A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†

In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as "intuitive statisticians" while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as "probing organisms." We first highlight how ecological rationality's focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: (a) the problem of cue salience, and (b) the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies ecological rationality, which originate from the misapplication of concepts in psychophysics (e.g., signal detection, just-noticeable-differences). We then work through the most popular experimental task in the ecological rationality literature-the city size task-to illustrate how psychophysical assumptions have informally been linked to ecological rationality. After highlighting these problems, we contrast ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Generative rationality builds on biology-in contrast to ecological rationality's focus on statistics. We argue that in uncertain environments cues are rarely given or available for statistical processing. Therefore we focus on the psychogenesis of awareness rather than psychophysics of cues. For any agent or organism, environments "teem" with indefinite cues, meanings and potential objects, the salience or relevance of which is scarcely obvious based on their statistical or physical properties. We focus on organism-specificity and the organism-directed probing that shapes awareness and perception. Cues in teeming environments are noticed when they serve as cues-for-something, requiring what might be called a "cue-to-clue" transformation. In this sense, awareness toward a cue or cues is actively "grown." We thus argue that perception might more productively be seen as the presentation of cues and objects rather than their representation. This generative approach not only applies to relatively mundane organism (including human) interactions with their environments-as well as organism-object relationships and their embodied nature-but also has significant implications for understanding the emergence of novelty in economic settings. We conclude with a discussion of how our arguments link with-but modify-Herbert Simon's popular "scissors" metaphor, as it applies to bounded rationality and its implications for decision making in uncertain, teeming environments.

More Thumbs Than Rules: Is Rationality an Exaptation?

The literatures on bounded and ecological rationality are built on adaptationism-and its associated modular, cognitivist and computational paradigm-that does not address or explain the evolutionary origins of rationality. We argue that the adaptive mechanisms of evolution are not sufficient for explaining human rationality, and we posit that human rationality presents exaptive origins, where exaptations are traits evolved for other functions or no function at all, and later co-opted for new uses. We propose an embodied reconceptualization of rationality-embodied rationality-based on the reuse of the perception-action system, where many neural processes involved in the control of the sensory-motor system, salient in ancestral environments have been later co-opted to create-by tinkering-high-level reasoning processes, employed in civilized niches.

Prediction and Explanation in a Postmodern World

The experimental research paradigm lies at the core of empirical psychology. New data analytical and computational tools continually enrich its methodological arsenal, while the paradigm's mission remains the testing of theoretical predictions and causal explanations. Predictions regarding experimental results necessarily point to the future. Once the data are collected, the causal inferences refer to a hypothesis now lying in the past. The experimental paradigm is not designed to permit strong inferences about particular incidents that occurred before predictions were made. In contrast, historical research and scholarship in other humanities focus on this backward direction of inference. The disconnect between forward-looking experimental psychology and backward-looking historical (i.e., narrative) psychology is a challenge in the postmodern era, which can be addressed. To illustrate this possibility, I discuss three historical case studies in light of theory and research in contemporary psychology.

What Are Visual Illusions?

Visual illusions have been a popular topic of study for a long time, but in recent years, a number of authors have questioned the coherence of this notion. This article deals in depth with ways in which illusions have been, could be, and should be defined and with various criticisms and different conceptions of the notion of illusions. After a review of definitions of illusions in the relevant literature, a more comprehensive but also more restrictive framework is presented, involving both veridicality and illusoriness, and is illustrated using two variants of a 2 × 2 scheme for the presentation of illusions. Many different aspects of illusions are discussed. A set of criteria for illusionhood is listed. Criticisms of the notion of illusions are presented, commented upon, and responded to. Conceptions of illusions differing from the one advocated here are discussed. Throughout the paper, novel variations of illusions are shown, and problems with accounts of some well-known illusions are noted. Examples of strong context effects which are not considered to be illusions are presented. It is concluded that the notion of visual illusions, suitably reformulated, is still viable.

Quantifying the prevalence and adaptiveness of behavioral rationalizations

Critical aspects of the "rationality of rationalizations" thesis are open empirical questions. These include the frequency with which past behavior determines attitudes (as opposed to attitudes causing future behaviors), the extent to which post hoc justifications take on a life of their own and shape future actions, and whether rationalizers experience benefits in well-being, social influence, performance, or other desirable outcomes.