia, 58 with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) as well as 45 non-clinical controls were presented 24 blurry black and white pictures, half of which contained a hidden object; the other half contained (“snowy”) visual noise. Participants had to judge whether the pictures depicted an object or not and how confident they were in this judgment.

Results

Participants with schizophrenia showed overconfidence in errors and an enhanced knowledge corruption index (i.e. rate of high-confident errors on all high-confident responses) relative to both control groups. In contrast, accuracy scores did not differ between clinical groups. Metacognitive parameters were correlated with self-rated levels of current paranoia.

Discussion

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate overconfidence in errors among individuals with psychosis using a visual perception task. Speaking to the specificity of this abnormality for schizophrenia and its pathogenetic relevance, overconfidence in errors and knowledge corruption were elevated in patients with schizophrenia relative to both control groups and were correlated with paranoia.

Adolescents with autism spectrum disorder show a circumspect reasoning bias rather than 'jumping-to-conclusions'

People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) often take longer to make decisions. The Autism-Psychosis Model proposes that people with autism and psychosis show the opposite pattern of results on cognitive tasks. As those with psychosis show a jump-to-conclusions reasoning bias, those with ASD should show a circumspect reasoning bias. Jumping-to-conclusions was assessed in a sample of 20 adolescents with ASD and 23 age-matched controls using the jumping-to-conclusions beads task. Both groups demonstrated equivalent levels of confidence in decision-making, however the ASD group required more beads than controls before making their decision. Furthermore, there was a positive correlation between the beads required and degree of autism symptoms. Consistent with the Autism-Psychosis Model, a more circumspect reasoning bias was evident in ASD.

Frequency and correlates of maladaptive responses to paranoid thoughts in patients with psychosis compared to a population sample

INTRODUCTION

The aims of this study were to identify whether responses to paranoid thoughts distinguish patients with psychotic disorders from people in the population who have paranoid thoughts occasionally and to identify factors that are associated with and might explain the different ways of responding.

METHODS

Paranoid thoughts were assessed in patients diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (n = 32) and a population control sample (n = 34) with the Paranoia Checklist. Responses to paranoid thoughts were assessed with the Reactions to Paranoid Thoughts Scale (RePT) and social support, self-efficacy and cognitive insight were assessed as potential correlates of the responses to paranoid thoughts.

RESULTS

The patients showed significantly more depressed, physical and devaluating responses to paranoid thoughts and employed less normalising responses than the controls. The differences in normalising responses were explained by perceived social integration, whereas the differences in depressive responses were explained by the overall levels of depression and partly explained by externality and social integration.

CONCLUSIONS

Maladaptive responses to paranoid thoughts could be relevant to the pathogenesis and maintenance of persecutory delusions. Interventions aimed at reducing paranoia could benefit from targeting dysfunctional responses to paranoid thoughts and by placing a stronger emphasis on treating depression and improving social integration.

Are you sure? Delusion conviction moderates the behavioural and emotional consequences of paranoid ideas

INTRODUCTION

Paranoid beliefs strongly impact behaviour and emotion: most people with paranoid delusions engage in safety behaviours and a relevant minority even commits violent acts under the influence of delusional thoughts. The present study examined whether different levels of belief conviction modulate subsequent behaviour and emotion. To be able to control for important confounds, we set up an analogue study using nonclinical participants.

METHODS

Participants were recruited from the general population (N=1935) and asked to fill out the Paranoia Checklist. Individuals had to imagine being persecuted by a secret service, whereby the level of subjective conviction was set at 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 90%, or 100%. Subsequently, participants had to estimate for 37 behavioural and emotional items how they might respond to this threat.

RESULTS

Three quarters of the sample affirmed the presence of at least one paranoid idea from the Paranoia Checklist over the duration of a month. The level of belief conviction and paranoia was positively associated with behavioural and emotional consequences.

CONCLUSIONS

Our investigation suggests that a higher degree of belief conviction aggravates the behavioural consequences of persecutory beliefs in a linear fashion. The study is limited by its "what if" character and should be replicated with clinical participants. The study suggests that treatment approaches that aim to reduce overconviction may positively impact behaviour in psychosis.

Investigation of the role of the jumping-to-conclusions bias for short-term functional outcome in schizophrenia

Symptom severity and neuropsychological deficits negatively influence functional outcomes in patients with schizophrenia. Recent research implicates specific types of biased thinking styles (e.g. jumping-to-conclusions) in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. This is the first study to test the impact of jumping-to-conclusions on functional outcome in schizophrenia. The aim of the study was to investigate the association of psychopathology, neuropsychology and JTC with subjective quality of life, vocational outcome and housing status in schizophrenia. Analyses were carried out both cross-sectionally at baseline, and longitudinally over the course of symptomatic improvement in the immediate aftermath of a psychotic exacerbation. Seventy-nine patients with schizophrenia were included in the study. Data concerning the variables of interest were collected at baseline, after one month, and after six months. Positive symptomatology was the most significant predictor of subjective and vocational outcome and changes across time. Verbal memory deficits were associated with functional status cross-sectionally, whereas general cognitive capacity significantly predicted functional changes over time. Improvement of the jumping-to-conclusions bias positively affected vocational outcome. Though limited, the observed effect of this bias on real-world functioning highlights the possible usefulness of interventions aimed at improving (meta)cognitive deficits in schizophrenia.

Reduced activation in ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area during probabilistic decision-making in schizophrenia

Patients with schizophrenia suffer from deficits in monitoring and controlling their own thoughts. Within these so-called metacognitive impairments, alterations in probabilistic reasoning might be one cognitive phenomenon disposing to delusions. However, so far little is known about alterations in associated brain functionality. A previously established task for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which requires a probabilistic decision after a variable amount of stimuli, was applied to 23 schizophrenia patients and 28 healthy controls matched for age, gender and educational levels. We compared activation patterns during decision-making under conditions of certainty versus uncertainty and evaluated the process of final decision-making in ventral striatum (VS) and ventral tegmental area (VTA). We replicated a pre-described extended cortical activation pattern during probabilistic reasoning. During final decision-making, activations in several fronto- and parietocortical areas, as well as in VS and VTA became apparent. In both of these regions schizophrenia patients showed a significantly reduced activation. These results further define the network underlying probabilistic decision-making. The observed hypo-activation in regions commonly associated with dopaminergic neurotransmission fits into current concepts of disrupted prediction error signaling in schizophrenia and suggests functional links to reward anticipation. Forthcoming studies with patients at risk for psychosis and drug-naive first episode patients are necessary to elucidate the development of these findings over time and the interplay with associated clinical symptoms.

Dopaminergic modulation of probabilistic reasoning and overconfidence in errors: a double-blind study

INTRODUCTION

Reasoning biases such as jumping to conclusions (JTC) and overconfidence in errors have been well replicated in patients with delusions. However, their relation to dopaminergic activity, central to pathophysiologic models of psychosis, has not yet been investigated. This study aimed to examine the effects of a dopaminergic agonist (L-dopa) and a dopaminergic antagonist (haloperidol) on the JTC bias and overconfidence in errors after single-dose administration in healthy individuals.

METHODS

The study used a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, 3-way crossover design. Participants were 36 healthy individuals aged 18-36 years. The variables of interest were draws to decision and probability threshold to decision on a computerized variant of the beads task and the number of high-confident incorrect responses on a visual memory task.

RESULTS

There were no significant effects of substance on draws to decision and probability threshold to decision. A significant effect emerged for high-confident incorrect responses in the memory task; pairwise comparisons indicated a significant reduction of the number of high-confident incorrect responses after administration of haloperidol vs l-dopa and placebo.

CONCLUSIONS

This is the first study to investigate the direct effects of dopaminergic drugs on reasoning biases. The JTC bias and overconfidence in errors showed a differential pattern of dopaminergic modulation, suggesting that they represent different facets of reasoning abnormalities that interact with each other to produce delusions in susceptible individuals.

Knowledge corruption for visual perception in individuals high on paranoia

Studies revealed that patients with paranoid schizophrenia display overconfidence in errors for memory and social cognition tasks. The present investigation examined whether this pattern holds true for visual perception tasks. Nonclinical participants were recruited via an online panel. Individuals were asked to complete a questionnaire that included the Paranoia Checklist and were then presented with 24 blurry pictures; half contained a hidden object while the other half showed snowy (visual) noise. Participants were asked to state whether the visual items contained an object and how confident they were in their judgment. Data from 1966 individuals were included following a conservative selection process. Participants high on core paranoid symptoms showed a poor calibration of confidence for correct versus incorrect responses. In particular, participants high on paranoia displayed overconfidence in incorrect responses and demonstrated a 20% error rate for responses made with high confidence compared to a 12% error rate in participants with low paranoia scores. Interestingly, paranoia scores declined after performance of the task. For the first time, overconfidence in errors was demonstrated among individuals with high levels of paranoia using a visual perception task, tentatively suggesting it is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In view of the significant decline in paranoia across time, bias modification programs may incorporate items such as the one employed here to teach patients with clinical paranoia the fallibility of human cognition, which may foster subsequent symptom improvement.

Predictors of early stable symptomatic remission after an exacerbation of schizophrenia: the significance of symptoms, neuropsychological performance and cognitive biases

Neuropsychological deficits and severity of initial psychopathology have been repeatedly associated with poor symptomatic outcomes in schizophrenia. The role of higher-order cognitive biases on symptomatic outcomes of the disorder has not yet been investigated. The present study aimed to assess the contribution of cognitive biases, psychopathology and neuropsychological deficits on the probability of achieving early symptomatic remission after a psychotic episode in patients with schizophrenia. Participants were 79 patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder undergoing an acute psychotic episode, and 25 healthy controls. According to psychopathology assessments, patients were split into those who had achieved remission after an average follow-up interval of 7 months, and those who had not (NR). Patients who achieved remission exhibited higher premorbid IQ and better performance on the TMT-B, as well as lower baseline positive, disorganized and distress symptoms than NR patients. TMT-B performance and positive symptoms at baseline were the best predictors of remission. Cognitive biases and negative symptoms were not associated with later remission. The findings highlight the significance of initial symptom severity for at least short-term symptomatic outcomes and, thus, the importance of adequate symptomatic treatment and prevention of psychotic outbreaks in patients.