Norm-establishing and norm-following in autonomous agency

Irruption Theory: A Novel Conceptualization of the Enactive Account of Motivated Activity

Cognitive science is lacking conceptual tools to describe how an agent's motivations, as such, can play a role in the generation of its behavior. The enactive approach has made progress by developing a relaxed naturalism, and by placing normativity at the core of life and mind; all cognitive activity is a kind of motivated activity. It has rejected representational architectures, especially their reification of the role of normativity into localized "value" functions, in favor of accounts that appeal to system-level properties of the organism. However, these accounts push the problem of reification to a higher level of description, given that the efficacy of agent-level normativity is completely identified with the efficacy of non-normative system-level activity, while assuming operational equivalency. To allow normativity to have its own efficacy, a new kind of nonreductive theory is proposed: irruption theory. The concept of irruption is introduced to indirectly operationalize an agent's motivated involvement in its activity, specifically in terms of a corresponding underdetermination of its states by their material basis. This implies that irruptions are associated with increased unpredictability of (neuro)physiological activity, and they should, hence, be quantifiable in terms of information-theoretic entropy. Accordingly, evidence that action, cognition, and consciousness are linked to higher levels of neural entropy can be interpreted as indicating higher levels of motivated agential involvement. Counterintuitively, irruptions do not stand in contrast to adaptive behavior. Rather, as indicated by artificial life models of complex adaptive systems, bursts of arbitrary changes in neural activity can facilitate the self-organization of adaptivity. Irruption theory therefore, makes it intelligible how an agent's motivations, as such, can make effective differences to their behavior, without requiring the agent to be able to directly control their body's neurophysiological processes.

Using enactive robotics to think outside of the problem-solving box: How sensorimotor contingencies constrain the forms of emergent autononomous habits

We suggest that the influence of biology in 'biologically inspired robotics' can be embraced at a deeper level than is typical, if we adopt an enactive approach that moves the focus of interest from how problems are solved to how problems emerge in the first place. In addition to being inspired by mechanisms found in natural systems or by evolutionary design principles directed at solving problems posited by the environment, we can take inspiration from the precarious, self-maintaining organization of living systems to investigate forms of cognition that are also precarious and self-maintaining and that thus also, like life, have their own problems that must be be addressed if they are to persist. In this vein, we use a simulation to explore precarious, self-reinforcing sensorimotor habits as a building block for a robot's behavior. Our simulations of simple robots controlled by an Iterative Deformable Sensorimotor Medium demonstrate the spontaneous emergence of different habits, their re-enactment and the organization of an ecology of habits within each agent. The form of the emergent habits is constrained by the sensory modality of the robot such that habits formed under one modality (vision) are more similar to each other than they are to habits formed under another (audition). We discuss these results in the wider context of: (a) enactive approaches to life and mind, (b) sensorimotor contingency theory, (c) adaptationist vs. structuralist explanations in biology, and (d) the limits of functionalist problem-solving approaches to (artificial) intelligence.

Health and environment from adaptation to adaptivity: a situated relational account

The definitions and conceptualizations of health, and the management of healthcare have been challenged by the current global scenarios (e.g., new diseases, new geographical distribution of diseases, effects of climate change on health, etc.) and by the ongoing scholarship in humanities and science. In this paper we question the mainstream definition of health adopted by the WHO-'a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity' (WHO in Preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the international health conference, The World Health Organization, 1948)-and its role in providing tools to understand what health is in the contemporary context. More specifically, we argue that this context requires to take into account the role of the environment both in medical theory and in the healthcare practice. To do so, we analyse WHO documents dated 1984 and 1986 which define health as 'coping with the environment'. We develop the idea of 'coping with the environment', by focusing on two cardinal concepts: adaptation in public health and adaptivity in philosophy of biology. We argue that the notions of adaptation and adaptivity can be of major benefit for the characterization of health, and have practical implications. We explore some of these implications by discussing two recent case studies of adaptivity in public health, which can be valuable to further develop adaptive strategies in the current pandemic scenario: community-centred care and microbiologically healthier buildings.

Goal Oriented Behavior With a Habit-Based Adaptive Sensorimotor Map Network

We present a description of an ASM-network, a new habit-based robot controller model consisting of a network of adaptive sensorimotor maps. This model draws upon recent theoretical developments in enactive cognition concerning habit and agency at the sensorimotor level. It aims to provide a platform for experimental investigation into the relationship between networked organizations of habits and cognitive behavior. It does this by combining (1) a basic mechanism of generating continuous motor activity as a function of historical sensorimotor trajectories with (2) an evaluative mechanism which reinforces or weakens those historical trajectories as a function of their support of a higher-order structure of higher-order sensorimotor coordinations. After describing the model, we then present the results of applying this model in the context of a well-known minimal cognition task involving object discrimination. In our version of this experiment, an individual robot is able to learn the task through a combination of exploration through random movements and repetition of historic trajectories which support the structure of a pre-given network of sensorimotor coordinations. The experimental results illustrate how, utilizing enactive principles, a robot can display recognizable learning behavior without explicit representational mechanisms or extraneous fitness variables. Instead, our model's behavior adapts according to the internal requirements of the action-generating mechanism itself.

The enactive naturalization of normativity: from self-maintenance to situated interactions

The autopoietic enactive account of cognition explains the emergence of normativity in nature as the norm of self-maintenance of life. The autonomous nature of living agents implies that they can differentiate events and regulate their responses in terms of what is better or worse to maintain their own precarious identity. Thus, normative behavior emerges from living organisms. Under this basic understanding of normativity as self-maintenance, autopoietic enactivism defends a continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms. The self-maintenance of an agent's sensorimotor identity establishes the cognitive norms that regulate its behavior, and the self-maintenance of its social identity determines the social norms. However, there is no clear explanation of how individuals, who by their very constitution are primarily moved to interact with the world under the norm of self-maintenance, could interact with the world driven by non-individual norms. Furthermore, understanding all normativity as self-maintenance makes it unclear how agents establish genuine social interactions and acquire habits that have no implication for their constitution as individuals. So, to face these challenges, I propose an alternative notion of normativity grounded on a Wittgensteinian, action-oriented, and pragmatic conception of meaning that distinguishes between an agent with a normative point of view and external normative criteria. I defend that a normative phenomenon is an interaction that is established by an individual point of view as defined by autopoietic enactivism and that is part of a self-maintaining system. The latter establishes the external normative criteria to evaluate the interaction, and it may or may not coincide with the identity of the interacting agent. Separating external normative criteria from the self-constitution of the interactant agent not only solves the challenge but potentially explains the situated and relational character of agency.

Self-preserving mechanisms in motile oil droplets: a computational model of abiological self-preservation

Recent empirical work has characterized motile oil droplets-small, self-propelled oil droplets whose active surface chemistry moves them through their aqueous environment. Previous work has evaluated in detail the fluid dynamics underlying the motility of these droplets. This paper introduces a new computational model that is used to evaluate the behaviour of these droplets as a form of viability-based adaptive self-preservation, whereby (i) the mechanism of motility causes motion towards the conditions beneficial to that mechanism's persistence; and (ii) the behaviour automatically adapts to compensate when the motility mechanism's ideal operating conditions change. The model simulates a motile oil droplet as a disc that moves through a two-dimensional spatial environment containing diffusing chemicals. The concentration of reactants on its surface change by way of chemical reactions, diffusion, Marangoni flow (the equilibriation of surface tension) and exchange with the droplet's local environment. Droplet motility is a by-product of Marangoni flow, similar to the motion-producing mechanism observed in the lab. We use the model to examine how the droplet's behaviour changes when its ideal operating conditions vary.

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: A Normative Way Out From Ontological Dilemmas

Two important issues of recent discussion in the philosophy of biology and of the cognitive sciences have been the ontological status of living, cognitive agents and whether cognition and action have a normative character per se. In this paper I will explore the following conditional in relation with both the notion of affordance and the idea of the living as self-creation: if we recognize the need to use normative vocabulary to make sense of life in general, we are better off avoiding taking sides on the ontological discussion between eliminativists, reductionists and emergentists. Looking at life through normative lenses is, at the very least, in tension with any kind of realism that aims at prediction and control. I will argue that this is so for two separate reasons. On the one hand, understanding the realm of biology in purely factualist, realist terms means to dispossess it of its dignity: there is more to life than something that we simply aim to manipulate to our own material convenience. On the other hand, a descriptivist view that is committed to the existence of biological and mental facts that are fully independent of our understanding of nature may be an invitation to make our ethical and normative judgments dependent on the discovery of such alleged facts, something I diagnose as a form of representationalism. This runs counter what I take to be a central democratic ideal: while there are experts whose opinion could be considered the last word on purely factual matters, where value is concerned, there are no technocratic experts above the rest of us. I will rely on the ideas of some central figures of early analytic philosophy that, perhaps due to the reductionistic and eliminativist tendencies of contemporary philosophy of mind, have not been sufficiently discussed within post-cognitivist debates.

Levels and Norm-Development: A Phenomenological Approach to Enactive-Ecological Norms of Action and Perception

The enactive approach and the skilled intentionality framework are two closely related forms of radical embodied cognition that nonetheless exhibit important differences. In this paper, I focus on a conceptual disparity regarding the normative character of action and perception. Whereas the skilled intentionality framework describes the norms of action and perception as the capacity of embodied agents to become attuned (i.e., skilled intentionality) to preestablished normative frameworks (i.e., situated normativity), the enactive approach describes the same phenomenon as the enactment of norms (i.e., as sense-making) at different levels of organization that go from individual biological agents to linguistic encounters. I will argue that although both accounts accurately recognize important features of the norms of action and perception, they also have significant shortcomings. Norm-attunement accurately sees normative, ecological frameworks as the necessary set of constraints for the existence of norms at play in sociocultural bodily practices, but it fails to acknowledge the temporal and open-ended character of these norms and frameworks. Norm-enactment, by contrast, acknowledges that norms of action and perception are temporally open-ended, but fails to explicitly recognize that environmental normative frameworks are necessary for the enactment and development of all sort of norms in the interactional domain of an agent-environment system. To overcome these problems, I propose an enactive-ecological approach to norms of action and perception. This approach consists in describing norm-enactment as a result of a developmental process I call norm-development. This process describes the enactment of norms from the background of ecological, normative frameworks. These frameworks are norms enacted in the past of the interactional history of the agent-environment system that remain open to new configurations (new norms) in the present. To clarify conceptually norm-development, I appeal to Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of norms of perception, and more particularly to his concept of spatial levels. Like the enactive approach, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that perceptual norms emerge in the interactional history of the agent-environment system, but, like the skilled intentionality framework, he also posits that normative frameworks, that he calls levels, enable and constrain the emergence of perceptual norms and its development. Levels are therefore a phenomenological description of ecological normative frameworks that has been temporally constituted and that stay temporally open-ended as a fundamental requisite for the enactment and development of norms of action and perception.

The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us after All These Years

In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically meaningful for living beings because of their precarious existence as adaptive autopoietic individuals. But this approach inherits the problem of failing to account for how meaning as such could make a difference for an agent’s behavior. In a nutshell, if life and mind are identified with physically deterministic phenomena, then there is no conceptual room for meaning to play a role in its own right. We argue that this impotence of meaning can be addressed by revising the concept of nature such that the macroscopic scale of the living can be characterized by physical indeterminacy. We consider the implications of this revision of the mind-body relationship for synthetic approaches.

Methods for Measuring Viability and Evaluating Viability Indicators

Life and other dissipative structures involve nonlinear dynamics that are not amenable to conventional analysis. Advances are being made in theory, modeling, and simulation techniques, but we do not have general principles for designing, controlling, stabilizing, or eliminating these systems. There is thus a need for tools that can transform high-level descriptions of these systems into useful guidance for their modification and design. In this article we introduce new methods for quantifying the viability of dissipative structures. We then present an information-theoretical approach for evaluating the quality of viability indicators, measurable quantities that covary with, and thus can be used to predict or influence, a system's viability.

The Structure of Ontogenies in a Model Protocell

Emergent individuals are often characterized with respect to their viability: their ability to maintain themselves and persist in variable environments. As such individuals interact with an environment, they undergo sequences of structural changes that correspond to their ontogenies. Ultimately, individuals that adapt to their environment, and increase their chances of survival, persist. This article provides an initial step towards a more formal treatment of these concepts. A network of possible ontogenies is uncovered by subjecting a model protocell to sequential perturbations and mapping the resulting structural configurations. The analysis of this network reveals trends in how the protocell can move between configurations, how its morphology changes, and how the role of the environment varies throughout. Viability is defined as expected life span given an initial configuration. This leads to two notions of adaptivity: a local adaptivity that addresses how viability changes in plastic transitions, and a global adaptivity that looks at longer-term tendencies for increased viability. To demonstrate how different protocell-environment pairings produce different patterns of ontogenic change, we generate and analyze a second ontogenic network for the same protocell in a different environment. Finally, the mechanisms of a minimal adaptive transition are analyzed, and it is shown that these rely on distributed spatial processes rather than an explicit regulatory mechanism. The combination of this model and analytical techniques provides a foundation for studying the emergence of viability, ontogeny, and adaptivity in more biologically realistic systems.

Properties of Life: Toward a Coherent Understanding of the Organism

The question of specific properties of life compared to nonliving things accompanied biology throughout its history. At times this question generated major controversies with largely diverging opinions. Basically, mechanistic thinkers, who tried to understand organismic functions in terms of nonliving machines, were opposed by those who tried to describe specific properties or even special forces being active within living entities. As this question included the human body, these controversies always have been of special relevance to our self-image and also touched practical issues of medicine. During the second half of the twentieth century, it seemed to be resolved that organisms are explainable basically as physicochemical machines. Especially from the perspective of molecular biology, it seemed to be clear that organisms need to be explained solely by the chemical functions of their component parts, although some resistance to this view never ceased. This research program has been working quite successfully, so that science today knows a lot about the physiological and chemical processes within organisms. However, again new doubts arise questioning whether the mere continuation of this analytical approach will finally generate a fundamental understanding of living entities. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the quest for a new synthesis actually comes from analytical empiricists themselves. The hypothesis of the present paper is that empirical research has been developed far enough today, that it reveals by itself the materials and the prerequisites to understand more of the specific properties of life. Without recourse to mysterious forces, it is possible to generate answers to this age-old question, just using recent, empirically generated knowledge. This view does not contradict the results of reductionistic research, but rather grants them meaning within the context of organismic systems and also may increase their practical usefulness. Although several of these properties have been discussed before, different authors usually concentrated on a single one or some of them. The paper describes ten specific properties of living entities as they can be deduced from contemporary science. The aim is to demonstrate that the results of empirical research show both the necessity as well as the possibility of the development of a new conception of life to build a coherent understanding of organismic functions.

A causal dispositional account of fitness

The notion of fitness is usually equated to reproductive success. However, this actualist approach presents some difficulties, mainly the explanatory circularity problem, which have lead philosophers of biology to offer alternative definitions in which fitness and reproductive success are distinguished. In this paper, we argue  that none of these alternatives is satisfactory and, inspired by Mumford and Anjum's dispositional theory of causation, we offer a definition of fitness as a causal dispositional property. We argue that, under this framework, the distinctiveness that biologists usually attribute to fitness-namely, the fact that fitness is something different from both the physical traits of an organism and the number of offspring it leaves-can be explained, and the main problems associated with the concept of fitness can be solved. Firstly, we introduce Mumford and Anjum's dispositional theory of causation and present our definition of fitness as a causal disposition. We explain in detail each of the elements involved in our definition, namely: the relationship between fitness and the functional dispositions that compose it, the emergent character of fitness, and the context-sensitivity of fitness. Finally, we explain how fitness and realized fitness, as well as expected and realized fitness are distinguished in our approach to fitness as a causal disposition.

Complex Autocatalysis in Simple Chemistries

Life on Earth must originally have arisen from abiotic chemistry. Since the details of this chemistry are unknown, we wish to understand, in general, which types of chemistry can lead to complex, lifelike behavior. Here we show that even very simple chemistries in the thermodynamically reversible regime can self-organize to form complex autocatalytic cycles, with the catalytic effects emerging from the network structure. We demonstrate this with a very simple but thermodynamically reasonable artificial chemistry model. By suppressing the direct reaction from reactants to products, we obtain the simplest kind of autocatalytic cycle, resulting in exponential growth. When these simple first-order cycles are prevented from forming, the system achieves superexponential growth through more complex, higher-order autocatalytic cycles. This leads to nonlinear phenomena such as oscillations and bistability, the latter of which is of particular interest regarding the origins of life.

Exploring the Space of Viable Configurations in a Model of Metabolism-Boundary Co-construction

We introduce a spatial model of concentration dynamics that supports the emergence of spatiotemporal inhomogeneities that engage in metabolism-boundary co-construction. These configurations exhibit disintegration following some perturbations, and self-repair in response to others. We define robustness as a viable configuration's tendency to return to its prior configuration in response to perturbations, and plasticity as a viable configuration's tendency to change to other viable configurations. These properties are demonstrated and quantified in the model, allowing us to map a space of viable configurations and their possible transitions. Combining robustness and plasticity provides a measure of viability as the average expected survival time under ongoing perturbation, and allows us to measure how viability is affected as the configuration undergoes transitions. The framework introduced here is independent of the specific model we used, and is applicable for quantifying robustness, plasticity, and viability in any computational model of artificial life that demonstrates the conditions for viability that we promote.

Adapting to Adaptations: Behavioural Strategies that are Robust to Mutations and Other Organisational-Transformations

Genetic mutations, infection by parasites or symbionts, and other events can transform the way that an organism’s internal state changes in response to a given environment. We use a minimalistic computational model to support an argument that by behaving “interoceptively,” i.e. responding to internal state rather than to the environment, organisms can be robust to these organisational-transformations. We suggest that the robustness of interoceptive behaviour is due, in part, to the asymmetrical relationship between an organism and its environment, where the latter more substantially influences the former than vice versa. This relationship means that interoceptive behaviour can respond to the environment, the internal state and the interaction between the two, while exteroceptive behaviour can only respond to the environment. We discuss the possibilities that (i) interoceptive behaviour may play an important role of facilitating adaptive evolution (especially in the early evolution of primitive life) and (ii) interoceptive mechanisms could prove useful in efforts to create more robust synthetic life-forms.

Enacting a social ecology: radically embodied intersubjectivity

Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as “world-involving,” indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent and its environment. The precise nature of the environment is frequently left ill-described, however, and provides a challenge for such approaches, particularly, it is noted here, for the enactive approach which emphasizes this complementarity in quite radical terms. This paper argues that enactivists should work to find common cause with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, a theoretical perspective that provides the most explicit theory of the psychological environment currently extant. In doing so, the intersubjective, cultural nature of the ecology of human psychology is explored, with the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches outlined. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is used to present a framework for resolving some of these challenges. Drawing these various strands together an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity is presented.

Embodiment of intersubjective time: relational dynamics as attractors in the temporal coordination of interpersonal behaviors and experiences

This paper addresses the issue of “being together,” and more specifically the issue of “being together in time.” We provide with an integrative framework that is inspired by phenomenology, the enactive approach and dynamical systems theories. To do so, we first define embodiment as a living and lived phenomenon that emerges from agent-world coupling. We then show that embodiment is essentially dynamical and therefore we describe experiential, behavioral and brain dynamics. Both lived temporality and the temporality of the living appear to be complex, multiscale phenomena. Next we discuss embodied dynamics in the context of interpersonal interactions, and briefly review the empirical literature on between-persons temporal coordination. Overall, we propose that being together in time emerges from the relational dynamics of embodied interactions and their flexible co-regulation.

Characterizing autopoiesis in the game of life

Maturana and Varela's concept of autopoiesis defines the essential organization of living systems and serves as a foundation for their biology of cognition and the enactive approach to cognitive science. As an initial step toward a more formal analysis of autopoiesis, this article investigates its application to the compact, recurrent spatiotemporal patterns that arise in Conway's Game-of-Life cellular automaton. In particular, we demonstrate how such entities can be formulated as self-constructing networks of interdependent processes that maintain their own boundaries. We then characterize the specific organizations of several such entities, suggest a way to simplify the descriptions of these organizations, and briefly consider the transformation of such organizations over time.

A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies

According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how, constituted by lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) in an active and situated agent. Despite the attention that this approach has attracted, there have been few attempts to define its core concepts formally. In this paper, we examine the idea of SMCs and argue that its use involves notions that need to be distinguished. We introduce four distinct kinds of SMCs, which we define operationally. These are the notions of sensorimotor environment (open-loop motor-induced sensory variations), sensorimotor habitat (closed-loop sensorimotor trajectories), sensorimotor coordination (reliable sensorimotor patterns playing a functional role), and sensorimotor strategy (normative organization of sensorimotor coordinations). We make use of a minimal dynamical model of visually guided categorization to test the explanatory value of the different kinds of SMCs. Finally, we discuss the impact of our definitions on the conceptual development and empirical as well as model-based testing of the claims of the sensorimotor approach.

Bacterial chemotaxis: introverted or extroverted? A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of basic forms of metabolism-based and metabolism-independent behavior using a computational model

Using a minimal model of metabolism, we examine the limitations of behavior that is (a) solely in response to environmental phenomena or (b) solely in response to metabolic dynamics, showing that basic forms of each of these kinds of behavior are incapable of driving survival-prolonging behavior in certain situations. Inspired by experimental evidence of concurrent metabolism-based and metabolism-independent chemotactic mechanisms in Escherichia coli and Rhodobacter sphaeroides, we then investigate how metabolism-independent and metabolism-based sensitivities can be integrated into a single behavioral response, demonstrating that a simple switching mechanism can be sufficient to effectively integrate metabolism-based and metabolism-independent behaviors. Finally, we use a spatial simulation of bacteria to show that the investigated forms of behavior produce different spatio-temporal patterns that are influenced by the metabolic-history of the bacteria. We suggest that these patterns could be a way to experimentally derive insight into the relationship between metabolism and chemotaxis in real bacteria.