Diagnostic validity and the definition of mental disorder: a program for conceptually advancing psychiatry

Cultural shifts in the symptoms of Anorexia Nervosa: The case of Orthorexia Nervosa

Orthorexia Nervosa (ON) is a term describing a fixation on food purity, involving ritualized eating patterns and a rigid avoidance of "unhealthy foods." Those self-identified as having ON tend to focus on food composition and feel immense guilt after eating food deemed "unhealthy." Although not formally recognized as a psychiatric disorder by the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), ON has received increasing attention since its identification in 1997. There is ongoing work to establish diagnostic and empirical tools for measuring ON; embedded in this is the question as to whether or not ON is a new eating disorder. In this paper, we argue ON is not a new psychiatric disorder but rather a new cultural manifestation of anorexia nervosa (AN). We begin by providing an overview of historical representations and classification of eating disorders, with a specific focus on AN. This is followed by discussion of the rise in diet culture and healthism since the 19th century. We conclude by examining the diagnostic validity and utility of ON through a discussion of empirical evidence. Classifying ON under the diagnostic umbrella of AN may improve our understanding of factors underlying restrictive eating behaviors.

Harm as a Necessary Component of the Concept of Medical Disorder: Reply to Muckler and Taylor

Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis asserts that the concept of medical disorder includes a naturalistic component of dysfunction (failure of biologically designed functioning) and a value (harm) component, both of which are required for disorder attributions. Muckler and Taylor, defending a purely naturalist, value-free understanding of disorder, argue that harm is not necessary for disorder. They provide three examples of dysfunctions that, they claim, are considered disorders but are entirely harmless: mild mononucleosis, cowpox that prevents smallpox, and minor perceptual deficits. They also reject the proposal that dysfunctions need only be typically harmful to qualify as disorders. We argue that the proposed counterexamples are, in fact, considered harmful; thus, they fail to disconfirm the harm requirement: incapacity for exertion is inherently harmful, whether or not exertion occurs, cowpox is directly harmful irrespective of indirect benefits, and colorblindness and anosmia are considered harmful by those who consider them disorders. We also defend the typicality qualifier as viably addressing some apparently harmless disorders and argue that a dysfunction's harmfulness is best understood in dispositional terms.

Relationship Between Adverse Childhood Experience Survey Items and Psychiatric Disorders

CONTEXT

Developmental psychopathology theory suggests a relationship between early childhood adversity and mental disorder.

OBJECTIVE

To examine the relationship between the specific items on the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) survey and the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) categories of psychiatric diagnoses in a pediatric sample.

DESIGN

The sample included patients enrolled in the Child and Adolescent Addiction Mental Health and Psychiatry Program with both a completed ACE survey and at least 1 diagnosis of record (per admission). These criteria yielded 2 samples for each sex (ACE survey item frequencies and values in collapsed and multiple-admission groups). Data were analyzed employing tetrachoric correlation, hierarchical regression, and polychoric factor analysis.

RESULTS

Hierarchical regression analysis identified that ICD-10 diagnostic categories, except for substance disorders, were not consistently related to ACE total score and tended to reduce the magnitude of the ACE total score in the multiple-admission group. Tetrachoric correlation revealed very low (< 0.4) positive and negative correlations between ICD-10 categories and ACE items in both multiple-admission and collapsed sample groups. Polychoric factor analysis indicated that the ACE survey items and the ICD-10 categories for both sexes were independent, with only the diagnostic ICD-10 category substance disorders being marginally associated with the ACE items factor for females.

CONCLUSION

The nominal relationship between ACE items and ICD-10 diagnostic categories indicates the need to include ACE assessment in advance of differential diagnosis and implementation of conventional mental health interventions for children and adolescents.

Diagnostic Issues and Controversies in DSM-5: Return of the False Positives Problem

The fifth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was the most controversial in the manual's history. This review selectively surveys some of the most important changes in DSM-5, including structural/organizational changes, modifications of diagnostic criteria, and newly introduced categories. It analyzes why these changes led to such heated controversies, which included objections to the revision's process, its goals, and the content of altered criteria and new categories. The central focus is on disputes concerning the false positives problem of setting a valid boundary between disorder and normal variation. Finally, this review highlights key problems and issues that currently remain unresolved and need to be addressed in the future, including systematically identifying false positive weaknesses in criteria, distinguishing risk from disorder, including context in diagnostic criteria, clarifying how to handle fuzzy boundaries, and improving the guidelines for "other specified" diagnosis.

DSM-5, psychiatric epidemiology and the false positives problem

The revision effort leading to the publication of the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was flawed in process, goals and outcome. The revision process suffered from lack of an adequate public record of the rationale for changes, thus shortchanging future scholarship. The goals, such as dimensionalising diagnosis, incorporating biomarkers and separating impairment from diagnosis, were ill-considered and mostly abandoned. However, DSM-5's greatest problem, and the target of the most vigorous and sustained criticism, was its failure to take seriously the false positives problem. By expanding diagnosis beyond plausible boundaries in ways inconsistent with DSM-5's own definition of disorder, DSM-5 threatened the validity of psychiatric research, including especially psychiatric epidemiology. I present four examples: increasing the symptom options while decreasing the diagnostic threshold for substance use disorder, elimination of the bereavement exclusion from major depression, allowing verbal arguments as evidence of intermittent explosive disorder and expanding attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder to adults before addressing its manifest false positives problems.

The biostatistical theory versus the harmful dysfunction analysis, part 1: is part-dysfunction a sufficient condition for medical disorder?

Christopher Boorse's biostatistical theory of medical disorder claims that biological part-dysfunction (i.e., failure of an internal mechanism to perform its biological function), a factual criterion, is both necessary and sufficient for disorder. Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder agrees that part-dysfunction is necessary but rejects the sufficiency claim, maintaining that disorder also requires that the part-dysfunction causes harm to the individual, a value criterion. In this paper, I present two considerations against the sufficiency claim. First, I analyze Boorse's central argument for the sufficiency claim, the "pathologist argument," which takes pathologists' intuitions about pathology as determinative of medical disorder and conclude that it begs the question and fails to support the sufficiency claim. Second, I present four counterexamples from the medical literature in which salient part-dysfunctions are considered nondisorders, including healthy disease carriers, HIV-positive status, benign mutations, and situs inversus totalis, thus falsifying the sufficiency claim and supporting the harm criterion.