Determinants of Propranolol's Selective Effect on Loss Aversion

Decision-making under stress: A psychological and neurobiological integrative model

Understanding the impact of stress on cognitive processes, particularly decision-making, is crucial as it underpins behaviors essential for survival. However, research in this domain has yielded disparate results, with inconsistencies evident across stress-induction paradigms and drug administration protocols designed to investigate specific stress pathways or neuromodulators. Building upon empirical studies, this research identifies a multifaceted matrix of variables contributing to the divergent findings. This matrix encompasses factors such as the temporal proximity between stressors and decision tasks, the nature of stressors and decision contexts, individual characteristics including psychobiological profiles and affective states at the time of decision-making and even cultural influences. In response to these complexities, we propose a comprehensive model that integrates these relevant factors and their intricate interplay to elucidate the mechanisms governing decision-making during stressful events. By synthesizing these insights, our model not only refines existing paradigms but also provides a framework for future study designs, offering avenues for theoretical advancements and translational developments in the field of stress's impact on cognitive functions. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the nuanced relationship between stress and decision-making, ultimately advancing our knowledge of cognitive processes under challenging conditions.

Multiple timescales of temporal context in risky choice: Behavioral identification and relationships to physiological arousal

Context-dependence is fundamental to risky monetary decision-making. A growing body of evidence suggests that temporal context, or recent events, alters risk-taking at a minimum of three timescales: immediate (e.g. trial-by-trial), neighborhood (e.g. a group of consecutive trials), and global (e.g. task-level). To examine context effects, we created a novel monetary choice set with intentional temporal structure in which option values shifted between multiple levels of value magnitude ("contexts") several times over the course of the task. This structure allowed us to examine whether effects of each timescale were simultaneously present in risky choice behavior and the potential mechanistic role of arousal, an established correlate of risk-taking, in context-dependency. We found that risk-taking was sensitive to immediate, neighborhood, and global timescales: risk-taking decreased following large (vs. small) outcome amounts, increased following large positive (but not negative) shifts in context, and increased when cumulative earnings exceeded expectations. We quantified arousal with skin conductance responses, which were related to the global timescale, increasing with cumulative earnings, suggesting that physiological arousal captures a task-level assessment of performance. Our results both replicate and extend prior research by demonstrating that risky decision-making is consistently dynamic at multiple timescales and that the role of arousal in risk-taking extends to some, but not all timescales of context-dependence.

Testing the effect of high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation of the insular cortex to modulate decision-making and executive control

Introduction

Previous neuroimaging evidence highlighted the role of the insular and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) in conflict monitoring and decision-making, thus supporting the translational implications of targeting these regions in neuro-stimulation treatments for clinical purposes. Recent advancements of targeting and modeling procedures for high-definition tDCS (HD-tDCS) provided methodological support for the stimulation of otherwise challenging targets, and a previous study confirmed that cathodal HD-tDCS of the dACC modulates executive control and decision-making metrics in healthy individuals. On the other hand, evidence on the effect of stimulating the insula is still needed.

Methods

We used a modeling/targeting procedure to investigate the effect of stimulating the posterior insula on Flanker and gambling tasks assessing, respectively, executive control and both loss and risk aversion in decision-making. HD-tDCS was applied through 6 small electrodes delivering anodal, cathodal or sham stimulation for 20 min in a within-subject offline design with three separate sessions.

Results

Bayesian statistical analyses on Flanker conflict effect, as well as loss and risk aversion, provided moderate evidence for the null model (i.e., absence of HD-tDCS modulation).

Discussion

These findings suggest that further research on the effect of HD-tDCS on different regions is required to define reliable targets for clinical applications. While modeling and targeting procedures for neuromodulation in clinical research could lead to innovative protocols for stand-alone treatment, or possibly in combination with cognitive training, assessing the effectiveness of insula stimulation might require sensitive metrics other than those investigated here.

RISK aversion in Italian forensic and non-forensic patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders

BACKGROUND

Goal-directed decision-making is a central component of the broader reward and motivation system, and requires the ability to dynamically integrate both positive and negative feedback from the environment in order to maximize rewards and minimize losses over time. Altered decision-making processes, in which individuals fail to consider the negative consequences of their decisions on both themselves and others, may play a role in driving antisocial behaviour.

AIM

The main study aim was to investigate possible differences in loss and risk aversion across matched patients, all with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SSD), but who varied according to whether they had a history of serious interpersonal violence or not, and a sample of healthy controls with no history of violence.

RESULTS

The sample included 14 forensic and 21 non-forensic patients with SSD, and 41 healthy controls. Among the three decision-making variables under investigation, risk aversion was the only significant predictor of membership of the three groups, with greater risk aversion among non-forensic patients with SSD compared to healthy controls. No differences were observed across groups in loss aversion and choice consistency.

CONCLUSIONS

This evidence suggests a new potential treatment target for rehabilitative measures aimed at achieving functional improvements in patients with SSD by selectively leveraging the neuro-cognitive processing of reward.

Decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics: Recent progress and ongoing challenges

In the past decade, decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics have developed many new insights in the study of decision making. This review provides an overarching update on how the field has advanced in this time period. Although our initial review a decade ago outlined several theoretical, conceptual, methodological, empirical, and practical challenges, there has only been limited progress in resolving these challenges. We summarize significant trends in decision neuroscience through the lens of the challenges outlined for the field and review examples where the field has had significant, direct, and applicable impacts across economics and psychology. First, we review progress on topics including reward learning, explore-exploit decisions, risk and ambiguity, intertemporal choice, and valuation. Next, we assess the impacts of emotion, social rewards, and social context on decision making. Then, we follow up with how individual differences impact choices and new exciting developments in the prediction and neuroforecasting of future decisions. Finally, we consider how trends in decision-neuroscience research reflect progress toward resolving past challenges, discuss new and exciting applications of recent research, and identify new challenges for the field. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Psychology > Emotion and Motivation.

Computational and Motivational Mechanisms of Human Social Decision Making Involving Close Others

Every day, human beings make decisions with social consequences. These social consequences matter most when they impact those closest to us. Recent research has shown that humans exhibit reliable preferences when deciding between conflicting outcomes involving close others - for example, prioritizing the interests of one's family member over one's friend. However, virtually nothing is known about the mechanisms that drive these preferences. We conducted a pre-registered study in a large (maximum N=375) sample to quantify the computational and motivational mechanisms of human social decision-making preferences involving close others. By pairing assessment techniques from behavioral economics and psychological science with computational modeling and random coefficient regression, we show that value-based cognitive computations (e.g., risk and loss aversion) drive social decision-making preferences involving financial outcomes, whereas socioemotional motivations (e.g., relationship quality) underlie preferences involving social outcomes. These results imply mechanistic heterogeneity, underscoring a need for greater attention to contextual specificity in social decision-making.

High-definition transcranial direct current stimulation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex modulates decision-making and executive control

Previous neuroimaging evidence highlights the translational implications of targeting the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), i.e. a key node of the networks underlying conflict monitoring and decision-making, in brain stimulation treatments with clinical or rehabilitative purposes. While the optimized modelling of "high-definition" current flows between multiple anode-cathode pairs might, in principle, allow to stimulate an otherwise challenging target, sensitive benchmark metrics of dACC neuromodulation are required to assess the effectiveness of this approach. On this basis, we aimed to assess the modulatory effect of anodal and cathodal high-definition tDCS (HD-tDCS) of the dACC on different facets of executive control and decision-making in healthy young individuals. A combined modelling/targeting procedure provided the optimal montage for the maximum intensity of dACC stimulation with six small "high-definition" electrodes delivering anodal, cathodal or sham HD-tDCS for 20 min in a within-subject design with three separate sessions. Following stimulation, participants performed Flanker and gambling tasks unveiling individual differences in executive control and both loss- and risk-aversion in decision-making, respectively. Compared to both anodal and sham conditions, cathodal dACC stimulation significantly affected task performance by increasing control over the Flanker conflict effect, and both loss and risk-aversion in decision-making. By confirming the feasibility and effectiveness of dACC stimulation with HD-tDCS, these findings highlight the implications of modelling and targeting procedures for neuromodulation in clinical research, whereby innovative protocols might serve as treatment addressing dysfunctional dACC activity, or combined with cognitive training, to enhance higher-order executive functioning in different neuropsychiatric conditions.

Do propranolol and amisulpride modulate confidence in risk-taking?

Background: Making rational choices and being able to consciously reflect on the goodness of these choices is important for successfully navigating the world. Value-based decisions have been extensively studied, but we know little about the factors that influence our confidence in value-based choice. Particularly, we know very little about the neurotransmitters that may mediate these processes.  Methods: In this double-blind, placebo-controlled study design involving 61 healthy human subjects (30 female), we assessed the contributions of dopamine (400 mg amisulpride) and noradrenaline (40 mg propranolol) to value-based decision making and the subjective confidence therein in a monetary risky gambling task.  Results: We did not find any significant effect of either of the two pharmacological manipulations, neither on value-based decision making, nor on subjective confidence.   Conclusion: We discuss these (null) findings, and release all relevant data and code. This will allow researchers to further interrogate the data, to counteract publication biases in favour of significant findings, and to use our study as a source for balanced meta-analyses.

β-Adrenergic Contributions to Emotion and Physiology During an Acute Psychosocial Stressor

OBJECTIVE

β-Adrenergic receptor signaling, a critical mediator of sympathetic nervous system influences on physiology and behavior, has long been proposed as one contributor to subjective stress. However, prior findings are surprisingly mixed about whether β-blockade (e.g., propranolol) blunts subjective stress, with many studies reporting no effects. We reevaluated this question in the context of an acute psychosocial stressor with more comprehensive measures and a larger-than-typical sample. We also examined the effects of β-blockade on psychophysiological indicators of sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system reactivity, given that β-blockade effects for these measures specifically under acute psychosocial stress are not yet well established.

METHODS

In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled study, 90 healthy young adults received 40 mg of the β-blocker propranolol or placebo. Participants then completed the Trier Social Stress Test, which involved completing an impromptu speech and difficult arithmetic in front of evaluative judges. Self-reported emotions and appraisals as well as psychophysiology were assessed throughout.

RESULTS

Propranolol blunted Trier Social Stress Test preejection period reactivity (b = 9.68, p = .003), a marker of sympathetic nervous system activity, as well as salivary α-amylase reactivity (b = -0.50, p = .006). Critically, propranolol also blunted negative, high arousal emotions in response to the stressor (b = -0.22, p = .026), but cognitive appraisals remained intact (b values < -0.17, p values > .10).

CONCLUSIONS

These results provide updated experimental evidence that β-adrenergic blockade attenuates negative, high arousal emotions in response to a psychosocial stressor while also blunting sympathetic nervous system reactivity. Together, these findings shed light on the neurophysiological mechanisms by which stressors transform into the subjective experience we call "stress."Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02972554.

Neurophysiological contributors to advantageous risk-taking: an experimental psychopharmacological investigation

The ability to learn from experience is critical for determining when to take risks and when to play it safe. However, we know little about how within-person state changes, such as an individual's degree of neurophysiological arousal, may impact the ability to learn which risks are most likely to fail vs succeed. To test this, we used a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled design to pharmacologically manipulate neurophysiological arousal and assess its causal impact on risk-related learning and performance. Eighty-seven adults (45% female, Mage = 20.1 ± 1.46 years) took either propranolol (n = 42), a beta-adrenergic receptor blocker that attenuates sympathetic nervous system-related signaling, or a placebo (n = 45). Participants then completed the Balloon Emotional Learning Task, a risk-taking task wherein experiential learning is necessary for task success. We found that individuals on propranolol, relative to placebo, earned fewer points on the task, suggesting that they were less effective risk-takers. This effect was mediated by the fact that those on propranolol made less optimal decisions in the final phase of the task on trials with the greatest opportunity for advantageous risk-taking. These findings highlight that neurophysiological arousal supports risk-related learning and, in turn, more advantageous decision-making and optimal behavior under conditions of risk.

Human complex exploration strategies are enriched by noradrenaline-modulated heuristics

An exploration-exploitation trade-off, the arbitration between sampling a lesser-known against a known rich option, is thought to be solved using computationally demanding exploration algorithms. Given known limitations in human cognitive resources, we hypothesised the presence of additional cheaper strategies. We examined for such heuristics in choice behaviour where we show this involves a value-free random exploration, that ignores all prior knowledge, and a novelty exploration that targets novel options alone. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled drug study, assessing contributions of dopamine (400 mg amisulpride) and noradrenaline (40 mg propranolol), we show that value-free random exploration is attenuated under the influence of propranolol, but not under amisulpride. Our findings demonstrate that humans deploy distinct computationally cheap exploration strategies and that value-free random exploration is under noradrenergic control.

Psychological mechanisms of loss aversion: A drift-diffusion decomposition

Decision makers often reject mixed gambles offering equal probabilities of a larger gain and a smaller loss. This important phenomenon, referred to as loss aversion, is typically explained by prospect theory, which proposes that decision makers give losses higher utility weights than gains. In this paper we consider alternative psychological mechanisms capable of explaining loss aversion, such as a fixed utility bias favoring rejection, as well as a bias favoring rejection prior to gamble valuation. We use a drift diffusion model of decision making to conceptually distinguish, formally define, and empirically measure these mechanisms. In two preregistered experiments, we show that the pre-valuation bias provides a very large contribution to model fits, predicts key response time patterns, reflects prior expectations regarding gamble desirability, and can be manipulated independently of the valuation process. Our results indicate that loss aversion is the result of multiple different psychological mechanisms, and that the pre-valuation bias is a fundamental determinant of this well-known behavioral tendency. These results have important implications for how we model behavior in risky choice tasks, and how we interpret its relationship with various psychological, clinical, and neurobiological variables.

t-Test and ANOVA for data with ceiling and/or floor effects

Ceiling and floor effects are often observed in social and behavioral science. The current study examines ceiling/floor effects in the context of the t-test and ANOVA, two frequently used statistical methods in experimental studies. Our literature review indicated that most researchers treated ceiling or floor data as if these data were true values, and that some researchers used statistical methods such as discarding ceiling or floor data in conducting the t-test and ANOVA. The current study evaluates the performance of these conventional methods for t-test and ANOVA with ceiling or floor data. Our evaluation also includes censored regression with regard to its capacity for handling ceiling/floor data. Furthermore, we propose an easy-to-use method that handles ceiling or floor data in t-tests and ANOVA by using properties of truncated normal distributions. Simulation studies were conducted to compare the performance of the methods in handling ceiling or floor data for t-test and ANOVA. Overall, the proposed method showed greater accuracy in effect size estimation and better-controlled Type I error rates over other evaluated methods. We developed an easy-to-use software package and web applications to help researchers implement the proposed method. Recommendations and future directions are discussed.

Quantifying the immediate computational effects of preceding outcomes on subsequent risky choices

Forty years ago, prospect theory introduced the notion that risky options are evaluated relative to their recent context, causing a significant shift in the study of risky monetary decision-making in psychology, economics, and neuroscience. Despite the central role of past experiences, it remains unclear whether, how, and how much past experiences quantitatively influence risky monetary choices moment-to-moment in a nominally learning-free setting. We analyzed a large dataset of risky monetary choices with trial-by-trial feedback to quantify how past experiences, or recent events, influence risky choice behavior and the underlying processes. We found larger recent outcomes both negatively influence subsequent risk-taking and positively influence the weight put on potential losses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian framework to fit a modified version of prospect theory, we demonstrated that the same risks will be evaluated differently given different past experiences. The computations underlying risky decision-making are fundamentally dynamic, even if the environment is not.

Decomposing loss aversion from gaze allocation and pupil dilation

Loss-averse decisions, in which one avoids losses at the expense of gains, are highly prevalent. However, the underlying mechanisms remain controversial. The prevailing account highlights a valuation bias that overweighs losses relative to gains, but an alternative view stresses a response bias to avoid choices involving potential losses. Here we couple a computational process model with eye-tracking and pupillometry to develop a physiologically grounded framework for the decision process leading to accepting or rejecting gambles with equal odds of winning and losing money. Overall, loss-averse decisions were accompanied by preferential gaze toward losses and increased pupil dilation for accepting gambles. Using our model, we found gaze allocation selectively indexed valuation bias, and pupil dilation selectively indexed response bias. Finally, we demonstrate that our computational model and physiological biomarkers can identify distinct types of loss-averse decision makers who would otherwise be indistinguishable using conventional approaches. Our study provides an integrative framework for the cognitive processes that drive loss-averse decisions and highlights the biological heterogeneity of loss aversion across individuals.

Loss Aversion Correlates With the Propensity to Deploy Model-Based Control

Reward-based decision making is thought to be driven by at least two different types of decision systems: a simple stimulus–response cache-based system which embodies the common-sense notion of “habit,” for which model-free reinforcement learning serves as a computational substrate, and a more deliberate, prospective, model-based planning system. Previous work has shown that loss aversion, a well-studied measure of how much more on average individuals weigh losses relative to gains during decision making, is reduced when participants take all possible decisions and outcomes into account including future ones, relative to when they myopically focus on the current decision. Model-based control offers a putative mechanism for implementing such foresight. Using a well-powered data set (N = 117) in which participants completed two different tasks designed to measure each of the two quantities of interest, and four models of choice data for these tasks, we found consistent evidence of a relationship between loss aversion and model-based control but in the direction opposite to that expected based on previous work: loss aversion had a positive relationship with model-based control. We did not find evidence for a relationship between either decision system and risk aversion, a related aspect of subjective utility.

Delayed effects of psychosocial stress on risk taking

Several studies found that acute stress leads to increased risk taking in humans. However, this effect appears to be time-dependent because the few studies that examined delayed (>40 min after stress onset) stress effects show in fact a decrease in risk taking. In 32 young healthy women, we intra-individually examined whether psychosocial stress decreases risk taking 80 min after stress induction. All participants performed the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) twice: once after exposure to the Trier social stress test (TSST) and once after a control condition Placebo-TSST (P-TSST). The experimental order was randomized across participants. The psychophysiological stress response increased after the TSST compared to the P-TSST, indicated by elevated cortisol concentrations, elevated alpha-amylase activity, and elevated blood pressure. We found a significant interaction of stress condition and experimental order. Compared to the control condition psychosocial stress decreased risk taking in novel decision situations but not when participants were already familiar with the BART from the prior condition. Delayed effects of psychosocial stress lead to a decrease in risk taking in unfamiliar but not familiar conditions 80 min after stress exposure. Lay summary It has been suggested that stress exerts delayed effects on risk taking propensity. We found that individuals who are exposed to psychosocial stress take less risk when confronted with novel decisions even 80 min after the stressor compared to individuals who are not stressed.

The Psychological and Neural Basis of Loss Aversion

Loss aversion is a central element of prospect theory, the dominant theory of decision making under uncertainty for the past four decades, and refers to the overweighting of potential losses relative to equivalent gains, a critical determinant of risky decision making. Recent advances in affective and decision neuroscience have shed new light on the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss aversion. Here, integrating disparate literatures from the level of neurotransmitters to subjective reports of emotion, we propose a novel neural and computational framework that links norepinephrine to loss aversion and identifies a distinct role for dopamine in risk taking for rewards. We also propose that loss aversion specifically relates to anticipated emotions and aspects of the immediate experience of realized gains and losses but not their long-term emotional consequences, highlighting an underappreciated temporal structure. Finally, we discuss challenges to loss aversion and the relevance of loss aversion to understanding psychiatric disorders. Refining models of loss aversion will have broad consequences for the science of decision making and for how we understand individual variation in economic preferences and psychological well-being across both healthy and psychiatric populations.

Propranolol reduces reference-dependence in intertemporal choice

In intertemporal choices between immediate and delayed rewards, people tend to prefer immediate rewards, often even when the delayed reward is larger. This is known as temporal discounting. It has been proposed that this tendency emerges because immediate rewards are more emotionally arousing than delayed rewards. However, in our previous research, we found no evidence for this but instead found that arousal responses (indexed with pupil dilation) in intertemporal choice are context-dependent. Specifically, arousal tracks the subjective value of the more variable reward option in the paradigm, whether it is immediate or delayed. Nevertheless, people tend to choose the less variable option in the choice task. In other words, their choices are reference-dependent and depend on variance in their recent history of offers. This suggests that there may be a causal relationship between reference-dependent choice and arousal, which we investigate here by reducing arousal pharmacologically using propranolol. Here, we show that propranolol reduces reference-dependence, leading to choices that are less influenced by recent history and more internally consistent.

Dopamine Receptor-Specific Contributions to the Computation of Value

Dopamine is thought to play a crucial role in value-based decision making. However, the specific contributions of different dopamine receptor subtypes to the computation of subjective value remain unknown. Here we demonstrate how the balance between D1 and D2 dopamine receptor subtypes shapes subjective value computation during risky decision making. We administered the D2 receptor antagonist amisulpride or placebo before participants made choices between risky options. Compared with placebo, D2 receptor blockade resulted in more frequent choice of higher risk and higher expected value options. Using a novel model fitting procedure, we concurrently estimated the three parameters that define individual risk attitude according to an influential theoretical account of risky decision making (prospect theory). This analysis revealed that the observed reduction in risk aversion under amisulpride was driven by increased sensitivity to reward magnitude and decreased distortion of outcome probability, resulting in more linear value coding. Our data suggest that different components that govern individual risk attitude are under dopaminergic control, such that D2 receptor blockade facilitates risk taking and expected value processing.

Combined Effects of Glucocorticoid and Noradrenergic Activity on Loss Aversion

Loss aversion is a well-known behavioral regularity in financial decision making, describing humans' tendency to overweigh losses compared to gains of the same amount. Recent research indicates that stress and associated hormonal changes affect loss aversion, yet the underlying neuroendocrine mechanisms are still poorly understood. Here, we investigated the causal influence of two major stress neuromodulators, cortisol and noradrenaline, on loss aversion during financial decision making. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled between-subject design, we orally administered either the α2-adrenergic antagonist yohimbine (increasing noradrenergic stimulation), hydrocortisone, both substances, or a placebo to healthy young men. We tested the treatments' influence on a financial decision-making task measuring loss aversion and risk attitude. We found that both drugs combined, relative to either drug by itself, reduced loss aversion in the absence of an effect on risk attitude or choice consistency. Our data suggest that concurrent glucocorticoid and noradrenergic activity prompts an alignment of reward- with loss-sensitivity, and thus diminishes loss aversion. Our results have implications for the understanding of the susceptibility to biases in decision making.

Emotion and decision-making under uncertainty: Physiological arousal predicts increased gambling during ambiguity but not risk

Uncertainty, which is ubiquitous in decision-making, can be fractionated into known probabilities (risk) and unknown probabilities (ambiguity). Although research has illustrated that individuals more often avoid decisions associated with ambiguity compared to risk, it remains unclear why ambiguity is perceived as more aversive. Here we examine the role of arousal in shaping the representation of value and subsequent choice under risky and ambiguous decisions. To investigate the relationship between arousal and decisions of uncertainty, we measure skin conductance response-a quantifiable measure reflecting sympathetic nervous system arousal-during choices to gamble under risk and ambiguity. To quantify the discrete influences of risk and ambiguity sensitivity and the subjective value of each option under consideration, we model fluctuating uncertainty, as well as the amount of money that can be gained by taking the gamble. Results reveal that although arousal tracks the subjective value of a lottery regardless of uncertainty type, arousal differentially contributes to the computation of value-that is, choice-depending on whether the uncertainty is risky or ambiguous: Enhanced arousal adaptively decreases risk-taking only when the lottery is highly risky but increases risk-taking when the probability of winning is ambiguous (even after controlling for subjective value). Together, this suggests that the role of arousal during decisions of uncertainty is modulatory and highly dependent on the context in which the decision is framed. (PsycINFO Database Record

A model-based analysis of decision making under risk in obsessive-compulsive and hoarding disorders

Attitudes towards risk are highly consequential in clinical disorders thought to be prone to "risky behavior", such as substance dependence, as well as those commonly associated with excessive risk aversion, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and hoarding disorder (HD). Moreover, it has recently been suggested that attitudes towards risk may serve as a behavioral biomarker for OCD. We investigated the risk preferences of participants with OCD and HD using a novel adaptive task and a quantitative model from behavioral economics that decomposes risk preferences into outcome sensitivity and probability sensitivity. Contrary to expectation, compared to healthy controls, participants with OCD and HD exhibited less outcome sensitivity, implying less risk aversion in the standard economic framework. In addition, risk attitudes were strongly correlated with depression, hoarding, and compulsion scores, while compulsion (hoarding) scores were associated with more (less) "rational" risk preferences. These results demonstrate how fundamental attitudes towards risk relate to specific psychopathology and thereby contribute to our understanding of the cognitive manifestations of mental disorders. In addition, our findings indicate that the conclusion made in recent work that decision making under risk is unaltered in OCD is premature.

Stress and Decision Making: Effects on Valuation, Learning, and Risk-taking

A wide range of stressful experiences can influence human decision making in complex ways beyond the simple predictions of a fight-or-flight model. Recent advances may provide insight into this complicated interaction, potentially in directions that could result in translational applications. Early research suggests that stress exposure influences basic neural circuits involved in reward processing and learning, while also biasing decisions towards habit and modulating our propensity to engage in risk-taking. That said, a substantial array of theoretical and methodological considerations in research on the topic challenge strong cross study comparisons necessary for the field to move forward. In this review we examine the multifaceted stress construct in the context of human decision making, emphasizing stress' effect on valuation, learning, and risk-taking.

Missed losses loom larger than missed gains: Electrodermal reactivity to decision choices and outcomes in a gambling task

Loss aversion is a defining characteristic of prospect theory, whereby responses are stronger to losses than to equivalently sized gains (Kahneman & Tversky Econometrica, 47, 263-291, 1979). By monitoring electrodermal activity (EDA) during a gambling task, in this study we examined physiological activity during risky decisions, as well as to both obtained (e.g., gains and losses) and counterfactual (e.g., narrowly missed gains and losses) outcomes. During the bet selection phase, EDA increased linearly with bet size, highlighting the role of somatic signals in decision-making under uncertainty in a task without any learning requirement. Outcome-related EDA scaled with the magnitudes of monetary wins and losses, and losses had a stronger impact on EDA than did equivalently sized wins. Narrowly missed wins (i.e., near-wins) and narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-losses) also evoked EDA responses, and the change of EDA as a function of the size of the missed outcome was modestly greater for near-losses than for near-wins, suggesting that near-losses have more impact on subjective value than do near-wins. Across individuals, the slope for choice-related EDA (as a function of bet size) correlated with the slope for outcome-related EDA as a function of both the obtained and counterfactual outcome magnitudes, and these correlations were stronger for loss and near-loss conditions than for win and near-win conditions. Taken together, these asymmetrical EDA patterns to objective wins and losses, as well as to near-wins and near-losses, provide a psychophysiological instantiation of the value function curve in prospect theory, which is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.

Acute stress does not affect risky monetary decision-making

The ubiquitous and intense nature of stress responses necessitate that we understand how they affect decision-making. Despite a number of studies examining risky decision-making under stress, it is as yet unclear whether and in what way stress alters the underlying processes that shape our choices. This is in part because previous studies have not separated and quantified dissociable valuation and decision-making processes that can affect choices of risky options, including risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency, among others. Here, in a large, fully-crossed two-day within-subjects design, we examined how acute stress alters risky decision-making. On each day, 120 participants completed either the cold pressor test or a control manipulation with equal probability, followed by a risky decision-making task. Stress responses were assessed with salivary cortisol. We fit an econometric model to choices that dissociated risk attitudes, loss aversion, and choice consistency using hierarchical Bayesian techniques to both pool data and allow heterogeneity in decision-making. Acute stress was found to have no effect on risk attitudes, loss aversion, or choice consistency, though participants did become more loss averse and more consistent on the second day relative to the first. In the context of an inconsistent previous literature on risk and acute stress, our findings provide strong and specific evidence that acute stress does not affect risk attitudes, loss aversion, or consistency in risky monetary decision-making.

Noradrenergic mechanisms of arousal's bidirectional effects on episodic memory

Arousal's selective effects on cognition go beyond the simple enhancement of emotional stimuli, sometimes enhancing and other times impairing processing of proximal neutral information. Past work shows that arousal impairs encoding of subsequent neutral stimuli regardless of their top-down priority via the engagement of β-adrenoreceptors. In contrast, retrograde amnesia induced by emotional arousal can flip to enhancement when preceding neutral items are prioritized in top-down attention. Whether β-adrenoreceptors also contribute to this retrograde memory enhancement of goal-relevant neutral stimuli is unclear. In this pharmacological study, we administered 40mg of propranolol or 40mg of placebo to healthy young adults to examine whether emotional arousal's bidirectional effects on declarative memory relies on β-adrenoreceptor activation. Following pill intake, participants completed an emotional oddball task in which they were asked to prioritize a neutral object appearing just before an emotional or neutral oddball image within a sequence of 7 neutral objects. Under placebo, emotional oddballs impaired memory for lower priority oddball+1 objects but had no effect on memory for high priority oddball-1 objects. Propranolol blocked this anterograde amnesic effect of arousal. Emotional oddballs also enhanced selective memory trade-offs significantly more in the placebo than drug condition, such that high priority oddball-1 objects were more likely to be remembered at the cost of their corresponding lower priority oddball+1 objects under arousal. Lastly, those who recalled more high priority oddball-1 objects preceding an emotional versus neutral oddball image showed greater increases in salivary alpha-amylase, a biomarker of noradrenergic system activation, across the task. Together these findings suggest that different noradrenergic mechanisms contribute to the anterograde and retrograde mnemonic effects of arousal on proximal neutral memoranda.

Psychophysiological arousal and inter- and intraindividual differences in risk-sensitive decision making

The current study assessed peripheral responses during decision making under explicit risk, and tested whether intraindividual variability in choice behavior can be explained by fluctuations in peripheral arousal. Electrodermal activity (EDA) and heart rate (HR) were monitored in healthy volunteers (N = 68) during the Roulette Betting Task. In this task, participants were presented with risky gambles to bet on, with the chances of winning varying across trials. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses demonstrated that EDA and HR acceleration responses during the decision phase were sensitive to the chances of winning. Interindividual differences in this peripheral reactivity during risky decision making were related to trait sensitivity to punishment and trait sensitivity to reward. Moreover, trial-by-trial variation in EDA and HR acceleration responses predicted a small portion of intraindividual variability in betting choices. Our results show that psychophysiological responses are sensitive to explicit risk and can help explain intraindividual heterogeneity in choice behavior.

Emotional arousal predicts intertemporal choice

People generally prefer immediate rewards to rewards received after a delay, often even when the delayed reward is larger. This phenomenon is known as temporal discounting. It has been suggested that preferences for immediate rewards may be due to their being more concrete than delayed rewards. This concreteness may evoke an enhanced emotional response. Indeed, manipulating the representation of a future reward to make it more concrete has been shown to heighten the reward's subjective emotional intensity, making people more likely to choose it. Here the authors use an objective measure of arousal-pupil dilation-to investigate if emotional arousal mediates the influence of delayed reward concreteness on choice. They recorded pupil dilation responses while participants made choices between immediate and delayed rewards. They manipulated concreteness through time interval framing: delayed rewards were presented either with the date on which they would be received (e.g., "$30, May 3"; DATE condition, more concrete) or in terms of delay to receipt (e.g., "$30, 7 days; DAYS condition, less concrete). Contrary to prior work, participants were not overall more patient in the DATE condition. However, there was individual variability in response to time framing, and this variability was predicted by differences in pupil dilation between conditions. Emotional arousal increased as the subjective value of delayed rewards increased, and predicted choice of the delayed reward on each trial. This study advances our understanding of the role of emotion in temporal discounting. (PsycINFO Database Record

Emotion-induced loss aversion and striatal-amygdala coupling in low-anxious individuals

Adapting behavior to changes in the environment is a crucial ability for survival but such adaptation varies widely across individuals. Here, we asked how humans alter their economic decision-making in response to emotional cues, and whether this is related to trait anxiety. Developing an emotional decision-making task for functional magnetic resonance imaging, in which gambling decisions were preceded by emotional and non-emotional primes, we assessed emotional influences on loss aversion, the tendency to overweigh potential monetary losses relative to gains. Our behavioral results revealed that only low-anxious individuals exhibited increased loss aversion under emotional conditions. This emotional modulation of decision-making was accompanied by a corresponding emotion-elicited increase in amygdala-striatal functional connectivity, which correlated with the behavioral effect across participants. Consistent with prior reports of ‘neural loss aversion’, both amygdala and ventral striatum tracked losses more strongly than gains, and amygdala loss aversion signals were exaggerated by emotion, suggesting a potential role for this structure in integrating value and emotion cues. Increased loss aversion and striatal-amygdala coupling induced by emotional cues may reflect the engagement of adaptive harm-avoidance mechanisms in low-anxious individuals, possibly promoting resilience to psychopathology.

The Malleability of Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal choices are ubiquitous: people often have to choose between outcomes realized at different times. Although it is generally believed that people have stable tendencies toward being impulsive or patient, an emerging body of evidence indicates that intertemporal choice is malleable and can be profoundly influenced by context. How the choice is framed, or the state of the decision-maker at the time of choice, can induce a shift in preference. Framing effects are underpinned by allocation of attention to choice attributes, reference dependence, and time construal. Incidental affective states and prospection also influence intertemporal choice. We advocate that intertemporal choice models account for these context effects, and encourage the use of this knowledge to nudge people toward making more advantageous choices.