Posthumous Reproduction: A Consideration of the Medical, Ethical, Cultural, Psychosocial and Legal Perspectives in the New Zealand Context

Posthumous conception in Australia - legal and ethical considerations

Posthumous conception, the ability to conceive a child after the death of one partner, is increasingly prevalent due to advances in Artificial Reproduction Technology (ART). This paper considers the complexities surrounding the practice in Australia, focusing primarily on the ethical and legal dimensions. It observes that state-based regulations in Australia create disparities in accessibility: some states prohibit the procedure without the deceased's written consent, while others permit it based on guidelines or lack explicit prohibitions. Addressing the juxtaposition of Will Theory and Interest Theory, it emphasises the ongoing debate on whether rights, particularly reproductive autonomy, outlive a person's demise. Finally, the paper highlights an evident inconsistency in Australian legislation and promotes a uniform approach across states.

Blurring the line between life and death: a review of the psychological and ethical concerns related to posthumous-assisted reproduction

Posthumous-assisted reproduction (PAR), though viewed unfavourably by some, is desirable to many individuals whose partners die prior to the completion of family building. PAR is technically feasible for males and females both pre- and post-mortem and these procedures have previously been completed on numerous occasions. However, such treatment is associated with three primary ethical concerns: autonomy; beneficence; and justice for the living, the deceased, and the soon-to-be conceived. Further, there are many psychological risks of PAR which may affect all involved parties. As such, early psychological counselling of patients and surviving family members is warranted.

Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in Cases of Death Caused by Sudden Trauma

The deceased's prior consent to posthumous reproduction is a common requirement in many common law jurisdictions. This paper critically evaluates four arguments advanced to justify the presumption against consent. It is argued that, in situations where death is caused by sudden trauma, not only is there inadequate justification for the presumption against consent, but there are good reasons to reverse the presumption. The article concludes that the precondition of prior consent may be inappropriate in these situations.