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Weinstein NY, Baldwin DA. The many faces of moralized self-control: Puritanical morality is not reducible to cooperation concerns. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e320. [PMID: 37789555 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x23000419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/05/2023]
Abstract
Fitouchi et al.'s moral disciplining approach highlights the significant role social evaluations of self-control appear to play in human moral judgment. At the same time, attributing the wide range of puritanical concerns to a singular focus on self-control seems unwarranted. A more pluralistic approach would enrich understanding of moral judgment in all its cultural and historical diversity.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Dare A Baldwin
- Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA ,
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2
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Kollareth D, Russell JA. Purity is not a distinct moral domain. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e308. [PMID: 37789525 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x23000365] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/05/2023]
Abstract
Purity violations overlap with other moral domains. They are not uniquely characterized by hypothesized markers of purity - the witness's emotion of disgust, taint to perpetrator's soul, or the diminished role of intention in moral judgment. Thus, Fitouchi et al.'s proposition that puritanical morality (a subset of violations in the purity domain) is part of cooperation-based morality is an important advance.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dolichan Kollareth
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA.
| | - James A Russell
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA.
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3
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Just wrong? Or just WEIRD? Investigating the prevalence of moral dumbfounding in non-Western samples. Mem Cognit 2023:10.3758/s13421-022-01386-z. [PMID: 36650349 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-022-01386-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 12/14/2022] [Indexed: 01/18/2023]
Abstract
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide a reason for this judgment. Dumbfounded responding may include admitting to not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations ("It's just wrong") as justification for a judgment. Published evidence for dumbfounding has drawn exclusively on samples of WEIRD backgrounds (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic), and it remains unclear to what extent the phenomenon is generalizable to other populations. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of moral dumbfounding have been disputed in recent years. In three studies we apply a standardized moral dumbfounding task, and show evidence for moral dumbfounding in a Chinese sample (Study 1, N = 165), an Indian sample (Study 2, N = 181), and a mixed sample primarily (but not exclusively) from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA region, Study 3, N = 264). These findings are consistent with a categorization theories of moral judgment.
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Giarratana AO, Kaliuzhna M, Kaiser S, Tobler PN. Adaptive coding occurs in object categorization and may not be associated with schizotypal personality traits. Sci Rep 2022; 12:19385. [PMID: 36371534 PMCID: PMC9653375 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-24127-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/08/2022] [Accepted: 11/10/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Processing more likely inputs with higher sensitivity (adaptive coding) enables the brain to represent the large range of inputs coming in from the world. Healthy individuals high in schizotypy show reduced adaptive coding in the reward domain but it is an open question whether these deficits extend to non-motivational domains, such as object categorization. Here, we develop a novel variant of a classic task to test range adaptation for face/house categorization in healthy participants on the psychosis spectrum. In each trial of this task, participants decide whether a presented image is a face or a house. Images vary on a face-house continuum and appear in both wide and narrow range blocks. The wide range block includes most of the face-house continuum (2.50-97.5% face), while the narrow range blocks limit inputs to a smaller section of the continuum (27.5-72.5% face). Adaptive coding corresponds to better performance for the overlapping smaller section of the continuum in the narrow range than in the wide range block. We find that participants show efficient use of the range in this task, with more accurate responses in the overlapping section for the narrow range blocks relative to the wide range blocks. However, we find little evidence that range adaptation in our object categorization task is reduced in healthy individuals scoring high on schizotypy. Thus, reduced range adaptation may not be a domain-general feature of schizotypy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anna O. Giarratana
- grid.7400.30000 0004 1937 0650Zurich Center for Neuroeconomics, Department of Economics, University of Zurich University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland
| | - Mariia Kaliuzhna
- grid.150338.c0000 0001 0721 9812Division of Adult Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Stefan Kaiser
- grid.150338.c0000 0001 0721 9812Division of Adult Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Philippe N. Tobler
- grid.7400.30000 0004 1937 0650Zurich Center for Neuroeconomics, Department of Economics, University of Zurich University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland
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Allam A, Kollareth D, Russell JA. On judging the morality of suicide. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104384] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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An exploration of the structure of moral intuitions in early adolescence. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2022.101248] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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Kollareth D, Russell JA. When judging purity norm violations, the perpetrator's intention matters. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2876] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Dolichan Kollareth
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience Boston College Chestnut Hill USA
| | - James A. Russell
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience Boston College Chestnut Hill USA
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McHugh C, Griffin SM, McGrath MJ, Rhee JJ, Maher PJ, McCashin D, Roth J. Moral Identity Predicts Adherence to COVID-19 Mitigation Procedures Depending on Political Ideology: A Comparison Between the USA and New Zealand. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022; 44:POPS12838. [PMID: 35941919 PMCID: PMC9349772 DOI: 10.1111/pops.12838] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
Reducing the spread of infectious viruses (e.g., COVID-19) can depend on societal compliance with effective mitigations. Identifying factors that influence adherence can inform public policy. In many cases, public health messaging has become highly moralized, focusing on the need to act for the greater good. In such contexts, a person's moral identity may influence behavior and serve to increase compliance through different mechanisms: if a person sees compliance as the right thing to do (internalization) and/or if a person perceives compliance as something others will notice as the right thing to do (symbolization). We argue that in societies that are more politically polarized, people's political ideology may interact with their moral identity to predict compliance. We hypothesized that where polarization is high (e.g., USA), moral identity should positively predict compliance for liberals to a greater extent than for conservatives. However, this effect would not occur where polarization is low (e.g., New Zealand). Moral identity, political ideology, and support for three different COVID-19 mitigation measures were assessed in both nations (N = 1,980). Results show that while moral identity can influence compliance, the political context of the nation must also be taken into account.
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Sackris D, Larsen RR. The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications. PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2056437] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- David Sackris
- Philosophy Department, Arapahoe Community College, Philosophy, Littleton, Colorado United States
| | - Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
- Departments of Philosophy and Forensic Science, University of Toronto - Mississauga, Philosophy, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada
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Royzman EB, Borislow SH. The puzzle of wrongless harms: Some potential concerns for dyadic morality and related accounts. Cognition 2022; 220:104980. [PMID: 34990961 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104980] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2021] [Revised: 11/21/2021] [Accepted: 11/30/2021] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
There is wide-ranging consensus that harm or perceptions of harm play a significant role in judgments of moral wrongdoing. On one prominent view, the pattern that makes up the "essence" (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012) of acts of moral wrongdoing is "harm caused by an agent" (Schein, Goranson, & Gray, 2015, p. 983). According to Gray, Schein, and colleagues, events matching this pattern-a thinking/intentional agent inflicting some manner of harm (i.e., emotional/physical pain) upon a suffering patient-will be perceived as immoral. With this proposal in mind, we argue two basic points: (1) the current specification of the dyadic template would need to be further refined or "fortified" to withstand some obvious counter-examples; (2) this "fortified" formulation is still unfit to address the underlying concern: for any general pattern that is supposed to link perceptions of harm and wrongdoing, there are a number of cases (the "wrongless harms" of the title) that match the pattern quite well but are not viewed as immoral. We show this in four studies and one supplementary study. In our original study, we find, across six vignettes, that people may judge a behavior to be intended, self-serving, as well as foreseeably harmful and yet not judge it immoral. In our subsequent studies, we replicate these results with further checks and controls. With these findings in mind, we argue that moral cognition is far too complex and capricious to be reduced to a template.
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Affiliation(s)
- Edward B Royzman
- Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA; Master of Behavioral and Decision Sciences Program, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA.
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Generic learning mechanisms can drive social inferences: The role of type frequency. Mem Cognit 2022; 50:1694-1705. [PMID: 35426069 PMCID: PMC9768010 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-022-01286-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 01/31/2022] [Indexed: 12/30/2022]
Abstract
How do we form opinions about typical and morally acceptable behavior in other social groups despite variability in behavior? Similar learning problems arise during language acquisition, where learners need to infer grammatical rules (e.g., the walk/walk-ed past-tense) despite frequent exceptions (e.g., the go/went alternation). Such rules need to occur with many different words to be learned (i.e., they need a high type frequency). In contrast, frequent individual words do not lead to learning. Here, we ask whether similar principles govern social learning. Participants read a travel journal where a traveler observed behaviors in different imaginary cities. The behaviors were performed once by many distinct actors (high type frequency) or frequently by a single actor (low type frequency), and could be good, neutral or bad. We then asked participants how morally acceptable the behavior was (in general or for the visited city), and how widespread it was in that city. We show that an ideal observer model estimating the prevalence of behaviors is only sensitive to the behaviors' type frequency, but not to how often they are performed. Empirically, participants rated high type frequency behaviors as more morally acceptable more prevalent than low type frequency behaviors. They also rated good behaviors as more acceptable and prevalent than neutral or bad behaviors. These results suggest that generic learning mechanisms and epistemic biases constrain social learning, and that type frequency can drive inferences about groups. To combat stereotypes, high type frequency behaviors might thus be more effective than frequently appearing individual role models.
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Imagining our moral values in the present and future. Behav Brain Sci 2022; 45:e308. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x21002156] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Imaginary worlds allow us to safely develop, crystallize, and criticize our moral values – at times even serving as catalysts for change in the real world. Fans of imaginary worlds sometimes form groups to advocate for social change in the real world, and it is part of Leftist ideology to imagine radically different, possible futures aligned around shared moral values.
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