Epistemology of psychiatry

What is Psychiatry? Was ist das, die Psychiatrie?

Drawing on Heidegger's method of analysis, the question of what is psychiatry is explored from within. This leads to a conception of psychiatry as a form of interpersonal interaction in which there is a specific reaching out of one Being to another. It is a 'specific reaching out' because, following the recognition through the interaction between Beings that the other is in some form of distress, there is the corresponding need to assuage. The reformulation of psychiatry in this sense is important because it emphasises the unity with which we communicate and interact, and it also serves as a reminder of the need in psychiatry to develop novel methods to undertake research in this complex and constantly evolving field.

From the chemical imbalance to the power imbalance: A psychiatry trainee's perspectives on service-user supervision

OBJECTIVE

This paper describes perspectives and insights of a trainee's experience of service-user supervision. This includes the background to this novel approach, outlining its process and content, key themes arising, applications in practice, limitations of the approach, and future considerations.

CONCLUSIONS

Service-user supervision promotes education and experiences at this important stage of professional development and can promote clinical, cultural, and systemic changes required to support the paradigm shift towards recovery-oriented and human rights-based practice.

Scientism, Ethics and Evil: From Mens Rea to Cerebrum Reus

Can criminology thrive on quantitative studies alone? Can evil be operationalized? Quantitative work may have, for the time being, supplanted common sense, personal experience and resulting in an improbable "Periodic Table of humanity". Has the construction of the psychopathic concept surpassed positivist "constitutional" formulations and translated into effective (re)habilitation of individuals lacking affiliative ethical behaviors? Or has it simply fueled a deterministic neo-Lombrosian truism: moral development has a brain. Has it helped so far? Has letting go of fundamental moral concepts, implicit in organized religion - but pervasive in most cultures irrespective of religious affiliation and devotion - in favor of causal explanations based solely on neuroimaging, personality inventories or structured emotional decoding tasks, made a difference in the life - or in the defense for that matter - of wrongdoers diagnosed as intrinsically evil?

A commentary on Effective Connectivity Between the Orbitofrontal Cortex and the Precuneus Differentiates Major Psychiatric Disorders: Results from a Transdiagnostic Spectral DCM Study

Translational psychiatry has been a hot topic in Neurosciences research. The authors present a commentary on the relevant findings from a transdiagnostic study applicable to clinic practice. Additional discussion on conceptual and clinical insight into this current broad line of research is explored in the integration of multi-level paradigm in Psychiatry research.

Training Psychiatry Residents in Descriptive Psychopathology: A Systematic Review

PURPOSE

Descriptive psychopathology (DP, sometimes called psychopathology or phenomenology) is the language of psychiatry and is dedicated to the description of mental symptoms. Due to its importance, there is an ongoing case to put it back at the heart of psychiatry and its training. This study seeks to examine the literature on how to train psychiatry residents in DP, including reported educational interventions and educational methods.

METHOD

The authors conducted a systematic review following the PRISMA and BEME guidelines to identify literature on how to train psychiatry residents in DP. In May 2019, they searched in Embase, ERIC, PsycINFO, PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science; of 7,199 initial results, 26 sources were finally included for analysis. The assessment tools were the CRAAP test, Kirkpatrick's 4 levels, and (when applicable) the Medical Education Research Study Quality Instrument (MERSQI).

RESULTS

The mean CRAAP score was 38.885 of a possible 50 (SD 0.983; range: 36.859-40.910). Fourteen sources (53.8%) had some kind of training evaluation: Kirkpatrick's level 1 was present in nearly all (13) and was the highest in half of them (7). Regarding the educational interventions, the mean MERSQI score was 10.592 of a possible 18 (SD 2.371; range 9.085-12.098). Lectures were the most widely reported educational method (5); among those in clinical settings, the live supervised interview with feedback was the most usual (4).

CONCLUSIONS

Despite its core importance as the language of psychiatry, the literature about training psychiatry residents in DP is scarce and heterogeneous. General lack of training evaluation and ongoing overemphasis on Kirkpatrick's levels 1-2 at the expense of levels 3-4 are causes for concern. During the review process, the authors identified a selection of educational interventions that could serve as the basis for the design of new training efforts in both clinical and nonclinical settings. Topics for future research are also suggested, such as the role of DP in competency-based training frameworks now in vogue and a series of neglected contents. Finally, the combined use of the CRAAP test and the MERSQI may be useful for future systematic reviews in medical education.

Historical Epistemology: a Research Approach in Psychiatry

Drawing on a key issue raised in the paper by Scardigno and Mininni (2021), this commentary explores the question of historical research in psychiatry. Firstly, the importance of historical research is highlighted for both psychiatry as a medical discipline, and for descriptive psychopathology, the language of psychiatry. Of significance has been the construction of psychiatry as a hybrid discipline formed through the deep participation of both the natural and the social sciences. This in turn brings to light the fundamental difference in epistemological basis to psychiatry and medicine, with ensuing consequences for our understanding of mental disorders and for the development of further research methodology. Likewise conceptually hybrid, the special role carried by mental symptoms in psychiatry places them, as concepts, in the position of crucial research tools. Secondly, given some of the complexities raised in carrying out historical research in this area, the issue of how this should be approached is examined. The method proposed here is that of historical epistemology. This is an approach that focuses on concepts, on mapping their biographies in order to clarify their structures, their roles, their discontinuities, their relationships and interactions with other concepts and so on. Given the central role of concepts in psychiatry and descriptive psychopathology, this approach to their study is most likely to provide valid and meaningful results.

L’evidence-based medicine, un projet épistémologique et éthique en porte-à-faux avec la psychiatrie ?

Le discours psychiatrique contemporain dominant repose principalement sur un paradigme médico-technologique où la souffrance mentale est conceptualisée comme un « mécanisme défectueux » qui nécessite une « réparation » grâce à l’arsenal médical. Dans ce contexte, l’evidence-based medicine (EBM) a donc été largement adopté par la psychiatrie à la fin des années 90. L’EBM est une proposition qui vise à influencer et même légiférer la prise de décisions cliniques en mettant de l’avant l’idée d’une hiérarchie des évidences, où le savoir tiré d’essais contrôlés randomisés (ECR) et de méta-analyses a préséance sur les informations tirées d’autres sources. Ainsi, comme l’EBM favorise ces outils de création de savoir (ECRs et méta-analyses) il en découle que le savoir qui compte véritablement dans le paradigme EBM est celui qui est mesurable et spécifique ; deux conditions préalables nécessaires pour l’utilisation même de ces outils. En conséquence, l’EBM diminue la valeur et va même jusqu’à ignorer d’autres formes d’évidences, de savoir et de justifications pour la prise de décisions cliniques. Du point de vue éthique, le concept EBM soutient que la « bonne chose à faire » est d’appliquer le savoir produit par l’EBM dans le contexte clinique. Les autres formes de savoir pouvant être impliquées dans la prise de décisions cliniques, mais qui ne peuvent pas être étudiées via l’EBM, sont dévalorisées d’un point de vue éthique. La littérature révisée et explorée ici considère donc que l’EBM est mal adapté à la réalité de la pratique psychiatrique. L’EBM ne peut pas, par définition, prendre en compte les spécificités de la discipline, notamment pour ce qui est des diagnostics psychiatriques ; leur complexité rend les évidences produites par l’EBM d’une validité questionnable. Le concept ne peut pas non plus tenir compte des spécificités des thérapeutiques psychiatriques. Les facteurs thérapeutiques non spécifiques, ceux discrédités par l’EBM, sont cruciaux pour les soins de santé mentale. Également, les observations portant sur des aspects de l’esprit, sur des expériences subjectives, ne sont que bien incorrectement traduites en résultats statistiques, mesurables et spécifiques. Ces observations amènent le présent essai à considérer qu’il serait peut-être préférable pour la psychiatrie, de rejeter la « hiérarchie des évidences » de l’EBM, et de développer son propre « système des savoirs ». Celui-ci devrait prendre en compte la position épistémologique unique de la psychiatrie, où subjectivité, contextes, et valeurs pourraient occuper de façon légitime la place qui leur revient dans la prise de décisions cliniques en psychiatrie. Bien qu’une alternative à l’EBM en psychiatrie n’ait pas encore été établie, la littérature, et ce papier pointent vers l’idée d’un « système des savoirs » plus flexible que ce qu’offre l’EBM en termes épistémologiques, où les aspects éthiques reliés à la discipline, incluant l’éthique du savoir, l’éthique de « ce qui compte comme évidence », revêtent une importance cruciale.

Clinician's Subjective Experience in the Cross-Cultural Psychiatric Encounter

INTRODUCTION

The clinical encounter is still at the core of the psychiatric evaluation. Since the diagnostic process remains basically clinical in nature, several authors have addressed the complexity of the clinical reasoning process and highlighted the role played by intersubjective phenomena and clinician's feelings. Some recent studies have supported the view of a significant link between the clinician's subjective experience during the assessment and the diagnosis made. In a globalized world, this issue requires a careful reflection, since cultural differences may affect the intersubjective atmosphere of the encounter, which may indirectly influence the clinician's thinking.

METHODS

We used a previously validated instrument, named Assessment of Clinician's Subjective Experience (ACSE), to compare the clinician's subjective experience during the evaluation of Italian patients with the subjective experience of the same clinician during the assessment of foreign patients. The 2 patient groups (n = 42 each) were individually matched for known potential confounders (age, sex, categorical diagnosis, and clinical severity).

RESULTS

We found no significant differences in mean scores on all ACSE dimensions (tension, difficulty in attune-ment, engagement, disconfirmation, and impotence), which suggests that cultural diversity did not substantially affect the clinician's subjective experience. However, the lack of information about the native country and linguistic proficiency of about a quarter of foreign patients may have limited the possibility to detect subtle or specific differences, especially with regard to the clinician's empathic attunement.

CONCLUSIONS

Although further investigation is needed, our preliminary findings may have significant implications for the reflection upon the clinician's empathic experience as well as pragmatic consequences for the act of psychiatric diagnosis in the cross-cultural encounter.

The theory of symptom complexes, mind and madness

Kahlbaum's seminal approach to symptom complexes, as opposed to disease entities, is still relevant. Many psychopathologists have approached mental symptom complexes without prejudging them as necessary physical deficits or diseases, favouring a broader dimensional and anthropological view of mental disorders. Discussions of symptom complexes gained prominence in psychiatry in the early twentieth century - through Hoche - and in the period leading up to World War II - through Carl Schneider. Their works, alongside those of Kraepelin, Bumke, Kehrer, Jaspers and others, are reviewed in relation to the theme of symptom complexes, the mind, and mental disorders. A particular feature of symptom complexes is their relationship to aspects of the normal mind and how this affects clinical manifestations. It is further suggested that symptom complexes might offer a useful bridge between the psychic and the biological in theories of the mind.

Seeing Beyond Diseases and Disorders: Symptom Complexes as Manifestations of Mental Constituents

Many psychopathologists have approached symptom complexes without prejudging them as physical deficits or diseases, an approach suitable to connections with normal mind, to a broad dimensional and anthropological view of mental disorders. It contrasts with the prevailing orientation in psychiatry toward the medical model of delimited diseases. Discussions of this order centered on symptom complexes gained special prominence in psychiatry between the early 20th century through Alfred Hoche and World War II through Carl Schneider. Their works, in addition to the work of other authors of that period, are considered. The late Kraepelin conceded the possibility that affective and schizophrenic manifestations do not represent disease processes but rather represent areas of human personality. Seeing mind or persons is a paradigmatic different perspective than seeing diseases. Re-emerge in this comprehensive or integrationist context the notion of unitary psychosis and philosophical questions as the mind-body problem; as background there was a process metaphysics. The possibility of human experience in a phenomenological sense is considered, and a matrix of symptom or function complexes is related to it. Examples of past unitary models of mental disorders with their neurophysiologic explanations are given, as well as an analogy to current biological aspects of the endogenous in chronobiology. The question or hypothesis arises whether mental symptom complexes are manifestations of mind constituents or functions that make human experience and mind possible. The present work is a conceptual analysis that indicates a positive answer to this question. The expectation is to emphasize the perspectives of investigation in psychopathology and sciences of mind fostered by this view of symptom complexes.

Translational neuroscience and psychiatry: A conceptual analysis

As rapidly developing research disciplines and enterprises, the translational sciences have made significant impact on research direction in medicine. Psychiatry has likewise been affected, and in this regard, the translational neurosciences have been the major drivers. This paper explores the conceptual underpinnings of this enterprise in relation to psychiatry. It shows that translation is used in a metaphorical sense in this context but that this can be misleading because of the resultant connotation that there is equivalence between neurobiological states and mental states. Furthermore, this equivalence is reinforced by the unidirectional flow or bottom up approach of the translational process. Given that the epistemological basis to psychiatry is fundamentally different to that underlying medicine, questions are raised concerning the application of the translational neurosciences approach to mental symptoms and mental disorders. The hybrid structure of mental symptoms and mental disorders demands that attention is paid to the "semantic" as well as the neurobiological constituents. Neglect of the former would carry implications for the validity of research findings as well as have ethical consequences for treating patients. Translational neurosciences may have greater validity in those mental disorders and mental symptoms whose constitution and sense are carried by the neurobiological elements.

Moral insanity and psychological disorder: the hybrid roots of psychiatry

This paper traces the significance of the diagnosis of 'moral insanity' (and the related diagnoses of 'monomania' and ' manie sans délire') to the development of psychiatry as a profession in the nineteenth century. The pioneers of psychiatric thought were motivated to explore such diagnoses because they promised public recognition in the high status surroundings of the criminal court. Some success was achieved in presenting a form of expertise that centred on the ability of the experts to detect quite subtle, 'psychological' forms of dangerous madness within the minds of offenders in France and more extensively in England. Significant backlash in the press against these new ideas pushed the profession away from such psychological exploration and back towards its medical roots that located criminal insanity simply within the organic constitution of its sufferers.

Dissociative trance and spirit possession: Challenges for cultures in transition

The cross-cultural validity of dissociative possession and trance disorders is a matter of some debate, limiting research and meaningful interpretation of prevalence data. Intimate to these concerns is the status of spirit possession categories studied in the social sciences, particularly anthropology. These two categories are phenomenologically related and display similar epidemiological associations. In India, dissociative and conversion disorders are fairly common in clinical settings. There is no doubt that there are true cultural variations in possession and trance disorders. A new framework may enable clinicians to better understand possession states and spirit possession.

Research in Psychiatry: Concepts and Conceptual Analysis

Current research in psychiatry is increasingly focused on empirical studies with methods and technologies adopted from medicine. This paper argues that psychiatry has a different epistemological basis from medicine, and it is on account of this that research in psychiatry demands a different approach, one that perforce focuses on the clarification of concepts central to psychiatric practice. This means undertaking conceptual analysis and conceptual history and only then moving on to empirical study. This paper highlights the crucial epistemological differences between the practice of medicine and psychiatry, showing that the latter is enacted at the level of language and communication. Consequently, the structures of psychiatric objects, namely, mental disorders and mental symptoms, are complexes of meaning derived from heterogeneous sources - both organic and semantic. Conceptual analysis of such structures is essential as ultimately the validity of empirical research is directly dependent on the conceptual clarification of its objects of inquiry.

The hermeneutics of mental symptoms in the Cambridge School

Current Psychiatry is in crisis. Decades of neuroscientific research have not yet delivered adequate explanations or treatments. One reason for this failure may be the wrongness of its central assumption, namely that mental symptoms and disorders are natural kinds. The Cambridge School has proposed that a new Epistemology must be constructed for Psychiatry, and that this should start with the development of a new model of mental symptom-formation. ‘Mental symptoms’ should be considered as hermeneutic co-constructions occurring in a intersubjective space created by the dialogue between sufferer and healer. Subjective experiences (caused either by neurobiological or psychosocial upheaval) penetrate the awareness of sufferers causing perplexity and/or distress. To understand, handle and communicate these experiences, sufferers proceed to configure them by means of templates borrowed from their own culture. Importantly, however, the same neurobiological information can be configured into different symptoms; and different neurobiological information into the same symptom. Therefore, ‘mental symptoms’ are dissimilar hybrid combinations of neurobiological and cultural information. To be ethical, therapeutic interventions must take into account such dissimilarities. Blind manipulation of the brain in all cases should be considered as counterproductive.

Phenomenology and neurobiology of self disorder in schizophrenia: Secondary factors

Schizophrenia is a diverse and varying syndrome that defies most attempts at classification and pathogenetic explanation. This is the second of two articles offering a comprehensive model meant to integrate an understanding of schizophrenia-related forms of subjectivity, especially anomalous core-self experience (disturbed ipseity), with neurocognitive and neurodevelopmental findings. Previously we discussed the primary or foundational role of disturbed intermodal perceptional integration ("perceptual dys-integration"). Here we discuss phenomenological alterations that can be considered secondary in a pathogenetic sense--whether as consequential products downstream from a more originary disruption, or as defensive reactions involving quasi-intentional or even volitional compensations to the more primary disruptions. These include secondary forms of: 1, hyperreflexivity, 2, diminished self-presence (self-affection), and 3. disturbed "rip" or "hold" on the cognitive/perceptual field of awareness. We consider complementary relations between these secondary abnormal experiences while also considering their temporal relationships and pathogenetic intertwining with the more primary phenomenological alterations discussed previously, all in relation to the neurodevelopmental model. The secondary phenomena can be understood as highly variable factors involving overall orientations or attitudes toward experience; they have some affinities with experiences of meditation, introspectionism, and depersonalization defense. Also, they seem likely to become more pronounced during adolescence as a result of new cognitive capacities related to development of the prefrontal lobes, especially attention allocation, executive functions, abstraction, and meta-awareness. Heterogeneity in these secondary alterations might help explain much of the clinical diversity in schizophrenia, both between patients and within individual patients over time--without however losing sight of key underlying commonalities.

Phenomenology and neurobiology of self disorder in schizophrenia: Primary factors

Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous syndrome, varying between persons and over course of illness. In this and a companion article, we argue that comprehension of this condition or set of conditions may require combining a phenomenological perspective emphasizing disorders of basic-self experience ("ipseity disturbance") with a multidimensional appreciation of possible neurobiological correlates--both primary and secondary. Previous attempts to link phenomenology and neurobiology generally focus on a single neurocognitive factor. We consider diverse aspects of schizophrenia in light of a diverse, albeit interacting, set of neurocognitive abnormalities, examining both synchronic (structural) interdependence and diachronic (temporal) succession. In this article we focus on the primary or foundational role of early perceptual and motoric disturbances that affect perceptual organization and especially intermodal or multisensory perceptual integration (“perceptual dys-integration”). These disturbances are discussed in terms of their implications for three interconnected aspects of selfhood in schizophrenia, primary forms of: disrupted "hold" or "grip" on the world, hyperreflexivity, diminished self-presence (self-affection). Disturbances of organization or integration imply forms of perceptual incoherence or diminished cognitive coordination. The effect is to disrupt one's ability to apprehend the world in holistic, vital, or contextually grounded fashion, or to fully identify with or experience the unity of one's own body or thinking--thereby generating an early and profound (albeit often subtle) disruption or diminishment of basic or core self and of the sense of existing in a coherent world. We discuss interrelationships or possible complementarities between these three aspects, and consider their relevance for a neurodevelopmental account of schizophrenia.

Carving versus Stitching: The Concept of Psychic Function and the Continuity/Discontinuity Debate

BACKGROUND

The current debate on the continuity or discontinuity of psychotic symptoms and common psychic experiences has mainly dealt with methodological, epidemiological and clinical issues, but it has neglected epistemological research on the main concepts of the field.

METHODS

The implicit epistemic structure of continuity models of psychotic symptoms and its effect on research are addressed.

RESULTS

We explain how the seemingly commonsense, unproblematic concept of psychic function may explain the contradictions and paradoxes of research.

CONCLUSIONS

A new model of symptom individuation and symptom eliciting is proposed - based on the concepts of 'schemas', 'embodied affordances' and 'thick/thin descriptions'.

Neopositivism and the DSM psychiatric classification. An epistemological history. Part 2: Historical pathways, epistemological developments and present-day needs

Little is known about the concrete historical sources for the use of neopositivist operational criteria by the DSM-III. This paper suggests that distinct sources operated implicitly. The current usefulness of the operational approach is questioned. It is shown that: (a) in epistemology, neopositivism has been replaced by more adequate accounts; (b) psychologists rejected operational definitions because these were unable to define the majority of mental phenomena; (c) mental symptoms cannot be directly described as such, because they already make part of the psychiatric diagnosis to which they belong. In conclusion, diagnosing is based on the hermeneutical co-construction of mental symptoms. The failure of the neopositivist programme suggests that it is time to reconcile scientific formalization and semiotic activity.

Is psychiatry scientific? A letter to a 21st century psychiatry resident

During the development of the DSM-5, even the lay press questioned psychiatr's scientific validity. This review provides 21st century psychiatry residents with ways of answering these attacks by defining the concepts and history of psychiatry (a branch of medicine), medicine and science. Psychiatric language has two levels: first, describing symptoms and signs (19th century descriptive psychopathology developed in France and Germany), and second, describing disorders (psychiatric nosology was developed in the early 20th century by Kraepelin and resuscitated by the US neo-Kraepelinian revolution leading to the DSM-III). Science is a complex trial-and-error historical process that can be threatened by those who believe too much in it and disregard its limitations. The most important psychiatric advances, electroconvulsive therapy and major psychopharmacological agents, were discovered by "chance", not by scientific planning. Jaspers's General Psychopathology is a complex 100-year-old book that describes: 1) psychiatric disorders as heterogeneous and 2) psychiatry as a hybrid scientific discipline requiring a combination of understanding (a social science method) and explanation (a natural science method). In the 21st century Berrios reminds us of psychiatry's unfortunate methodological issues due to hybrid symptoms and disorders, some of which are better understood as problems in communication between interacting human beings; in those situations neuroscience methods such as brain imaging make no sense. A new language is needed in psychiatry. East Asian psychiatry residents, who are not particularly attached to the antiquated language currently used, may be particularly equipped for the task of recreating psychiatric language using 21st century knowledge.

Rediscovering psychopathology: the epistemology and phenomenology of the psychiatric object

Questions concerning both the ontology and epistemology of the "psychiatric object" (symptoms and signs) should be at the forefront of current concerns of psychiatry as a clinical neuroscience. We argue that neglect of these issues is a crucial source of the stagnation of psychiatric research. In honor of the centenary of Karl Jaspers' book, General Psychopathology, we offer a critique of the contemporary "operationalist" epistemology, a critique that is consistent with Jaspers' views. Symptoms and signs cannot be properly understood or identified apart from an appreciation of the nature of consciousness or subjectivity, which in turn cannot be treated as a collection of thing-like, mutually independent objects, accessible to context-free, "atheoretical" definitions or unproblematic forms of measurement (as is often assumed in structured interviewing). Adequate and faithful distinctions in the phenomenal or experiential realm are therefore a fundamental prerequisite for classification, treatment, and research. This requires a multidisciplinary approach, incorporating (among other things) insights provided by psychology, phenomenological philosophy, and the philosophy of mind.