Epistemic violence in psychological science: Can knowledge of, from, and for the (othered) people solve the problem?

A primary target of Indigenous psychologists and critical psychologists is the epistemic violence found in mainstream research. The epistemic violence derives from two alleged mainstream tendencies: (a) omitting concepts/conceptions of othered peoples and (b) interpreting observed group differences to be caused by inherent inferiorities of othered peoples. In seeking remedial research practice, some theoretical psychologists distinguish (a) psychological knowledge from and for the folk, which they advocate and (b) psychological “knowledge” about the folk, the alleged source of objectification of othered peoples. Though seemingly self-evident, this for/about prepositional divide may not be clear. First, mainstream epistemic violence often depends on folk notions. Second, the use in science of folk concepts/conceptions has advanced oppressive purposes, whereas some mainstream findings may serve progressive goals. I exemplify with race concepts, especially racialized essentialism and dehumanization, and I demonstrate how mainstream science sometimes reveals mechanisms of othering that may inform progressive social reform efforts.

Genes, Race, and Causation: US Public Perspectives About Racial Difference

Concerns have been raised that the increase in popular interest in genetics may herald a new era within which racial inequities are seen as 'natural' or immutable. In the following study, we provide data from a nationally representative survey on how the US population perceives general ability, athleticism, and intellect being determined by race and/or genetics and whether they believe racial health inequities to be primarily the product of genetic or social factors. We find that self-described race is of primary importance in attributing general ability to race, increasing age is a significant factor in attributing athleticism and intellect to genes and race, and education is a significant factor in decreasing such racially and genetically deterministic views . Beliefs about the meaning of race are statistically significantly associated with respect to the perception of athletic abilities and marginally associated with the perception of racial health inequalities being either socially or genetically derived. Race, education, socioeconomic status, and concepts of race were frequently found to be multiplicative in their statistical effects. The persistent acceptance of a genetically and racially deterministic view of athleticism among the White and older population group is discussed in respect to its social impact, as is the high level of agreement that general abilities are determined by race among non-White respondents and those of lower socioeconomic status. We argue that these findings highlight that both biological and non-biological forms of understanding race continue to play a role into the politics of race and social difference within contemporary US society.

Putting humanity back into the teaching of human biology

In this paper, I draw upon debates about race in biology and philosophy as well as the concepts of ineliminable pluralism and psychological essentialism to outline the necessary subject matter knowledge that teachers should possess if they desire to: (i) increase student understanding of scientific research on genetic and behavioral variation in humans; and (ii) attenuate inegalitarian beliefs about race amongst students.

Philosophy of race meets population genetics

In this paper, I respond to four common semantic and metaphysical objections that philosophers of race have launched at scholars who interpret recent human genetic clustering results in population genetics as evidence for biological racial realism. I call these objections 'the discreteness objection', 'the visibility objection', 'the very important objection', and 'the objectively real objection.' After motivating each objection, I show that each one stems from implausible philosophical assumptions about the relevant meaning of 'race' or the nature of biological racial realism. In order to be constructive, I end by offering some advice for how we can productively critique attempts to defend biological racial realism based on recent human genetic clustering results. I also offer a clarification of the relevant human-population genetic research.