B or 13? Unconscious Top-Down Contextual Effects at the Categorical but Not the Lexical Level

Semantic priming modulates the strength and direction of the Kanizsa illusion

Visual illusions are considered key examples for cognitive impenetrability, as they are held not to be affected by non-perceptual processes. We revisit this claim in five experiments (N = 1148; four preregistered) focused on the Kanizsa illusion, where a nonexistent shape is experienced within illusory contours. Pac-Man-like shapes inducing the illusion were presented after primes that were either semantically related to the Pac-Man game or not. We hypothesized that semantic primes would promote interpreting the shapes as individual Pac-Man characters, thus biasing participants away from the holistic Kanizsa illusion. Indeed, we found that the Kanizsa shape was detected less when participants were primed with Pac-Man-related stimuli. We then also demonstrated the opposite effect: a prime indexing the illusory shape ("Triangle") enhanced the probability of seeing the illusion. Together, our results suggest that semantic priming can both reduce and increase the probability of experiencing the Kanizsa illusion, thus supporting claims of cognitive penetrability.

Context-Sensitive Conscious Interpretation and Layer-5 Pyramidal Neurons in Multistable Perception

INTRODUCTION

There appears to be a fundamental difference between the two ways of how an object becomes perceptually experienced. One occurs when preconscious object-specifying sensory data processing crosses a certain threshold so that sensory constituents of object depiction become consciously experienced. The other occurs when the already consciously experienced sensory features of the object become interpreted as belonging to a certain visual object category. Surprisingly, experimental facts about neural markers of conscious access gathered so far do not allow us to distinguish mechanisms responsible for these two varieties.

METHODS

A cortical multicompartment layer-5 pyramidal neuron-based generic processing model is presented in order to conceptualize a possible mechanistic solution for the explanatory cul-de-sac. To support the argument, a review of pertinent research is compiled as associated with data from studies where physically invariant perceptual stimuli have underwent alternative interpretation(s) by the brain.

RESULTS

Recent developments in the newly emerging field of cellular psycho(physio)logy are introduced, offering a hypothetical solution for distinguishing the mechanisms subserving sensory content experience and conscious interpretation.

CONCLUSION

The multicompartment single cell-based mechanistic approach to brain process correlates of conscious perception appears to have an added value beyond the traditional inter-areal connectivity-based theoretical stances.

In Search of an Integrative Method to Study Unconscious Processing: An Application of Bayesian and General Recognition Theory Models to the Processing of Hierarchical Patterns in the Absence of Awareness

The dissociation between conscious and unconscious perception is one of the most relevant issues in the study of human cognition. While there is evidence suggesting that some stimuli might be unconsciously processed up to its meaning (e.g., high-level stimulus processing), some authors claim that most results on the processing of subliminal stimuli can be explained by a mixture of methodological artefacts and questionable assumptions about what can be considered non-conscious. Particularly, one of the most controversial topics involves the method by which the awareness of the stimuli is assessed. To address this question, we introduced an integrative approach to assess the extent to which masked hierarchical stimuli (i.e., global shapes composed of local elements) can be processed in the absence of awareness. We combined a priming task where participants had to report global or local shapes, with the use of subjective and objective awareness measures collected either in a separate block (offline), or trial-by-trial during the main task (online). The unconscious processing of the masked primes was then evaluated through two different novel model-based methods: a Bayesian and a General Recognition Theory modeling approach. Despite the high correlation between awareness measures, our results show that the use of alternative approaches based on different theoretical assumptions leads to diverging conclusions about the extent of the unconscious processing of the masked primes.

Visual imagination can influence visual perception - towards an experimental paradigm to measure imagination

During visual imagination, a perceptual representation is activated in the absence of sensory input. This is sometimes described as seeing with the mind's eye. A number of physiological studies indicate that the brain uses more or less the same neural resources for visual perception of sensory information and visual imagination. The intensity of visual imagination is typically assessed with questionnaires, while more objective measures are missing. Aim of the present study was, to test a new experimental paradigm that may allow to objectively quantify imagination. For this, we used priming and adaptation effects during observation of ambiguous figures. Our perception of an ambiguous stimulus is unstable and alternates spontaneously between two possible interpretations. If we first observe an unambiguous stimulus variant (the conditioning stimulus), the subsequently presented ambiguous stimulus can either be perceived in the same way as the test stimulus (priming effect) or in the opposite way (adaptation effect) as a function of the conditioning time. We tested for these conditioning effects (priming and adaptation) using an ambiguous Necker Cube and an ambiguous Letter /Number stimulus as test stimuli and unambiguous variants thereof as conditioning stimuli. In a second experimental condition, we tested whether the previous imagination of an unambiguous conditioning stimulus variant - instead of its observation - can have similar conditioning effects on the subsequent test stimulus. We found no systematic conditioning effect on the group level, neither for the two stimulus types (Necker Cube stimuli and Letter /Number stimuli) nor for the two conditions (Real and Imaginary). However, significant correlations between effects of Real and Imaginary Condition were observed for both stimulus types. The absence of conditioning effects at the group level may be explained by using only one conditioning time, which may fit with individual priming and adaptation constants of some of our participants but not of others. Our strong correlation results indicate that observers with clear conditioning effects have about the same type (priming or adaptation) and intensity of imaginary conditioning effects. As a consequence, not only past perceptual experiences but also past imaginations can influence our current percepts. This is further confirmation that the mechanisms underlying perception and imagination are similar. Our post-hoc qualitative observations from three self-defined aphantasic observers indicate that our paradigm may be a promising objective measure to identify aphantasia.

Awareness is needed for contextual effects in ambiguous object recognition

Despite its centrality to human experience, the functional role of conscious awareness is not yet known. One hypothesis suggests that consciousness is necessary for allowing high-level information to refine low-level processing in a "top-down" manner. To test this hypothesis, in this work we examined whether consciousness is needed for integrating contextual information with sensory information during visual object recognition, a case of top-down processing that is automatic and ubiquitous to our daily visual experience. In three experiments, 137 participants were asked to determine the identity of an ambiguous object presented to them. Crucially, a scene biasing the interpretation of the object towards one option over another (e.g., a picture of a tree when the object could equally be perceived as a fish or a leaf) was presented either before, after, or alongside the ambiguous object. In all three experiments, the scene biased perception of the ambiguous object when it was consciously perceived, but not when it was processed unconsciously. The results therefore suggest that conscious awareness may be needed for top-down contextual processes.

The reach of reactivation: Effects of consciously triggered versus unconsciously triggered reactivation of associative memory

Consolidating memories for long-term storage depends on reactivation. Reactivation occurs both consciously, during wakefulness, and unconsciously, during wakefulness and sleep. While considerable work has examined conscious awake and unconscious sleep reactivation, in this study, we directly compare the consequences of conscious and unconscious reactivation during wakefulness. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., fruits, vehicles) such that we could examine consequences of reactivation on semantically related memories. After an intensive learning protocol, we systematically reactivated some of the triads by presenting the adjective as a cue. Reactivation was done so that it was consciously experienced for some triads, and only unconsciously processed for others. Memory for spatial positions, the most distal part of the association, was affected by reactivation in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. Conscious reactivation resulted in weakening of semantically related memories that were strong initially, resonating with prior findings of retrieval-induced forgetting. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, selectively benefited weak reactivated memories, as previously shown for reactivation during sleep. Semantically linked memories were not impaired, but rather were integrated with the reactivated memory. These results taken together demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation have qualitatively different consequences. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, whereby unconscious reactivation entails less inhibition than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of conscious experience in memory storage and structuring.

Progressing, not regressing: A possible solution to the problem of regression to the mean in unconscious processing studies

How convincing is current evidence for unconscious processing? Recently, a major criticism suggested that some, if not much, of this evidence might be explained by a mere statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean (RttM). Excluding participants based on an awareness assessment is a common practice in studies of unconscious processing, and this post hoc data selection might lead to false effects that are driven by RttM for aware participants wrongfully classified as unaware. Here, we examined this criticism using both simulations and data from 12 studies probing unconscious processing (35 effects overall). In line with the original criticism, we confirmed that the reliability of awareness measures in the field is concerningly low. Yet, using simulations, we showed that reliability measures might be unsuitable for estimating error in awareness measures. Furthermore, we examined other solutions for assessing whether an effect is genuine or reflects RttM; all suffered from substantial limitations, such as a lack of specificity to unconscious processing, lack of power, or unjustified assumptions. Accordingly, we suggest a new nonparametric solution, which enjoys high specificity and relatively high power. Together, this work emphasizes the need to account for measurement error in awareness measures and evaluate its consequences for unconscious processing effects. It further suggests a way to meet the important challenge posed by RttM, in an attempt to establish a reliable and robust corpus of knowledge in studying unconscious processing.

The reach of reactivation: Effects of consciously-triggered versus unconsciously-triggered reactivation of associative memory

Newly formed memories are not passively stored for future retrieval; rather, they are reactivated offline and thereby strengthened and transformed. However, reactivation is not a uniform process: it occurs throughout different states of consciousness, including conscious rehearsal during wakefulness and unconscious processing during both wakefulness and sleep. In this study, we explore the consequences of reactivation during conscious and unconscious awake states. Forty-one participants learned associations consisting of adjective-object-position triads. Objects were clustered into distinct semantic groups (e.g., multiple fruits, vehicles, musical instruments) which allowed us to examine the consequences of reactivation on semantically-related memories. After an extensive learning phase, some triads were reactivated consciously, through cued retrieval, or unconsciously, through subliminal priming. In both conditions, the adjective was used as the cue. Reactivation impacted memory for the most distal association (i.e., the spatial position of associated objects) in a consciousness-dependent and memory-strength-dependent manner. First, conscious reactivation of a triad resulted in a weakening of other semantically related memories, but only those that were initially more accurate (i.e., memories with lower pre-reactivation spatial errors). This is similar to what has been previously demonstrated in studies employing retrieval-induced forgetting designs. Unconscious reactivation, on the other hand, benefited memory selectively for weak cued items. Semantically linked associations were not impaired, but rather integrated with the reactivated memory. Taken together, our results demonstrate that conscious and unconscious reactivation of memories during wakefulness have qualitatively different consequences on memory for distal associations. Effects are memory-strength-dependent, as has been shown for reactivation during sleep. Results support a consciousness-dependent inhibition account, according to which unconscious reactivation involves less inhibitory dynamics than conscious reactivation, thus allowing more liberal spread of activation. Our findings set the stage for additional exploration into the role of consciousness in memory structuring.

Scientific Research Conformity of University Teachers: Role of Incentives and Internal Attribution

Background: Conformity is a process by which a person changes his original idea and attitude in response to group pressure and chooses to be consistent with the majority. The study was undertaken to explore university teachers’ scientific research conformity (SRC), the psychological process of information processing and the types of internal attribution in SRC, and the relationship between SRC incentives and types of internal attribution. Method: A survey of 349 teachers from seven universities was conducted. We employed the mixed-method approach; data was collected through in-depth interviews and were analyzed using AMOS. Results: In-depth interviews revealed that the basic principle of human organizational behavior is conformity with incentive, and conformity is a motivational behavior produced through psychological processing of social information. Factor analysis results revealed that teachers’ SRC is characterized by abidance, compliance, and obedience. The internal incentives mainly affect abidance, and have a significant impact on obedience and compliance; the environmental incentives mainly affect abidance, and have a significant impact on obedience. Family and social relationship incentives mainly affect compliance, but social relationship incentives also have a significant impact on obedience. Additionally, policy incentives have a highly significant impact on obedience. Conclusions: This study provides first-hand empirical data for studies pertaining to research motivation and SRC behavior of Chinese university teachers. It also provides a theoretical basis for subsequent research on conformity behavior.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.

The Challenge of Inferring Unconscious Mental Processes

Studies of unconscious mental processes often compare a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with a measure of awareness (e.g., a verbal report or forced-choice response) of the critical cue or contingency taken either concurrently or separately. The resulting patterns of bivariate data across participants lend themselves to several analytic approaches for inferring the existence of unconscious mental processes, but it is rare for researchers to consider the underlying generative processes that might cause these patterns. We show that bivariate data are generally insufficient to discriminate single-process models, with a unitary latent process determining both performance and awareness, from dual-process models, comprising distinct latent processes for performance and awareness. Future research attempting to isolate and investigate unconscious processes will need to employ richer types of data and analyses.

Interaction Between Conscious and Unconscious Information-Processing of Faces and Words

It is widely acknowledged that holistic processing is a key characteristic of face perception. Although holistic processing implies the automatic integration of face parts, it is unclear whether such processing requires the awareness of face parts. Here, we investigated the interactions between visible face parts and face parts rendered invisible using continuous flash suppression (CFS). In the first experiment with the upper half-face visible and the lower half-face invisible, the results showed that perceived face identity was influenced by the invisible lower half-face, suggesting that integration occurs between the visible and invisible face parts, a variant of the "composite face effect". In the second experiment, we investigated the influence of visible face parts on the processing of invisible face parts, as measured by the time it took for the invisible parts to break out from CFS. The results showed a visible-to-invisible facilitation effect, that the aligned invisible face parts broke through CFS faster than when the visible and invisible face parts were misaligned. Visible eyes had a stronger influence on the invisible nose/mouth than the other way around. Such facilitation of processing from visible to invisible parts was also found when Chinese characters were used as stimuli. These results show that information integration occurs across the consciousness boundary.

Correlation analysis to investigate unconscious mental processes: A critical appraisal and mini-tutorial

As a method to investigate the scope of unconscious mental processes, researchers frequently obtain concurrent measures of task performance and stimulus awareness across participants. Even though both measures might be significantly greater than zero, the correlation between them might not, encouraging the inference that an unconscious process drives task performance. We highlight the pitfalls of this null-correlation approach and provide a mini-tutorial on ways to avoid them. As reference, we use a recent study by Salvador et al. (2018) reporting a non-significant correlation between the extent to which memory was suppressed by a Think/No-Think cue and an index of cue awareness. In the Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) framework, it is inappropriate to interpret failure to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., correlation = 0) as evidence for the null. Furthermore, psychological measures are often unreliable, which can dramatically attenuate the size of observed correlations. A Bayesian approach can circumvent both problems and compare the extent to which the data provide evidence for the null versus the alternative hypothesis (i.e., correlation > 0), while considering the usually low reliabilities of the variables. Applied to Salvador et al.'s data, this approach indicates no to moderate support for the claimed unconscious nature of participants' memory-suppression performance-depending on the model of the alternative hypothesis. Hence, more reliable data are needed. When analyzing correlational data, we recommend researchers to employ the Bayesian methods developed here (and made freely available as R scripts), rather than standard NHST methods, to take account of unreliability.

Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on - or at least goes hand in hand with - conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.