Challenges to reasoning in forensic science decisions

The success of forensic science depends heavily on human reasoning abilities. Although we typically navigate our lives well using those abilities, decades of psychological science research shows that human reasoning is not always rational. In addition, forensic science often demands that its practitioners reason in non-natural ways. This article addresses how characteristics of human reasoning (either specific to an individual or in general) and characteristics of situations (either specific to a case or in general in a lab) can contribute to errors before, during, or after forensic analyses. In feature comparison judgments, such as fingerprints or firearms, a main challenge is to avoid biases from extraneous knowledge or arising from the comparison method itself. In causal and process judgments, for example fire scenes or pathology, a main challenge is to keep multiple potential hypotheses open as the investigation continues. Considering the contributions to forensic science judgments by persons, situations, and their interaction, reveals ways to develop procedures to decrease errors and improve accuracy.

Evaluating arguments during instigations of defence motivation and accuracy motivation

When people evaluate the strength of an argument, their motivations are likely to influence the evaluation. However, few studies have specifically investigated the influences of motivational factors on argument evaluation. This study examined the effects of defence and accuracy motivations on argument evaluation. According to the compatibility between the advocated positions of arguments and participants' prior beliefs and the objective strength of arguments, participants evaluated four types of arguments: compatible-strong, compatible-weak, incompatible-strong, and incompatible-weak arguments. Experiment 1 revealed that participants possessing a high defence motivation rated compatible-weak arguments as stronger and incompatible-strong ones as weaker than participants possessing a low defence motivation. However, the strength ratings between the high and low defence groups regarding both compatible-strong and incompatible-weak arguments were similar. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants possessed a high accuracy motivation, they rated compatible-weak arguments as weaker and incompatible-strong ones as stronger than when they possessed a low accuracy motivation. However, participants' ratings on both compatible-strong and incompatible-weak arguments were similar when comparing high and low accuracy conditions. The results suggest that defence and accuracy motivations are two major motives influencing argument evaluation. However, they primarily influence the evaluation results for compatible-weak and incompatible-strong arguments, but not for compatible-strong and incompatible-weak arguments.

A Short (Personal) Future History of Revolution 2.0

Crisis of replicability is one term that psychological scientists use for the current introspective phase we are in—I argue instead that we are going through a revolution analogous to a political revolution. Revolution 2.0 is an uprising focused on how we should be doing science now (i.e., in a 2.0 world). The precipitating events of the revolution have already been well-documented: failures to replicate, questionable research practices, fraud, etc. And the fact that none of these events is new to our field has also been well-documented. I suggest four interconnected reasons as to why this time is different: changing technology, changing demographics of researchers, limited resources, and misaligned incentives. I then describe two reasons why the revolution is more likely to catch on this time: technology (as part of the solution) and the fact that these concerns cut across social and life sciences—that is, we are not alone. Neither side in the revolution has behaved well, and each has characterized the other in extreme terms (although, of course, each has had a few extreme actors). Some suggested reforms are already taking hold (e.g., journals asking for more transparency in methods and analysis decisions; journals publishing replications) but the feared tyrannical requirements have, of course, not taken root (e.g., few journals require open data; there is no ban on exploratory analyses). Still, we have not yet made needed advances in the ways in which we accumulate, connect, and extract conclusions from our aggregated research. However, we are now ready to move forward by adopting incremental changes and by acknowledging the multiplicity of goals within psychological science.

Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Depression: The Integrated Perspective

Social psychologists fighting prejudice and clinical psychologists fighting depression have long been separated by the social-clinical divide, unaware that they were facing a common enemy. Stereotypes about others leading to prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989) and schemas about the self leading to depression (e.g., A. T. Beck, 1967) are fundamentally the same type of cognitive structure. According to the integrated perspective on prejudice and depression, negative stereotypes (i.e., schemas) are activated in a Source, who expresses prejudice toward the Target, causing the Target to experience depression. This linking of prejudice and depression (i.e., "comorbid" prejudice and depression) can occur at the societal level (e.g., Nazis' prejudice causing Jews' depression), the interpersonal level (e.g., an abuser's prejudice causing an abusee's depression), and the intrapersonal level (e.g., a person's self-prejudice causing his or her depression). The integrated perspective addresses several longstanding paradoxes, controversies, and questions; generates new areas of inquiry; and spotlights specific methods and findings that have direct cross-disciplinary applications in the battle against prejudice and depression. Ironically, some interventions developed by depression researchers may be especially useful against prejudice, and some interventions developed by prejudice researchers may be especially useful against depression.

Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.

Where the wild things are: informal experience and ecological reasoning

Category-based induction requires selective use of different relations to guide inferences; this article examines the development of inferences based on ecological relations among living things. Three hundred and forty-six 6-, 8-, and 10-year-old children from rural, suburban, and urban communities projected novel diseases or insides from one species to an ecologically or taxonomically related species; they were also surveyed about hobbies and activities. Frequency of ecological inferences increased with age and with reports of informal exploration of nature, and decreased with population density. By age 10, children preferred taxonomic inferences for insides and ecological inferences for disease, but this pattern emerged earlier among rural children. These results underscore the importance of context by demonstrating effects of both domain-relevant experience and environment on biological reasoning.

Much Pain, Little Gain? Paradigm-Specific Models and Methods in Experimental Psychology

Paradigm-oriented research strategies in experimental psychology have strengths and limitations. On the one hand, experimental paradigms play a crucial epistemic and heuristic role in basic psychological research. On the other hand, empirical research is often limited to the observed effects in a certain paradigm, and theoretical models are frequently tied to the particular features of the given paradigm. A paradigm-driven research strategy therefore jeopardizes the pursuit of research questions and theoretical models that go beyond a specific paradigm. As one example of a more integrative approach, recent research on illusory and spurious correlations has attempted to overcome the limitations of paradigm-specific models in the context of biased contingency perception and social stereotyping. Last but not least, the use of statistical models for the analysis of elementary cognitive functions is a means toward a more integrative terminology and theoretical perspective across different experimental paradigms and research domains.