The functional effects of color perception and color imagery

Beneficial impact of visual stimulation-based digital therapeutics on blood pressure control in non-hypertensive individuals

Hypertension-related diseases occur in both hypertensive and non-hypertensive individuals. However, few studies to date have explored blood pressure (BP) control in non-hypertensive individuals. This before-after study aimed to examine the impact of visual stimulation-based digital therapeutics (VS-DTx) on BP and heart rate (HR). Eighty-three eligible non-hypertensive participants were included in this study. The McNemar test and Paired Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test were employed to assess decline rates and differences in BP and HR between the control phase and the intervention (using VS-DTx) phase. Pairwise correlation analysis was used to analyze the correlation between the two phases. This study found the systolic BP (SBP) and mean arterial pressure (MAP) in the VS-DTx phase showed a downward trend (66.2% vs 49.3%; 68.7% vs 55.4%). The mean SBP decreased from 114.73 mm Hg to 111.18 mm Hg, and the mean MAP decreased from 87.96 mm Hg to 84.88 mm Hg in the VS-DTx phase. Paired Samples Wilcoxon Test showed differences in both ΔSBP (Z = -3.296; P < 0.01) and ΔMAP (Z = -2.386; P < 0.05) (Δ is defined as the difference between baseline and post-stimulus). The pairwise correlations analysis revealed that VS-DTx affected the MAP reduction (r = 0.33; P < 0.01) between the browsing digital devices phase and the VS-DTx phase. The results indicated that VS-DTx may have a certain effect on BP, including SBP and MAP. This study preliminarily explored the possible effects of VS-DTx on BP, providing certain useful insights for future research in digital BP management.

Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture

Theories of Visual Mental Imagery (VMI) emphasize the processes of retrieval, modification, and recombination of sensory information from long-term memory. Yet, only few studies have focused on the behavioral mechanisms and neural correlates supporting VMI of stimuli from different semantic domains. Therefore, we currently have a limited understanding of how the brain generates and maintains mental representations of colors, faces, shapes - to name a few. Such an undetermined scenario renders unclear the organizational structure of neural circuits supporting VMI, including the role of the early visual cortex. We aimed to fill this gap by reviewing the scientific literature of five semantic domains: visuospatial, face, colors, shapes, and letters imagery. Linking theory to evidence from over 60 different experimental designs, this review highlights three main points. First, there is no consistent activity in the early visual cortex across all VMI domains, contrary to the prediction of the dominant model. Second, there is consistent activity of the frontoparietal networks and the left hemisphere's fusiform gyrus during voluntary VMI irrespective of the semantic domain investigated. We propose that these structures are part of a domain-general VMI sub-network. Third, domain-specific information engages specific regions of the ventral and dorsal cortical visual pathways. These regions partly overlap with those found in visual perception studies (e.g., fusiform face area for faces imagery; lingual gyrus for color imagery). Altogether, the reviewed evidence suggests the existence of domain-general and domain-specific mechanisms of VMI selectively engaged by stimulus-specific properties (e.g., colors or faces). These mechanisms would be supported by an organizational structure mixing vertical and horizontal connections (heterarchy) between sub-networks for specific stimulus domains. Such a heterarchical organization of VMI makes different predictions from current models of VMI as reversed perception. Our conclusions set the stage for future research, which should aim to characterize the spatiotemporal dynamics and interactions among key regions of this architecture giving rise to visual mental images.

Different Mechanisms for Supporting Mental Imagery and Perceptual Representations: Modulation Versus Excitation

Recent research suggests imagery is functionally equivalent to a weak form of visual perception. Here we report evidence across five independent experiments on adults that perception and imagery are supported by fundamentally different mechanisms: Whereas perceptual representations are largely formed via increases in excitatory activity, imagery representations are largely supported by modulating nonimagined content. We developed two behavioral techniques that allowed us to first put the visual system into a state of adaptation and then probe the additivity of perception and imagery. If imagery drives similar excitatory visual activity to perception, pairing imagery with perceptual adapters should increase the state of adaptation. Whereas pairing weak perception with adapters increased measures of adaptation, pairing imagery reversed their effects. Further experiments demonstrated that these nonadditive effects were due to imagery weakening representations of nonimagined content. Together these data provide empirical evidence that the brain uses categorically different mechanisms to represent imagery and perception.

A comparison of mental imagery and perceptual cueing across domains of attention

Mental imagery and perceptual cues can influence subsequent visual search performance, but examination of this influence has been limited to low-level features like colors and shapes. The present study investigated how the two types of cues influence low-level visual search, visual search with realistic objects, and executive attention. On each trial, participants were either presented with a colored square or tasked with using mental imagery to generate a colored square that could match the target (valid trial) or distractor (invalid trial) in the search array that followed (Experiments 1 and 3). In a separate experiment, the colored square displayed or generated was replaced with a realistic object in a specific category that could appear as a target or distractor in the search array (Experiment 2). Although the displayed object was in the same category as an item in the search display, they were never a perfect match (e.g., jam drop cookie instead of chocolate chip). Our findings revealed that the facilitation of performance on valid trials compared with invalid trials was greater for perceptual cues than imagery cues for low-level features (Experiment 1), whereas the influence of these two types of cues was comparable in the context of realistic objects (Experiment 2) The influence of mental imagery appears not to extend to the resolution of conflict generated by color-word Stroop stimuli (Experiment 3). The present findings extend our understanding of how mental imagery influences the allocation of attention.

Imagining and reading actions: Towards similar motor representations

While action language and motor imagery both engage the motor system, determining whether these two processes indeed share the same motor representations would contribute to better understanding their underlying mechanisms. We conducted two experiments probing the mutual influence of these two processes. In Exp.1, hand-action verbs were presented subliminally, and participants (n = 36) selected the verb they thought they perceived from two alternatives. When congruent actions were imagined prior to this task, accuracy significantly increased, i.e. participants were better able to "see" the subliminal verbs. In Exp.2, participants (n = 19) imagined hand flexion or extension, while corticospinal excitability was measured via transcranial magnetic stimulation. Corticospinal excitability was modulated by action verbs subliminally presented prior to imagery. Specifically, the typical increase observed during imagery was suppressed after presentation of incongruent action verbs. This mutual influence of action language and motor imagery, both at behavioral and neurophysiological levels, suggests overlapping motor representations.

Comparing imagery and perception: Using eye movements to dissociate mechanisms in search

It has been demonstrated that color imagery can have a profound impact when generated prior to search, while at the same time, perceptual cues have a somewhat limited influence. Given this discrepancy, the present study evaluated the processes impacted by imagery and perception using a singleton search task where participants had to find an oddball colored target among homogenously colored distractors. Prior to each trial, a perceptual color was displayed or imagery was generated that could match the target, distractors, or neither item in the search array. It was revealed that color imagery led to both a larger benefit when it matched the target and a larger cost when it matched the distractors relative to perceptual cues. By parsing response times into pre-search, search, and response phases based on eye movements, it was revealed that, while imagery and perceptual cues both influenced the search phase, imagery had a significantly greater influence than perceptual cues. Further, imagery influenced pre-search and response phases as well. Overall, the present findings reveal that the influence of imagery is profound as it affects multiple processes in the vision-perception pipeline, while perception only appeared to impact search.

Top-down imagery overrides the influence of selection history effects

The present study investigated whether color imagery could override the representations of the prevalent selection history effect termed Priming of Pop-out (PoP), which is constituted by faster responding when the target color is repeated rather than switched across trials of color singleton search. Participants imagined a color in the interval between trials of a color singleton search task that could be the same as or different to the previous target color, and they were to rate the vividness of these representations following each imagery event. It was revealed that when highly vivid imagery was reported, the PoP effect was attenuated relative to less vivid forms of it (and absent in two out of three experiments), and that color imagery eliminated the build-up of priming following consecutive target color repeats. Overall, the present findings suggest the representations of the selection history system can be overridden by top-down imagery.

Why do imagery and perception look and feel so different?

Despite the past few decades of research providing convincing evidence of the similarities in function and neural mechanisms between imagery and perception, for most of us, the experience of the two are undeniably different, why? Here, we review and discuss the differences between imagery and perception and the possible underlying causes of these differences, from function to neural mechanisms. Specifically, we discuss the directional flow of information (top-down versus bottom-up), the differences in targeted cortical layers in primary visual cortex and possible different neural mechanisms of modulation versus excitation. For the first time in history, neuroscience is beginning to shed light on this long-held mystery of why imagery and perception look and feel so different. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Looking into the mind's eye: Directed and evaluated imagery vividness modulates imagery-perception congruency effects

While most people have had the experience of seeing a representation in the mind's eye, it is an open question whether we have control over the vividness of these representations. The present study explored this issue by using an imagery-perception interface whereby color imagery was used to prime congruent color targets in visual search. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were required to report the vividness of an imagined representation after generating it, and in Experiment 2, participants were directed to create an imagined representation with particular vividness prior to generating it. The analyses revealed that the magnitude of the imagery congruency effect increased with both reported and directed vividness. The findings here strongly support the notion that participants have metacognitive awareness of the mind's eye and willful control over the vividness of its representations.

Visual imagery influences attentional guidance during visual search: Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence

Recent behavioral studies have shown that color imagery can benefit visual search when it is congruent with an upcoming target. In the present study we investigated whether this color imagery benefit was due to the processes underlying attentional guidance, as indicated by the electrophysiological marker known as the N2pc component. Participants were instructed to imagine a color prior to each trial of a singleton search task. On some trials, the imagined color was congruent with the target, and on other trials, it was congruent with the distractors. The analyses revealed that the N2pc was present when color imagery was congruent with the search target, and absent when it was congruent with the distractors. Further, there was preliminary evidence that attentional guidance depended on the vividness of color imagery and the frequency at which participants implemented the imagery instruction. Overall, the results of the present study indicate that color imagery can influence the attentional guidance processes underlying visual search.

Cortical excitability controls the strength of mental imagery

Mental imagery provides an essential simulation tool for remembering the past and planning the future, with its strength affecting both cognition and mental health. Research suggests that neural activity spanning prefrontal, parietal, temporal, and visual areas supports the generation of mental images. Exactly how this network controls the strength of visual imagery remains unknown. Here, brain imaging and transcranial magnetic phosphene data show that lower resting activity and excitability levels in early visual cortex (V1-V3) predict stronger sensory imagery. Further, electrically decreasing visual cortex excitability using tDCS increases imagery strength, demonstrating a causative role of visual cortex excitability in controlling visual imagery. Together, these data suggest a neurophysiological mechanism of cortical excitability involved in controlling the strength of mental images.

Between-subject variability in the influence of mental imagery on conscious perception

Mental imagery and visual perception rely on similar neural mechanisms, but the function of this overlap remains unclear. One idea is that imagery can influence perception. Previous research has shown that imagining a stimulus prior to binocular presentation of rivalling stimuli increases the chance of perceiving the imagined stimulus. In this study we investigated how this effect interacts with bottom-up sensory input by comparing psychometric response curves for congruent and incongruent imagery in humans. A Bayesian hierarchical model was used, allowing us to simultaneously study group-level effects as well as effects for individual participants. We found strong effects of both imagery as well as its interaction with sensory evidence within individual participants. However, the direction of these effects were highly variable between individuals, leading to weak effects at the group level. This highlights the heterogeneity of conscious perception and emphasizes the need for individualized investigation of such complex cognitive processes.

Measuring Thought-Control Failure: Sensory Mechanisms and Individual Differences

The ability to control one’s thoughts is crucial for attention, focus, ideation, and mental well-being. Although there is a long history of research into thought control, the inherent subjectivity of thoughts has made objective examination, and thus mechanistic understanding, difficult. Here, we report a novel method to objectively investigate thought-control success and failure by measuring the sensory strength of visual thoughts using binocular rivalry, a perceptual illusion. Across five experiments ( N = 67), we found that thought-control failure may occur because of the involuntary and antithetical formation of nonreportable sensory representations during attempts at thought suppression but not during thought substitution. Notably, thought control was worse in individuals with high levels of anxiety and schizotypy but more successful in mindful individuals. Overall, our study offers insight into the underlying mechanisms of thought control and suggests that individual differences play an important role in the ability to control thoughts.

Visual mental imagery influences attentional guidance in a visual-search task

Visual mental imagery resembles visual working memory (VWM). Because both visual mental imagery and VWM involve the representation and manipulation of visual information, it was hypothesized that they would exert similar effects on visual attention. Several previous studies have demonstrated that working-memory representations guide attention toward a memory-matching task-irrelevant stimulus during visual-search tasks. Therefore, mental imagery may also guide attention toward imagery-matching stimuli. In the present study, five experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of visual mental imagery on visual attention during a visual-search task. Participants were instructed to visualize a color or an object clearly associated with a specific color, after which they were asked to detect a colored target in the visual-search task. Reaction times for target detection were shorter when the color of the target matched the imagined color, and when the color of the target was similar to that strongly associated with the imagined object, than when the color of the target did not match that of the mental representation. This effect was not observed when participants were not instructed to imagine a color. These results suggest that similar to VWM, visual mental imagery guides attention toward imagery-matching stimuli.

Decoding the contents and strength of imagery before volitional engagement

Is it possible to predict the freely chosen content of voluntary imagery from prior neural signals? Here we show that the content and strength of future voluntary imagery can be decoded from activity patterns in visual and frontal areas well before participants engage in voluntary imagery. Participants freely chose which of two images to imagine. Using functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) and multi-voxel pattern analysis, we decoded imagery content as far as 11 seconds before the voluntary decision, in visual, frontal and subcortical areas. Decoding in visual areas in addition to perception-imagery generalization suggested that predictive patterns correspond to visual representations. Importantly, activity patterns in the primary visual cortex (V1) from before the decision, predicted future imagery vividness. Our results suggest that the contents and strength of mental imagery are influenced by sensory-like neural representations that emerge spontaneously before volition.

Imagined event files: An interplay between imagined and perceived objects

An important function of attention is to integrate features processed in distinct brain areas into a single coherent object representation. The immediate outcome of this binding process has been termed an event file, a transient memory structure that links features, context, and associated actions. A key result that supports the existence of event files is the partial repetition cost - slowed responses to a current event thought to reflect the updating of event file bindings in simple trial-to-trial repetition methods. In four experiments, using a procedure similar to Hommel (Visual Cognition, 5 (1/2), 183-216, 1998), we explored whether similar event file binding effects occurred when participants imagine rather than perceive a first event prior to responding to a following visual event. The results indicate that this effect does occur, implying that feature binding in imagery and perception may follow similar principles.

Human V4 Activity Patterns Predict Behavioral Performance in Imagery of Object Color

Color is special among basic visual features in that it can form a defining part of objects that are engrained in our memory. Whereas most neuroimaging research on human color vision has focused on responses related to external stimulation, the present study investigated how sensory-driven color vision is linked to subjective color perception induced by object imagery. We recorded fMRI activity in male and female volunteers during viewing of abstract color stimuli that were red, green, or yellow in half of the runs. In the other half we asked them to produce mental images of colored, meaningful objects (such as tomato, grapes, banana) corresponding to the same three color categories. Although physically presented color could be decoded from all retinotopically mapped visual areas, only hV4 allowed predicting colors of imagined objects when classifiers were trained on responses to physical colors. Importantly, only neural signal in hV4 was predictive of behavioral performance in the color judgment task on a trial-by-trial basis. The commonality between neural representations of sensory-driven and imagined object color and the behavioral link to neural representations in hV4 identifies area hV4 as a perceptual hub linking externally triggered color vision with color in self-generated object imagery.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Humans experience color not only when visually exploring the outside world, but also in the absence of visual input, for example when remembering, dreaming, and during imagery. It is not known where neural codes for sensory-driven and internally generated hue converge. In the current study we evoked matching subjective color percepts, one driven by physically presented color stimuli, the other by internally generated color imagery. This allowed us to identify area hV4 as the only site where neural codes of corresponding subjective color perception converged regardless of its origin. Color codes in hV4 also predicted behavioral performance in an imagery task, suggesting it forms a perceptual hub for color perception.

Enhanced mental imagery and intact perceptual organization in schizotypal personality disorder

According to a widely held view, psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia are characterized by a vague boundary between the perception of the external world and the inner imagery of persons, objects, and events. In this study, we addressed the perception-imagery debate in schizotypal personality disorder (SPD). Thirty individuals with SPD and 30 matched healthy subjects completed a lateral masking task. Participants were asked to detect a low-contrast Gabor patch flanked by two collinear Gabor masks. In the perceptual task, the masks were physically present, whereas in the imagery task, participants only imagined the masks. By applying a binocular rivalry paradigm, we also measured the imagery priming effect. Results revealed that, in the perceptual task, collinear masks similarly decreased contrast threshold in SPD and controls. In the imagery task, contrast threshold reduction (facilitation by the imagined masks) was more pronounced in SPD relative to the controls. In the binocular rivalry paradigm, individuals with SPD showed higher imagery priming effects as compared to healthy controls. Enhanced imagery was not related to schizotypal traits. These results indicate intact early visual perception and heightened imagery in SPD, which may be a trait marker of unusual experiences without psychotic disorganization.

The blind mind: No sensory visual imagery in aphantasia

For most people the use of visual imagery is pervasive in daily life, but for a small group of people the experience of visual imagery is entirely unknown. Research based on subjective phenomenology indicates that otherwise healthy people can completely lack the experience of visual imagery, a condition now referred to as aphantasia. As congenital aphantasia has thus far been based on subjective reports, it remains unclear whether individuals are really unable to imagine visually, or if they have very poor metacognition - they have images in their mind, but are blind to them. Here we measured sensory imagery in subjectively self-diagnosed aphantasics, using the binocular rivalry paradigm, as well as measuring their self-rated object and spatial imagery with multiple questionnaires (VVIQ, SUIS and OSIQ). Unlike, the general population, experimentally naive aphantasics showed almost no imagery-based rivalry priming. Aphantasic participants' self-rated visual object imagery was significantly below average, however their spatial imagery scores were above average. These data suggest that aphantasia is a condition involving a lack of sensory and phenomenal imagery, and not a lack of metacognition. The possible underlying neurological cause of aphantasia is discussed as well as future research directions.

Audio-visual interactions uniquely contribute to resolution of visual conflict in people possessing absolute pitch

Individuals possessing absolute pitch (AP) are able to identify a given musical tone or to reproduce it without reference to another tone. The present study sought to learn whether this exceptional auditory ability impacts visual perception under stimulus conditions that provoke visual competition in the form of binocular rivalry. Nineteen adult participants with 3–19 years of musical training were divided into two groups according to their performance on a task involving identification of the specific note associated with hearing a given musical pitch. During test trials lasting just over half a minute, participants dichoptically viewed a scrolling musical score presented to one eye and a drifting sinusoidal grating presented to the other eye; throughout the trial they pressed buttons to track the alternations in visual awareness produced by these dissimilar monocular stimuli. On “pitch-congruent” trials, participants heard an auditory melody that was congruent in pitch with the visual score, on “pitch-incongruent” trials they heard a transposed auditory melody that was congruent with the score in melody but not in pitch, and on “melody-incongruent” trials they heard an auditory melody completely different from the visual score. For both groups, the visual musical scores predominated over the gratings when the auditory melody was congruent compared to when it was incongruent. Moreover, the AP participants experienced greater predominance of the visual score when it was accompanied by the pitch-congruent melody compared to the same melody transposed in pitch; for non-AP musicians, pitch-congruent and pitch-incongruent trials yielded equivalent predominance. Analysis of individual durations of dominance revealed differential effects on dominance and suppression durations for AP and non-AP participants. These results reveal that AP is accompanied by a robust form of bisensory interaction between tonal frequencies and musical notation that boosts the salience of a visual score.

Individual differences shape the content of visual representations

Visually perceiving a stimulus activates a pictorial representation of that item in the brain, but how pictorial is the representation of a stimulus in the absence of visual stimulation? Here I address this question with a review of the literatures on visual imagery (VI), visual working memory (VWM), and visual preparatory templates, all of which require activating visual information in the absence of sensory stimulation. These processes have historically been studied separately, but I propose that they can provide complimentary evidence for the pictorial nature of their contents. One major challenge in studying the contents of visual representations is the discrepant findings concerning the extent of overlap (both cortical and behavioral) between externally and internally sourced visual representations. I argue that these discrepancies may in large part be due to individual differences in VI vividness and precision, the specific representative abilities required to perform a task, appropriateness of visual preparatory strategies, visual cortex anatomy, and level of expertise with a particular object category. Individual differences in visual representative abilities greatly impact task performance and may influence the likelihood of experiences such as intrusive VI and hallucinations, but research still predominantly focuses on uniformities in visual experience across individuals. In this paper I review the evidence for the pictorial content of visual representations activated for VI, VWM, and preparatory templates, and highlight the importance of accounting for various individual differences in conducting research on this topic.

Mental Imagery: Functional Mechanisms and Clinical Applications

Mental imagery research has weathered both disbelief of the phenomenon and inherent methodological limitations. Here we review recent behavioral, brain imaging, and clinical research that has reshaped our understanding of mental imagery. Research supports the claim that visual mental imagery is a depictive internal representation that functions like a weak form of perception. Brain imaging work has demonstrated that neural representations of mental and perceptual images resemble one another as early as the primary visual cortex (V1). Activity patterns in V1 encode mental images and perceptual images via a common set of low-level depictive visual features. Recent translational and clinical research reveals the pivotal role that imagery plays in many mental disorders and suggests how clinicians can utilize imagery in treatment.